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This thesis offers an original theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments 
based on the Francophone interpretation of the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. 
Recently Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf have argued that practical 
philosophers must direct more attention to how our passionate attachments radically 
affect our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. By neglecting this topic, 
these thinkers argue, we overlook some of the strongest and most distinctively human 
motivations that guide our practical lives, ones that have a powerful effect on our capacity 
to flourish. Not only should philosophers explain how our moral obligations and 
prudential concerns guide our conduct, they should also explain how and why we are 
guided by deep-seated passionate attachments, considerations that Frankfurt, Williams, 
and Wolf argue provide the conditions for leading a life with a sense of meaning and 
purpose. 
 
Despite viewing passionate attachments as being vitally important, Frankfurt, Williams, 
and Wolf offer separate accounts of either (i) why we cannot actively cultivate them, or (ii) 
why we cannot form a philosophical theory of doing so. If there is a way in which we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments, then these thinkers argue that we must look outside 
philosophy: to the contingency of personal preference, to self-help instruction manuals, to 
guidance from religious traditions, or in extremis to clinical psychology. My study aims to 
show that this attitude is overly pessimistic. Not only do we have reason to view 
passionate attachments as susceptible to growth, change, and improvement, but we 
should view these entities as amenable to self-cultivation. Only by understanding this 
process can we construct a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments.  
 
Focusing on Pierre Hadot’s and Michel Foucault’s respective accounts of Hellenistic self-
cultivation, provides vital conceptual tools to formulate a theory of cultivating our 
passionate attachments. First, their accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation offer the 
conceptual resources for a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments. Second, the exercises of self-cultivation they focus on allow us to outline a 
practical method though which we can cultivate our passionate character. This takes the 
exercises of self-cultivation beyond their historical use, as well as beyond their role in the 
respective projects of these Francophone thinkers. Doing this brings out a significantly 
new dimension to the role of the passionate attachments in the flourishing life: not only 
are they valuable in the way Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf suggest, but we can offer 
theoretical and practical accounts how we can cultivate them based on the Hellenistic 





































































That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. 
 

































       Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments 





I.   Prospects For a Theory of Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments   
 
Aristotle tells us that philosophy can be divided into the ‘speculative, practical, and 
productive’, but this tripartite division has long since been replaced by numerous 
specialisms and subdivisions in modern-day philosophy departments (1984 [Topics]: 
145a15–6). Regarding the practical branch of philosophy, Aristotle views it as comprising 
both ethics and politics, along with what many philosophers now consider to be moral 
philosophy, which some have argued is best viewed as a subcategory of the ethical sphere. 
Moving boundary stones always has an effect on what they demarcate, of course, and the 
historical Aristotle would surely have raised an eyebrow at how his expansive conception 
of practical philosophy has now been cleanly divided into the two disciplines of politics 
and ethics with the latter being increasingly occupied with the intellectual concerns of what 
I follow Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential formulation in terming ‘modern moral 
philosophy’ (1958: 1). Not only would most practical philosophers working in the 
Anglophone world most readily identify as ‘moral philosophers’, but the apparatus of the 
modern philosophy department is solidly geared to reinforce this. Students can opt for 
courses in moral philosophy, permanent chairs of moral philosophy have been long 
established, and these self-described moral philosophers belong to societies and publish in 
journals, which all define themselves – at least in name – as moral philosophy.1   
                                               
1 Philosophers sometimes distinguish between ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ to carve practical philosophy 
into a narrower and wider sense. On this view, the term ‘morality’ is reserved for discussion of other-
regarding duties and obligations, whereas the more expansive term ‘ethics’ applies to aspects of our 
conduct that are non-obligatory and self-directed. The problem of employing such a distinction is 
that the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ are often used as synonyms in today’s debates. Furthermore, 
many who would describe themselves as ‘moral philosophers’ work on a range of questions only 
loosely connected to other-regarding duties or obligations. I use Anscombe’s formulation ‘modern 
moral philosophers’ to describe those primarily concerned with the narrow version, and the term 
‘practical philosophers’ for those concerned with normative questions relating to our wider conduct. 
For philosophers who employ this wide and narrow sense, see Edward Harcourt (2015: 166), John 
 2 
Anscombe’s essay appeared in the 1950s, but from the last three decades of the 20th 
century the rumbling discontent it expresses became increasingly impossible to ignore. The 
effect of her writings on galvanising a renaissance of Aristotle’s ideas in the virtue ethics 
movement has been well documented, and virtue ethicists have often expressed their 
desire to make good on her proposal to ‘jettison’ the notions of ‘moral obligation and moral 
duty’, so as to replace them with character-based and virtue concepts (1958: 1). 
Nevertheless, although the virtue ethical project has made serious headway in realising 
Anscombe’s proposal, it has arguably done little to expand the parameters of moral 
philosophy to give it the scope Aristotle originally envisaged for the practical branch of the 
discipline. Rather, one could argue, virtue ethicists have done little more than use 
alternative conceptual terminology (character, virtue, et cetera.) to offer new answers to 
the old contentions of modern moral philosophy. Questions regarding the moral rightness 
or wrongness of actions, are no longer answered by reference to our duties or obligations, 
but rather by reference to virtues of character and moral goodness.2 Such emphasis may 
lead us to think that, despite reintroducing a terminological vocabulary (character, virtue) 
that deals with philosophical issues concerning practical life more satisfactorily, virtue 
ethicists tend to understand the remit of their discipline similarly to those modern moral 
philosophers they began by criticising so vociferously. While questions relating to moral 
goodness and our moral character will always be in important part of practical philosophy, 
an exclusive emphasis these questions can obscure other significant concerns that are not 
only squarely within the remit of practical philosophy in Aristotle’s sense but which also 
undeniably affect human flourishing.  
Writing in the spirit of Anscombe’s essay, Iris Murdoch also suggests that the 
absence of attention towards such concerns should be viewed as a ‘void in present-day 
moral philosophy’, preventing philosophers from doing justice to the richness and 
complexity of our practical lives (2014 [1969]: 46). We must think of the limits of moral 
philosophy more expansively, Murdoch argues, so that we can ‘speak significantly of 
Freud and Marx’, to give rise to a practical philosophy in which the ‘concept of love, so 
rarely mentioned by moral philosophers, can once again be made central’ (2014 [1969]: 45). 
                                               
Skorupski (1998), and Charles Taylor (1982: 4–5), Bernard Williams (1993 [1972]: xiv, 73–81; 1985: 6–
8; 2008 [1993]: 41–2). 
2 See Harcourt’s criticism of the exclusive focus of contemporary virtue ethicists to ‘settle questions 
about the rightness of action’ (2015: 165). Julia Annas could be said to fall foul of this criticism in 
Intelligent Virtue. See her exhaustive arguments on why virtue must be connected to moral goodness, 
as well as her attacks on ‘virtue pluralists’, such as Hume and Nietzsche, who countenance non-
moral conceptions of virtue (2011: 100–18).  
 3 
Thinking in terms of the expansive Aristotelian remit of practical philosophy, it is perhaps 
no accident that Murdoch picks a psychologist and a political philosopher, both of whom 
show that there is troublingly more to our practical lives than voluntary, conscious actions. 
Marx offers us a picture of ethical life that is inextricably linked to its social and political 
conditions, whereas Freud offers a story of personal development that reveals the oft-
dominant strength of internal motivations. Without the input of these thinkers, and those 
like them, moral philosophy assumes a bare and stripped-down model of the subject, one 
which is ‘free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, brave’, Murdoch 
writes, the unfortunate ‘hero of so many […] books of moral philosophy’ (2014 [1967]: 78). 
While ‘free, independent, lonely’ suggest a subject alienated from the external conditions 
of social and political life, ‘powerful, rational, responsible’ indicate one hubristically acting 
in ignorance of the unconscious forces actually motivating them. While Aristotle might 
have struggled to incorporate all the insights of modern day political science and moral 
psychology into his world view, Murdoch is surely right to suggest that he would 
appreciate the potential value of the resources of these disciplines for practical philosophy.3  
Furthermore, as Murdoch notes in her comment that the ‘concept of love [should] 
once again be made central’ (cited above; emphasis added), many topics recently neglected 
by modern moral philosophy involve our love relationships. Perhaps scholars have 
interpreted this comment overly narrowly in terms of the importance of romantic love in 
our practical lives (the obsession of many of the fictional characters in Murdoch’s novels), 
but we can more fully understand this thought by interpreting her as thinking of love as 
encompassing different kinds of deep-seated attachments, including those that do not 
involve other persons. To avoid viewing the term love in the light of today’s clichéd 
cultural connotations, in this study I use the term ‘passionate attachment’,4 a notion I sketch 
broadly in order to circumscribe all the heterogeneous things we can care about, not just 
those we love romantically. The examples of this are extremely diverse: from attachments 
relating to a creative or intellectual endeavour; to those relating to aesthetic projects or 
                                               
3 For two thinkers with character-based sympathies, see Jonathan Lear’s work on Freud (1999) and 
Amartya Sen’s work on human capacities and political emancipation (1999 [1985]). 
4 This term appears in the Anglophone literature on Hellenism. Annas uses it as a synonym for 
‘affectionate relationship’ (1991: 196). Nussbaum uses it to refer to cherished ‘externals’ (2009 [1994]: 
484). For these thinkers, our passionate attachments can give rise to strong emotions (pathē), although 
these emotions are generated by other things too (see my remarks in ‘Methodology’ below). The 
thinkers I examine in Ch. 1 – Frankfurt, Williams, Wolf – use their own terminology, so it is useful to 
introduce a bridging term. 
 4 
social justice; as well as the various deep-seated attachments we have to parents, children, 
friends, or spouse.  
Understanding such heterogeneous love relationships under the composite rubric 
of passionate attachments has significant theoretical advantages. It avoids becoming 
distracted by idiosyncrasies that only apply to one kind of love relationship because what 
is important is the characteristic responses that the pursuit of passionate attachments 
generate in us. It allows us to consider how they affect human flourishing, rather than the 
particular nature of this or that passionate attachment. Such a ‘family resemblance’ model 
allows us to understand what these relationships have in common, as well as safeguarding 
us from making unwarranted normative specifications about the desirability (or 
otherwise) of specific kinds of love relationships.5 The passionate attachment to a political 
ideal, say, and the love for one’s children clearly differ in vastly important ways, but they 
are also similar in a way we cannot understand if we focus too closely on the differences. 
Rather than viewing the many varieties of love as incommensurate, exploring them 
together shows how we can better understand the role these kinds of attachments play in 
our practical lives.   
After sketching what passionate attachments are and how deeply enwoven they 
are in our practical lives, I offer a theory of how we can cultivate these kinds of attachments, 
one that moves beyond existing work on this theme in contemporary practical philosophy. 
Before doing so I first explain why even those philosophers who offer the most compelling 
and comprehensive account of them – Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf 
– either baulk at the idea that we can actively cultivate them to any significant degree, or 
deny we can form a philosophical theory of them. For these thinkers, our passionate 
attachments cannot be reflectively cultivated because they are largely impervious to self-
directed change. On their view, the best we can do is identify whichever passionate 
attachments we happen to have, and adjust our conduct to better accommodate them in 
our practical lives. Moreover, even if the self-directed cultivation of our love relationships 
is possible, Wolf indicates that a philosophical theory of passionate self-cultivation would 
be especially unsuited to this task. Instead, we would do better to seek such a theory from 
self-help books, the teachings of spiritual leaders, or – when things go seriously awry –
clinical psychologists or psychotherapists. I call this view ‘romantic fatalism’ in honour of 
                                               
5 There is much emancipatory potential in focusing on love relationships at the right level. If what is 
important is pursuing passionate attachments, then many questions that have traditionally garnered 
heated folk attention become otiose. If what matters are the conditions for loving successfully, it does 
not matter whether one’s children are biologically related, what gender one’s partner is, whether or 
not one marries one’s long-term partner, et cetera.  
 5 
the widespread folk belief that what we love is not up to us, and – in the case of romantic 
love – all we have to do is wait patiently for Cupid to strike. 
Although romantic fatalists take such a pessimistic view of our ability to cultivate 
passionate attachments, theories of how we can cultivate the moral and prudential 
dimensions of our characters are alive and well in other areas of practical philosophy.6 It 
has long been recognised that through processes and practices of self-cultivation we have 
the capacity for self-directed development, although this has mainly been explored in the 
context of moral improvement. Although there has been some philosophical interest in 
how we can cultivate our prudential characters in the virtue ethical tradition, most 
literature on this topic focuses on how we can ameliorate these kinds of considerations 
through the cultivation of moral ones, which is perhaps unsurprising given the dominant 
concerns of modern moral philosophy. Although we might imagine virtue ethicists to be 
more sympathetic to the idea that our passionate attachments are integral to flourishing, 
they invariably focus on how we can  cultivate our moral character, fitting with the claim 
I make above about how deeply these thinkers remain enthralled by the guiding concerns 
of modern moral philosophy.7 In contrast to how self-cultivation has been traditionally 
interpreted in a restricted sense, I argue that self-cultivation is an all encompassing term, 
one which applies to all dimensions of our character along with the corresponding 
domains of practical reasoning. On the view I defend, theories of self-directed 
development need not only apply to the moral or prudential domains of practical 
reasoning because we can – and should – complement them with one explaining the self-
directed development of our passionate character.  
As well as the Francophone interpreters of Hellenism that will be the focus of my 
study, Murdoch touches on the importance of the self-directed cultivation of character 
when she discusses ‘techniques for the purification and reorientation of an energy that is 
naturally selfish’, even proposing that the investigation of these techniques should be 
                                               
6 The juxtaposition of ‘prudential’ to ‘moral’ considerations has been widely taken up by modern 
moral philosophers, especially by virtue ethicists. As Philippa Foot writes: “‘moral” and “prudential” 
considerations differ insofar as the latter are patently “‘self-regarding” pursuits’ which by definition 
places them ‘outside morality’ (2001 [2010]: 68; cf. Swanton 2003: 58–9). Similarly, Williams defines 
them as considerations that relate ‘merely to comfort, excitement, self-esteem, power, or another 
advantage of the agent’ (1985: 13). I use ‘prudential’ as a catch-all term to refer to all means-orientated 
considerations that are instrumentally related to our well-being in an unspecified sense. 
7 See Snow (2016). While interest in moral cultivation has been most evident among virtue ethicists, 
recently informative studies have been published detailing how Kant’s and Mill’s accounts of this 
kind of self-cultivation, as well as how it can be integrated with the demands of the Categorical 
Imperative (Louden 1986: 473–89) and the Utilitarian Calculus (Donner 2010: 146–65). 
 6 
viewed as ‘[o]ne of the main problems of moral philosophy’ (2001 [1962]: 67; emphasis 
added). Elsewhere Murdoch tells us that such ‘techniques’ – or ‘spiritual exercises’ as she 
calls them8 – are extremely important in our practical development, although she leaves us 
with no more than a sketch of how such exercises function. Making her account of these 
exercises even more intriguing, Murdoch’s description may well be better described as the 
passionate rather than moral cultivation of character (or something in between). In her 
celebrated portrayal of a mother (M) who successfully manages to reverse the antipathy 
she initially feels for her new daughter-in-law (D), Murdoch describes the self-directed 
process through which M cultivates her passionate relationship with D. To do this, M 
deliberately redirects her loving attention towards the aspects of the younger woman’s 
character which she had previously viewed as unpalatable. By reflectively redirecting her 
attention, Murdoch writes, M manages to change her view that D is ‘unpolished’, 
‘brusque’, ‘rude’, ‘tiresomely juvenile’, and comes to reinterpret these characteristics as 
‘refreshingly simple’,  ‘not undignified but spontaneous’, ‘not tiresomely juvenile but 
delightfully youthful’. Murdoch gives no details of the techniques through which M does 
this, merely telling us that M is a ‘intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-
criticism’, but she does indicate that it involves directing ‘careful and just attention to the 
object which confronts her’ through how she ‘looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses her 
attention’ (2001 [1964]: 17; 22).9  
Studies such as Murdoch’s account of M and D, indicate that the idea we can 
actively and self-reflectively cultivate our passionate attachments is at least plausible, and 
perhaps her example is powerful because it reminds us of the manifold ways in which we 
are required to cultivate our passionate characters in our practical lives. Life requires that 
we constantly re-evaluate our current passionate attachments, galvanise ourselves to take 
up new ones, strive to integrate those we already possess, as well as shedding those that 
are no longer appropriate or satisfying. Moreover, our ability to cultivate our passionate 
attachments reduces the extent we are at their mercy, decreasing our vulnerability to the 
                                               
8 I discuss Pierre Hadot’s account of the ‘spiritual exercises’ in Pt. II, but it is striking that Murdoch 
also views such exercises as a vital aspect of the history of philosophy. In a remark that significantly 
predates Hadot’s work on this topic, she writes, ‘[m]oral philosophy is properly, and in the past has 
sometimes been, the discussion of the ego and of the techniques (if any) for its defeat’ (2001 [1962]: 51; 
both emphases added). 
9  Murdoch deploys this example to illustrate how we can cultivate ourselves morally. Nevertheless, 
since her view of moral goodness is markedly differently to the one employed by modern moral 
philosophers, she discusses the self-directed cultivation of our love relationships in order to explain 
how we can develop the moral dimension of our characters. 
 7 
distress we suffer on their account, as well as increasing our ability to replace them if we 
lose them. Recognising the importance of this kind of self-cultivation means that practical 
philosophers would do well to seek to understand this kind of human endeavour. It is 
through practices of self-cultivation that we exercise our capacity to improve a 
fundamentally important aspect of ourselves, to love more solidly and deliberately, and to 
enable ourselves to reach a greater measure of flourishing. If our passionate lives are as 
important as Murdoch, Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf suggest, we stand to learn much 
about how to bring ourselves to a greater measure of flourishing by explaining what 
passionate self-cultivation is, how it takes place, and understanding the best way to go 
about it.  
Nevertheless, finding the conceptual resources for a compelling theory of how we 
can cultivate our passionate attachments, requires parting company with Murdoch for two 
reasons: first, despite her avowed commitment to the importance of love relationships in 
how we organise our practical lives, she understands these kinds of relationships to be 
valuable because they bring us closer to moral goodness; second, her account of ‘spiritual 
exercises’ is fleeting and lacks sufficient depth to provide the conceptual resources for a 
comprehensive theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments.10 So where can 
we find the conceptual resources for a theory of how to cultivate our passionate 
attachments, if the very thinkers who argue so persuasively for their importance actively 
deny – or like Murdoch offer no more than a sketch of how – they can be cultivated? I argue 
that the resources to do this can be found in French philosophy, specifically in the 
interpretation of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation offered by Pierre Hadot and 
Michel Foucault. 
Both these thinkers make auspicious claims regarding potential use of the 
Hellenistic account of self-cultivation in contemporary practical philosophy, as well as 
claiming that these conceptual resources can benefit our practical lives.11 Not only do these 
thinkers locate the conceptual resources for a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments in the Hellenistic source material, but they also offer detailed accounts of the 
various practices through which we can do this. These claims should encourage us to take 
seriously the project of seeking philosophical insight into the question of how we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments from the Hellenistic tradition. Furthermore, Hadot’s 
                                               
10 See Maria Antonaccio’s proposal for how this could be done (1998: 84–6).  
11 Hadot uses the Hellenistic emphasis on self-cultivation to advocate a return to the conception of 
‘philosophy as a way of life’, whereas Foucault argues that it could be used to underwrite a ‘politics 
of ourselves’. Compelling studies on these claims have already appeared. See Stuart Elden (2016), 
Timothy O’Leary (2002), and John Sellars (2009 [2003]).   
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and Foucault’s comments should embolden us in the face of criticism from twentieth-
century Anglophone thinkers12 who think that Hellenistic self-cultivation only applies to 
extirpating pathē, scholars who deny that these exercises might serve another practical 
function without this explicit aim. Anglophone thinkers invariably view the exercises of 
self-cultivation as aiming to extirpate the strong emotions [pathē] that Hellenistic 
philosophers regarded as inimical to human flourishing. While Anglophone thinkers are 
correct that this was the overriding aim of the exercises of self-cultivation in the Hellenistic 
world, the work of Foucault and Hadot enables us to think of these exercises more broadly, 
both in terms of how they functioned in the Hellenistic world but – more importantly – 
how we might reinterpret them for use in contemporary thought and action. Hadot 
emphasises how the very same exercises of self-cultivation were frequently transferred 
between the Hellenistic schools, and claims that they can be applied to problems both in 
contemporary philosophy and practical life. Foucault takes the transferability of the 
exercises even further, showing how the Hellenistic exercises of self-shaping have the 
potential to facilitate wholesale character change, understood more broadly than the 
suppression of strong emotions. This means a potential theory of cultivating our passionate 
attachments is offered two important theoretical boons by Hadot and Foucault: first, they 
provide a philosophical account of the self-directed practices of character change that were 
popular in the Hellenistic world. Second, they interpret these practices in a suitably broad 
manner, so that can be applied to the self-directed cultivation of our passionate 
attachments.  
Nevertheless, to date, scholars of Hadot’s and Foucault’s work have rarely 
accepted the challenge of applying the conceptual resources of Hellenism to contemporary 
philosophical debate, perhaps because they find Hadot’s and Foucault’s remarks on this 
topic to be elliptical and overly enigmatic. Instead, scholarly attention is invariably 
directed towards comprehending how their interest in Hellenistic self-cultivation fits with 
their respective intellectual trajectories. Taking Foucault, for example, numerous scholarly 
studies now attempt to explain why he turns to Greek and Roman Hellenism in his final 
works, a trend that will surely increase with the recent publication of the final incomplete 
volume of L'histoire de la sexualité, subtitled Les aveux de la chair (2018). Given the 
impassioned remarks both Hadot and Foucault make on the importance of the Hellenistic 
                                               
12 I truncate ‘twentieth-century Anglophone thinkers’ to ‘Anglophone thinkers’. I use this as an 
umbrella term for contemporary commentators who focus on how the Hellenistic exercises strove to 
extirpate strong emotions, including Annas (1993, 1996, 2011), Irwin (1998), Nussbaum (1985, 1990, 
1993, 2001, 2001 [1986], 2009 [1994]), and Porter (2003). When distinguishing these thinkers from 
Nussbaum, I use the expression ‘traditional Anglophone thinkers’.  
 9 
tradition for contemporary philosophy, it would be a pity if philosophical work on these 
thinkers were restricted to demonstrating how their work on this topic relates to the rest 
of their intellectual trajectory. Both Hadot and Foucault make it clear that their turn to the 
Hellenistic tradition of self-cultivation is no idle intellectual interest, but rather one 
motivated by the desire to respond to urgent philosophical problems, both in theoretical 
thought and in practical life. This study aims to make good on this desire.    
 
II.   Methodology 
 
One potential difficulty for my project is finding a common philosophical vocabulary so 
that the thinkers I discuss can converse with one another informatively. Isolating a 
common conception of a passionate attachment that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf could 
be said to share is not a simple task in itself; showing how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments using the conceptual resources from an alien philosophical tradition is even 
more difficult. Not only is the Hellenistic source material temporally, linguistically, and 
geographically distant from contemporary Anglophone philosophy, prima facie it is so far 
removed from contemporary philosophical concerns that we might wonder if we can 
meaningfully engage with it all, let alone whether it can provide the conceptual resources 
to answer a contemporary philosophical problem. Further potential difficulties are created 
by tricky interpretive questions regarding the Hellenistic source material, especially as the 
approaches of both Francophone thinkers I examine has been harshly criticised by their 
Anglophone colleagues. This might leave us wondering whether we even know what the 
Hellenistic position was at all, let alone successfully apply it to a pressing issue in 
contemporary practical philosophy. Finally, we may even think it perverse to seek the 
conceptual resources for a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments from 
a tradition explicitly arguing that whatever generates strong emotional responses in us 
should be strenuously avoided. As Anglophone interpreters stress, historically speaking, 
Hellenistic philosophers developed the exercises of self-cultivation to counteract the effects 
of pathē, strong emotions which they regarded as hampering our ability to conduct 
ourselves morally. While passionate attachments are not the only things capable of 
generating such strong emotions, these kinds of attachments are rightly viewed as an active 
source of emotional turbulence, particularly because they are so valuable to us and 
connected to our sense of purpose.  
While all these problems are potentially serious, they can be avoided by clarifying 
the parameters of this study. First, I aim to offer a comprehensive theory of how we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments, along with a practical method inspired by the 
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Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation that shows how we can do this effectively. I do not 
aim give a historically accurate account of the role of the exercises of self-cultivation in 
Hellenistic philosophy, nor even to adjudicate between the clashes between Anglophone 
and Francophone scholars on their respective interpretations of the source material. (I do 
attend to these disputes, but only when it directly sheds light on the idea of passionate self-
cultivation.) The Francophone thinkers I examine have not been chosen because of the 
accuracy of their readings of the source material, but on account of the themes they 
emphasise in the Hellenistic corpus, for how they mobilise, transform, and deploy the 
resources of Hellenism for use in a contemporary account of self-cultivation. Not only do 
these thinkers offer a compelling account of self-cultivation, but Hadot’s exercices spirituels 
and Foucault’s pratiques de soi offer detailed practical accounts of how to do this. My aim is 
to show how viewing the account of self-cultivation of the Hellenistic philosophers 
through the prism of Foucault and Hadot presents us with the conceptual resources for a 
theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments.  
Second, I do not claim to show how self-cultivation figures in Foucault’s or 
Hadot’s respective philosophies, nor how it relates to the rest of their work. Many excellent 
studies have already been written on this, and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis 
to offer a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments alongside an account of how 
Hellenism relates to the rest of Foucault’s or Hadot’s work. What is more, much of this 
work has to proceed speculatively because, as I discuss extensively in Pt. II, Foucault and 
Hadot do little more than indicate what their work on Hellenistic philosophy has to offer 
contemporary philosophy and practical life. For these reasons, I propose that one way to 
make good on their claims regarding the importance of Hellenism is to identify a 
contemporary theoretical problem that has important implications for how we lead our 
practical lives, and then to show how their work contributes to solving it.  
 
III.  Summary of Research Aims  
 
This thesis offers a theory of how we cultivate our passionate attachments, one which 
explains examples of passionate self-cultivation such as those I have proposed can be 
found in Murdoch. To do this, I offer a comprehensive theory of passionate self-cultivation, 
one which departs from those philosophers who acknowledge the value of such 
attachments in our practical lives, but who resist the idea that (i) we can actively cultivate 
them, or (ii) form a philosophical theory of doing so. Departing from these views, I aim to 
show why it is important that we cultivate our passionate attachments, and that we can 
construct a philosophical theory of doing so from the conceptual resources of the 
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Hellenistic tradition. One upshot of this is that it shows why this area of our practical lives 
deserves attention from practical philosophers in the form of a comprehensive 
philosophical theory, one which would complement the theories of moral and prudential 
self-cultivation that already exist in practical philosophy. In sum, my thesis has four 
research aims, namely to: 
 
(1)   Show that we can and do cultivate our passionate attachments.  
(2)   Explain why the self-directed cultivation of our passionate attachments is important. 
(3)   Offer a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments.  
(4)   Give examples of the practical processes through which we do this.  
 
In addition to achieving these primary research aims, this approach may pay another 
intellectual dividend: by seeking the resources to enrich contemporary practical 
philosophy from French philosophy, we may be able to understand this tradition better 
itself. Understanding precisely how philosophers such as Hadot and Foucault offer a 
contribution to practical philosophy that is not dominated by an interest in morality can 
help us come to better understand this tradition, especially enabling us to appreciate that 
this tradition deals with a different set of issues and concerns.  
 
IV.   Overview 
 
Pt. I focuses on the complaints directed against modern moral philosophy by Frankfurt, 
Williams, and Wolf, especially their contention that it cannot fully account for the 
flourishing life, as it fails to recognise the vital role of love relationships in our practical 
reasoning. Not only do our passionate attachments directly generate integral 
considerations in resolving the question of ‘how one should live’ – what these thinkers 
term the ‘Socratic question’ – they are also responsible for considerations connected to 
meaningfulness, which Williams emphasises is a vital condition of wanting to be alive at 
all. Ch. 1 ends with a comparison of these thinkers’ differing accounts of our love 
relationships to form the composite notion of a ‘passionate attachment’ – which aims to 
capture the heterogeneity of the various types of love relationship that can affect our 
practical reasoning. After this, Ch. 2 asks why Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf regard our 
passionate attachments as something we are unable to choose or cultivate, and asks why 
this is so given that philosophers have traditionally held out much hope for analogous 
accounts of how we can cultivate the moral and prudential dimension of our characters. I 
then turn to why we are highly motivated to cultivate our passionate attachments, as well 
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as to exploring the reasons why philosophical insight on this topic can transform the 
observation that we do cultivate our passionate attachments into a fully-fledged 
philosophical theory.   
 Pt. II explores recent claims about the potential of Hellenistic philosophy to 
provide the resources to expand and enrich contemporary practical philosophy, focusing 
especially on self-cultivation. While both the Anglophone philosophers (Nussbaum) and 
Francophone ones (Foucault, Hadot) make this claim, examining the pronounced 
differences between how these thinkers understand the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation to function allows us to grasp the potential for a contemporary theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments. After this I examine the various accounts of the 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation offered by Nussbaum, Foucault, and Hadot. I argue 
that Nussbaum’s criticisms of Foucault are tendentious once we fully appreciate the role 
of the Hellenistic exercises in his own account, and adopt a similar approach to Hadot’s 
hostile remarks. Most importantly, however, Ch. 4 gathers the accounts that each of these 
thinkers give of the Hellenistic exercises, which provide the conceptual resources for an 
account of cultivating our passionate attachments specifically, which I offer in Pt. III. To 
do this, I examine three of Foucault’s pratiques de soi for self-shaping, as well as three of 
Hadot’s exercices spirituels. 
Pt. III offers a theory of cultivating the passionate attachments, one that responds 
to the account of passionate attachments given in Pt. I, and furnishes this theory with the 
philosophical resources of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments in Pt. II. In Ch. 
5 I offer a two-part theory of cultivating our passionate attachments that shows what 
counts as passionate self-cultivation, as well as the various processes through which it 
operates. In Ch. 6 I show that the exercises of self-cultivation developed in the Hellenistic 
tradition are well-suited to offering an account of cultivating our passionate attachments, 












Chapter 1  
 
 
The Value of Our Passionate Attachments 
 
If we turn from books on moral philosophy to any vivid account of 
human life and action such as we find in Shakespeare, nothing strikes 
us more than the comparative remoteness of the discussions of moral 
philosophy from the facts of actual life. Is not this largely because, while 
moral philosophy has, quite rightly, concentrated its attention on the 
fact of obligation, in the case of many of those whom we admire most 
and whose lives are of the greatest interest, the sense of obligation, 
though it may be important, is not a dominating factor in their lives?  
  
H. A. Prichard 1949 [1912]: 113  
 
1.0   Overview 
 
This chapter introduces Harry Frankfurt’s, Bernard Williams’, and Susan Wolf’s respective 
contentions that the disciplinary parameters of modern moral philosophy need expanding 
in order for it to explain fundamentally important aspects of the flourishing life. I begin by 
examining these thinkers’ proposal that we should return to what they call the Socratic 
question of ‘how one should live’, arguing that this question cannot be settled by 
determining the normative weight of moral and prudential considerations alone. 
Following this, I explore what each thinker considers moral philosophers to currently 
neglect: examining Frankfurt’s ‘reasons of love’ (1.2), Williams’ notion of a ‘ground project’ 
(1.3), and Wolf’s account of ‘meaningfulness’ (1.4). To provide a complete resolution to the 
Socratic question, I follow these thinkers in arguing that we must acknowledge a third set 
of entities – what I term ‘passionate attachments’ – which are a crucial source of action-
guiding considerations. Passionate attachments, I argue, allow us to identify with entities 
other than ourselves, experience our lives as meaningful, and so are an integral part of 
human flourishing. The chapter ends by showing how the accounts which Frankfurt, 
Williams, and Wolf propose can bolster one another when scrutinised side-by-side, as well 
as how their direct engagements with one another reveal significant and theoretically rich 
                                               
13 Cited by Slote (2013: vi). 
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overlappings which illuminate each of their arguments. This enables me to build a 
composite account explaining what passionate attachments are, and why they are 
indispensable to the flourishing life (1.5).  
 
1.1   Returning to the Socratic Question 
 
Over the last three decades increasing numbers of moral philosophers have expressed their 
disquiet that the parameters of their discipline are overly narrow. These philosophers 
complain that contemporary moral philosophy cannot account for fundamental aspects of 
human flourishing as it focuses too closely (often exclusively) on a simplistic interplay 
between our prudential interests and our moral obligations, rendering its conception of 
flourishing too thin and limited. While many of these complaints have arisen from thinkers 
in the virtue ethical tradition,14 they have perhaps been most eloquently expressed by three 
philosophers who are not card-carrying virtue ethicists: Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf.15 
Each of these thinkers argue that a full account of a flourishing life – an account of a life 
that is truly choiceworthy – cannot be given solely in terms of our adherence to any of the 
theories that moral philosophy currently offers, and (more radically) they propose that our 
flourishing can involve acting on reasons that are neither generated by our prudential 
considerations nor our moral obligations. All agree that moral obligations are important, 
but they argue that we can only deepen our understanding of what a fully flourishing life 
looks like by acknowledging that it cannot be thought of as one that is exclusively directed 
by considerations pertaining to morality. Understanding what this kind of life consists of, 
these philosophers contend, requires us to broaden the scope of our enquiry to ask what 
else is necessary for flourishing, aside from – and sometimes instead of – ceaseless moral 
rectitude.  
To set their discipline on a more appropriate footing, Frankfurt, Williams, and 
Wolf each propose that moral philosophy should return to its founding question – one 
often attributed to Socrates – the question of ‘how one should live’. Williams argues that 
                                               
14 For classic critiques see Foot (2002 [1977]: 1–5, 181–8); Hursthouse (2002 [1999]: 1–24); Slote (1997: 
175–237); MacIntyre (2007 [1981]: 1–22).   
15 I focus on these thinkers because they explicitly argue that passionate attachments ought to have a 
leading role in resolving the question of ‘how one should live’. They are not the only philosophers 
who view these kinds of attachments as important (cf. Anscombe 1958: 1; Murdoch 2014 [1973]: 45), 
but they are distinctive insofar as they insist that these kinds of considerations have an especially 
important role (cf. Nussbaum 1990: 24–5). 
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the Socratic question is not equivalent to ‘what life morally ought I to live’, and is more 
basic than moral philosophy’s other traditional questions such as ‘what is one’s duty?’ (the 
Kantian question) or ‘how may one be good?’ (the utilitarian question) or even ‘how can 
one be happy?’ (the eudaimonist one). For Williams, the latter three questions ‘take too 
much for granted’ since they privilege a single kind of reasons (ones relating to one’s 
duties, goodness, happiness, et cetera.), and presuppose that a flourishing life must be 
thought exclusively in these terms. As Williams explains, ‘Socrates’ question […] means 
“how has one most reason to live?”’, and because the ‘force of should in the question [is] 
just should […] no prior advantage is built into the question for one kind of reason over 
another’. He adds, if moral reasons ‘emerge importantly in the answer, [then] this will not 
be because they have simply been selected for by the question’ (1985: 19). Because it 
assumes less and has more breadth, Socrates’ question is better cast than the other 
founding questions of moral philosophy, allowing us to canvass a wider and more diverse 
set of considerations, taking seriously both moral and non-moral reasons that govern our 
conduct, while not expressing a view in advance about which considerations ought to 
come out on top. This means that all three thinkers are ‘normative pluralists’ insofar as 
they think that the Socratic question cannot be resolved with reference to one type of 
normative consideration.16  
As Julia Annas notes, to the modern philosophical ear, the question of ‘how one 
should live’ may seem ‘too particular to be a properly ethical question […] but it may also, 
oddly, seem too general’ (1993: 27).17 For Annas, this creates a paradox. While a ‘great deal 
of modern literature and psychology arises from and revolves around the way people 
reflect about their lives, […] thought about one’s life is no longer seen as central to ethical 
philosophy’ (1993: 27). Compared to the practical philosophy of the ancient world, modern 
moral philosophy has drastically narrowed the scope of philosophical enquiry, neglecting 
vital considerations pertaining to the question of ‘how one should live’, which today has 
almost exclusively become the domain of writers of self-help manuals, autobiographers, 
and psychologists of well-being. Today we have to turn to ‘popular self-help manuals to 
find extensive discussion of questions of the best life, self-fulfilment, the proper role of the 
emotions, personal friendships and commitments’, Annas writes, whereas in the ancient 
                                               
16 See Dale Dorsey who tells us, ‘[n]ormative pluralism holds that there is no such thing as a distinct 
set of rational requirements or “oughts” (distinct, that is, from individual “oughts” generated by the 
individual special standpoints such as morality, prudence, aesthetics, et cetera.). In other words, 
there is no such thing as an ought, period.’ (2016: 19) 
17 Annas attributes this question to Socrates pronouncement, ‘honitia tropon chrē zēn’ (Plato 1997 [Rep.]: 
352d; cited by Annas 1993: 27).  
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world these topics were ‘always treated in a more intellectual way as part of ethics’ (1993: 
10).18 Indeed the breadth of the Socratic question reflected the range of practical issues that 
ancient philosophers were expected to address, a range which is strikingly broader than 
the topics covered by a present-day moral philosophy syllabus. For Socrates and his 
ancient interlocutors, this ‘fundamental’ question was regarded as the ‘natural starting 
point for ethical reflection’ and was consequently ‘subject to much literature’ (1993: 27–8). 
Although Williams claims that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is the kind of 
‘practical inquiry, which is directed, in effect, to answering Socrates’ question’, many of 
Aristotle’s minor texts deal with explicitly non-moral dimensions of this question, 
especially his Parva Naturalia.19 While Aristotle’s notion of practical philosophy certainly 
has the conceptual bandwidth to accommodate the range of topics that inform the Socratic 
question, it was the philosophers who came to prominence in the Hellenistic schools after 
his death who developed his initial insights in practical philosophy in increasing detail, 
and a wide range of topics relating to the Socratic question were once again explicitly 
prioritised.20 In what follows I argue that this period could be regarded as a veritable 
golden age for practical philosophy insofar as the philosophers of this era strove to 
exhaustively address the many different considerations that allow us to resolve the Socratic 
question, devoting lengthy philosophical treatises, protracted scholarly discussion, and – 
prefiguring the interest in moral psychology of today’s theorists – incorporating much 
empirical evidence pertaining to these topics.   
In a similar manner to how today’s self-help books are often marketed with ‘tell-
all’ slogans, the titles of many founding Hellenistic texts give a good indication of the 
philosophical riches they contained, which is fortunate as few of these works have 
survived. Epicurus, for example, was credited with titles such as On Love, On Choice and 
Avoidance, Opinions on the Passions, On the Chief Good, as well as countless letters on these 
themes (Diogenes Laertius 1972: X.27–9). The titles of the lost works of the Stoic school are 
equally as intriguing: Zeno wrote On Passions, On Duty, On Greek Education; Herillus wrote 
                                               
18 Since Annas’ remarks in 1993, philosophers have increasingly begun addressing a broader range 
of issues and topics bearing on practical reasoning, many of which share a close resemblance to the 
items on Murdoch’s wish list.  
19 Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia comprises seven short texts on the non-moral conditions of human 
flourishing: Sense and Sensibilia, On Memory, On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep, On Length 
and Shortness of Life, and On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration.   
20 Recently Sellars has asked whether Socrates’ ‘humanistic’ or Aristotle’s ‘scientific conception of 
philosophy’ was most important for the Hellenistic tradition, and has suggested that the Hellenistic 
philosophers followed Socrates’ conception (2017: 42–4).   
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On Training, Of the Passions; Sphaerus wrote Dialogues on Love, Of Wealth, Of Fame, Of Death; 
and Chrysippus wrote On Pleasure, Of Virtues, Of Love (Diogenes Laertius 1972: XII.107–
79). From what we know from extant works, not only did Hellenistic philosophers provide 
detailed philosophical theories (logoi) of the good life, these thinkers explicitly strove to 
make their work relevant to the lives of their followers, offering practical guides 
concerning the art (technē) of human flourishing, as well as practical exercises (askēsis) 
detailing how to attain it. This is most evident in the texts of the Roman Hellenists, which 
have been better preserved than those from the Greek period. Lucretius’ lengthy prose-
poem not only gives an account of Epicurean cosmology and metaphysics, but also the 
central practical tenets of the latter-day incarnation of the school. The more numerous 
extant works of Stoics from the Imperial period also follow this pattern. Epictetus’ 
Enchiridion contains a philosophical account of a range of issues from childbearing to slave 
keeping. Seneca’s essays and letters deal with topics from anger, to happiness, to leisure, 
whereas Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations seek to understand how social and psychological 
factors affect our flourishing. I return to many of these examples in Pt. II, showing how 
they philosophically investigate many of the most important issues bearing upon the 
question of ‘how one should live’.  
 
1.2   Frankfurt’s ‘Reasons of Love’ 
 
In The Reasons of Love, Frankfurt tells us that his key concern, ‘how should a person live’, 
should be understood as the quintessential question of ‘practical reasoning’, which he 
defines as consisting of ‘several varieties of deliberation in which people endeavour to 
decide what to do, or in which they undertake to evaluate what has been done’ (2004: 5). 
In the same way that Aristotle demarcates the scope of practical reasoning widely, 
Frankfurt thinks of it as encompassing many species of deliberation and evaluation 
relating to our conduct. Moral evaluation, for Frankfurt, is only a species within the genus 
of practical reasoning, one which, he claims, has traditionally garnered an inordinate 
amount of philosophical attention. Frankfurt is not an immoralist like Plato’s 
Thrasymachus or – on some readings (Foot 2010 [2001]: 111) – Nietzsche because he 
recognises moral considerations as ‘unquestionably important’. Nevertheless, he claims 
these kinds of considerations tell us less about ‘what we should value and how we should 
live’ than moral philosophers typically suppose. Because morality does not ‘necessarily 
have the last word’, its ‘importance […] in directing our lives tends to be exaggerated’ 
(2004: 6–7). He writes: 
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Authoritative reasoning about what to do and how to behave is not 
limited to moral deliberation. Its scope extends […] to evaluations in 
terms of various nonmoral modes of normativity that also bear upon the 
conduct of life. The theory of normative practical reasoning is therefore 
more inclusive, with respect to the types of deliberation that it considers, 
than moral philosophy. (2004: 9) 
 
Many of Frankfurt’s earlier articles on this theme begin with observing that people do not 
act according to moral considerations alone, and that our practical reasoning is in fact 
legitimately affected by a wide variety of considerations. In an early essay on this theme, 
for example, he notes that ‘the requirements of ethics are not the only things [most of us] 
care about’, and that ‘even people who care a great deal about morality generally care still 
more about other things’ (1998 [1982]: 81). He continues:  
 
The role of moral judgment in the development and pursuit of concerns 
[…] is often quite marginal, not only in potency but in relevance as well. 
There are many important decisions with regard to which moral 
considerations are simply not decisive, and which must accordingly be 
based, at least to some extent, upon considerations of nonmoral kinds. 
[…]  Moreover, it is not wholly apparent that making them in such ways 
is always unjustifiable. (1998 [1982]: 81) 
 
Frankfurt expands on these observations elsewhere, arguing that all too often modern 
moral philosophers wrongly presume that the ‘demands of morality are inherently 
[authoritative and] pre-emptive’, and that such demands ‘must always be accorded an 
overriding precedence over all other interests and claims’ (2004: 6–7). For Frankfurt, acting 
on moral considerations is certainly an important component of flourishing, but given that 
resolving the question ‘how one should live’ must also take into account a panoply of non-
moral considerations, morality does not ‘necessarily have the last word.’ (2004: 6–7).21  
                                               
21 Frankfurt and Williams suggest different ways of distinguishing moral, non-moral, and ethical 
considerations. Frankfurt acknowledges that although there are ‘other ways to construe the subject 
matter of morality’, we can define moral considerations as those that show us ‘how our attitudes and 
our actions should take into account the needs, the desires, and the entitlements of other people’ 
(2004: 7), which fits with his definition of morality as a ‘matter of how a person relates himself to the 
interests of others.’ (1999 [1993]: 115). By contrast Williams tells us that ‘it does no harm that the 
notion [of an ethical consideration] is vague’ because it is in fact ‘morality, the special system, that 
demands a sharp boundary for itself’ (1985: 7; cf. 1995: 241). Cf. n.1 above. 
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We can think of Frankfurt’s argument as having two sides: one negative, one 
positive. His negative claim is that acting on moral considerations alone is insufficient for 
attaining the good life, as the moral life can be (and often is) mixed with recalcitrant non-
moral vices which interfere with living well: 
 
People who are scrupulously moral may nonetheless be destined by 
deficiencies of character or of constitution to lead lives that no 
reasonable person would freely choose. They may have personal defects 
and inadequacies that have nothing much to do with morality but that 
make it impossible for them to live well. For example, they may be 
emotionally shallow; or they may lack vitality; or they may be 
chronically indecisive. To the extent that they do actively choose and 
pursue certain goals, they may devote themselves to such insipid 
ambitions that their experience is generally dull and without flavour. In 
consequence, their lives may be relentlessly banal and hollow, and – 
whether or not they recognize this about themselves – they may be 
dreadfully bored. (2004: 6–7) 
 
Lacking vitality, chronic indecision, or cherishing insipid ambitions, are badly described 
as moral failings because they apply to our character as a whole, and may only apply to 
moral character tangentially, Nevertheless they clearly inhibit or thwart our capacity to 
lead a life that flourishes in the full sense of the term. To give a complete account of human 
flourishing, therefore, we need a richer and broader conception of what it means to live 
well, one which weighs-up all relevant considerations, including those that have nothing 
to do with moral concerns.  
Wolf supports and expands upon this line of thought in her essay ‘Moral Saints’ 
in which she countenances the life of a person who exclusively governs themselves by 
moral imperatives alone. Wolf’s intuitions follow Frankfurt’s here. She tells us that such 
‘moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness’ does not serve as an ‘unequivocally 
compelling personal ideal’ nor one which it would be ‘particularly rational or good or 
desirable for a human being to strive’, because the lives of many moral saints neglect some 
fundamental constituents of the flourishing life (2015 [1982]: 11).22 For Wolf, as for 
                                               
22 George Orwell writes that passionate relationships are viewed as dangerous by a moral saint such 
as Gandhi because they interfere with the domination of moral considerations in our practical 
reasoning: ‘Close friendships, Gandhi says, are dangerous, because “friends react on one another” 
and through loyalty to a friend one can be led into wrong-doing. […] The essence of being human is 
that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty 
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Frankfurt, understanding which fundamental aspects of the good life are missing is the 
most pressing task.23 I return to Wolf’s account of those aspects of the flourishing life that 
a moral saint could be said to neglect below.  
In addition to his negative claim regarding non-moral vices which can prevent us 
from living well, Frankfurt argues that modern moral philosophy neglects positive 
considerations pertaining to how a flourishing life must include passionate attachments or 
– in his terms – what we ‘love’ or ‘care about’. Although not originating in ‘moral nor in 
egoistic considerations’, these ‘modes of normativity are quite properly compelling’, for 
Frankfurt, and their essential role in the flourishing life makes them highly relevant to the 
concerns of practical philosophers (2004: 8). For example, although ‘there is nothing 
distinctively moral about such ideals as being steadfastly loyal to a family tradition, or 
selflessly pursuing mathematical truth, or devoting oneself to some type of 
connoisseurship’, considerations relating to these things can legitimately supplant or 
mitigate our moral commitments (1998 [1982]: 81). Sometimes it is reasonable, Frankfurt 
tells us, for persons to ‘care more about their personal projects, about certain individuals 
and groups’ or about the ‘various ideals to which they accord commanding authority in 
their lives’ than their moral commitments (1998 [1982]: 81).24 As I show in my discussion 
of Williams, such personal projects can provide the very conditions of living in the first 
place, and Frankfurt seems to have something like this in mind.  
Frankfurt suggests that ‘specific concrete individual[s]’, such as persons or other 
sentient beings, invariably generate ‘greater emotional colour and urgency’ in us, although 
passionate attachments need not be concrete at all. While we can love ‘another person, or 
a country, or an institution’, Frankfurt stresses that we can do this with a very wide range 
of entities, even abstract objects such as future projects or social ideals (1999 [1994]: 130). 
He writes:  
 
                                               
[…], and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable 
price of fastening one’s love upon other human individuals.’ (1961: 455–6; cited by Cocking and 
Jenning 2000: 278). 
23 We should note that for both Frankfurt and Williams it is possible for our passionate attachments 
to be, as Williams’ puts it, ‘in a very evident sense moral projects’, for example, ‘working for reform, 
or justice, or general improvement’ (1981a [1976]: 13). Like Wolf, both Williams and Frankfurt think 
of persons who are passionately attached to a moral project as relatively rare. See n.45. 
24 As Wolf notes, ‘[W]hen we are drawn to or moved by beauty or love or intellectual curiosity, we 
neither are nor ought to be moved by them only insofar as they are sources or pleasure or possessors 
of moral worth.’ (2015: 6)  
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A person may legitimately be devoted to ideals – for instance, aesthetic, 
cultural, or religious ideals – whose authority for him is independent of 
the desiderata with which moral principles are distinctively concerned; 
and he may pursue these nonmoral ideals without having his own 
personal interests in mind at all. Although it is widely presumed that 
moral claims are necessarily overriding, it is far from clear that 
assigning a higher authority to some nonmoral mode of normativity 
must always be – in every circumstance and regardless of the pertinent 
magnitudes – a mistake. (2004: 8) 
 
As well as caring about non-concrete ‘ideals’, elsewhere Frankfurt canvasses a wide range 
of other suitably weighty non-moral considerations which can become passionate 
attachments, ranging from ‘imperatives of […] style, of intellect, or of some other mode of 
ambition’ (1999 [1993]: 115) to ‘social justice, or scientific truth, or a family tradition’ (1999 
[1994]: 130). Such passionate attachments generate considerations that can, under the right 
circumstances, be more compelling than moral or prudential considerations leading to 
them to feature decisively (and legitimately) in our practical reasoning when we seek to 
resolve the question of ‘how should one live’. Not only do they do this, but there are good 
reasons why this is the case, as I show in my discussion of Williams in the next section.   
For Frankfurt, passionate attachments have two essential features: first, they can 
be incorporated into our practical identities insofar as we can come to identify with them; 
second, passionate attachments generate a sense of our lives being meaningful since these 
entities generate goals against which our conduct can be evaluated, goals providing the 
normative criteria for ‘seeking to resolve the question of how [one] should live’ (1999 
[1992]: 91).  Regarding the first of these distinctive features, identification, Frankfurt tells 
us:    
 
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He 
identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes 
himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon 
whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Thus he 
concerns himself with what concerns it, giving particular attention to 
such things and directing his behaviour accordingly. (1998 [1982]: 83) 
 
From this we can see that identifying with something as a passionate attachment involves 
expanding the remit of our concerns so they include the entity towards which our love is 
directed. As Thomas Nagel puts it in his essay on meaningfulness, identifying with 
something else ‘multiplies the problem’ because our own flourishing is now passively tied 
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to an entity other than ourselves (1979 [1971]: 14). Returning to identification again in his 
later work, Frankfurt warns that this process can only ever be ‘inexact and less than totally 
comprehensive’ because the interests of the lover and the beloved can never be entirely 
concomitant, and – adding somewhat pessimistically – it is ‘improbable that they will even 
be wholly compatible’ (2004: 62). Despite this, if we think of an object of prudential concern 
pertaining to our welfare, it is clear that we cannot identify with it because we are only 
interested in it insofar as it contributes to something else that we care about.25  
Regarding the second distinctive feature of passionate attachments, Frankfurt 
suggests that they are what make our lives meaningful, at least from a first-personal point 
of view. Returning to his remarks on identification shows why he thinks this. We identify 
with our passionate attachments, which means we are affected by how they fare. But just 
as the ups and downs of our own fortunes are highly meaningful for us, once we identify 
with something its fate becomes meaningful to us too. Our orientation and comportment 
intimately depend on the fate of our passionate attachment, and our flourishing closely 
tracks its successes and failures. Moreover, we do not just pursue passionate attachments 
because we love the objects to which we have become passionately attached: we also 
recognise that having passionate attachments is closely tied to our well-being. As Frankfurt 
puts it, ‘[b]eing engaged in the pursuit of a desirable state of affairs is not desirable 
exclusively because it is desirable that the state of affairs should obtain’, but also because 
the ‘pursuit is also desirable as an end in itself’ since ‘working to reach desirable ends is 
essential to a meaningful life’ (1999 [1992]: 90). This is well illustrated if we consider why 
human beings often go to great lengths to become romantically entwined with another. 
This difficult to explain solely in terms of the value of the beloved, because we often desire 
such relations without having any potential beloved in mind. On Frankfurt’s view, 
however, there is another reason why we care about romantic love, one which does not 
depend on the perceived worth of the beloved at all: loving generates a sense that our life 
is meaningful, which in turn contributes to our flourishing. While this is not the primary 
reason why we pursue romantic passionate attachments, the effect of having passionate 
attachments is salutary insofar as it increases the meaningfulness of our activity, and 
consequently our flourishing. 
 
 
                                               
25 It is also interesting to think about what kind of world we would live in if we were not the kind of 
creatures that did not love by way of identification. Many quintessentially human practices would 
disappear, including environmental concerns, concerns to do with social justice or animal rights, et 
cetera.   
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1.3   Williams’ ‘Ground Projects’ 
 
Like Frankfurt, Williams is open about the range of considerations we should canvass in 
responding to the Socratic question. He grants that moral considerations are often 
compelling, but bemoans the fact that philosophers tend to think of them as ‘possess[ing] 
some special, indeed supreme, kind of dignity or importance’ (1981a: 21). As he puts it in 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, practical philosophers err insofar as they assume moral 
considerations contribute to an ‘especially important kind of deliberative conclusion’, and 
that these considerations must always be prioritised in any practical dilemma (1985: 174–
5). This is an error, for Williams, because we can legitimately determine a course of conduct 
‘for reasons of prudence, self-protection, aesthetic or artistic concern, or sheer self-
assertion’, reasons which may, on occasion, legitimately trump moral ones (1985: 188). 
Because it drastically narrows the range of permissible considerations to be adjudicated 
over by our practical reasoning, Williams tells us that many ‘philosophical mistakes are 
woven into morality’:  
 
It misunderstands obligations, not seeing how they form just one type 
of ethical consideration. It misunderstands practical necessity, thinking 
it peculiar to the ethical. It misunderstands ethical practical necessity, 
thinking it peculiar to obligations. Beyond all this, morality makes 
people think that, without its very special obligation, there is only 
inclination; without its utter voluntariness, there is only force; without 
its ultimately pure justice, there is no justice. Its philosophical errors are 
only the most abstract expressions of a deeply rooted and still powerful 
misconception of life. (1985: 196) 
 
Just as Frankfurt indicates that resolving the Socratic question requires us to take 
‘nonmoral modes of normativity’ seriously, so too Williams proposes that what he calls 
our ‘ground projects’ are fundamentally important in getting the question into focus. If we 
compare the non-moral considerations both thinkers list, many are strikingly similar; 
Frankfurt’s ‘imperatives [concerning] style, of intellect’ (1999 [1993]: 115) closely track 
Williams’ ‘reasons of […] aesthetic or artistic concern, or sheer self-assertion’ (1985: 188). 
So what does Williams understand ground projects to be? And can it add anything to the 
composite notion of a passionate attachment which we have started to build from 
Frankfurt’s account of entities that generate ‘reasons of love’? 
Williams’ most informative characterisation of ground projects appears in 
‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, where he describes them as activities or goals 
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constituting our practical identities (1981a [1976]). Ground projects are both the stake that 
we have in being a specific person, as well as the practical purposes around which we 
orientate our lives. This could make such projects sound self-orientated or even resolutely 
selfish, which in turn would make it difficult for us to distinguish them from prudential 
considerations. This would be a mistake. For Williams, we exist for the sake of our ground 
project, not the other way round. Like Frankfurt’s ‘loved’ or ‘cared for’ entities, a ground 
project provides the semantic horizon of a life imbued with meaningful concerns.26 Ground 
projects are not just the most important source of considerations pertaining to the question 
of ‘how one should live’, but they also bear decisively on the question of whether one has 
reason to live at all. He writes:    
 
[A] man’s ground projects provid[e] the motive force which propels him 
into the future, and give him a reason for living. […] For a project to 
play this ground role, it does not have to be true that if it were frustrated 
or in any of various ways he lost it, he would have to commit suicide, 
nor does he have to think that. Other things, or the mere hope of other 
things, may keep him going. But he may feel in those circumstances that 
he might as well have died. (1981a [1976]: 13)27 
 
In the passage above Williams does not pull his punches in delimiting the magnitude of 
what is at stake: ground projects are so deeply connected with our flourishing that they 
underwrite our very attachment to life itself. Indeed, we could think back to H. A. 
Prichard’s comment, used as the epigraph of this chapter, about those Shakespearian 
characters we find ourselves admiring for non-moral reasons. In Williams’ terms we can 
                                               
26 The two definitive features of ground projects: how they (i) constitute our practical identity, and 
(ii) allow us to view our activities as meaningful, are used by Williams to attack the central 
contentions of Utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophy respectively. Regarding the former (i), 
Utilitarianism makes the ‘absurd […] demand that a person should ‘neglect how his actions and his 
decisions [are] the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and the attitudes with which 
he is most closely identified’ (1973: 116–7); regarding the latter (ii), the Kantian faces the problem of 
explaining how ‘impartial morality’ can be a ‘reasonable demand on the agent’ when it involves 
giving up ‘in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents, something which 
is a condition of his having any interest in being around in that world at all.’ (1981a [1976]: 14) 
27 Cf. Wolf. ‘One difference, which Williams himself points out, has to do with the special connection 
meaning has with having a reason to live. What gives meaning to our lives gives us reasons to live, 
even when we do not care much, for our own sakes, whether we live or die. What gives meaning to 
our lives gives us reasons to live even when the prospects for our own well-being are bleak.’ (2010: 
55–6) 
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say that what drives Juliet to kill herself is her feeling that remaining alive would be 
abhorrent since the ground project of a shared life with her beloved is (or seems due to his 
coma) no longer possible. Juliet does not turn Romeo’s dagger on herself because she is 
excruciatingly unhappy; rather she does so because her passionate character has been so 
deeply altered that she can no longer recognise herself – she can no longer identify as Juliet 
– and she finds the prospect of living with none of her previous ground projects deeply 
alienating and ultimately unconscionable.  
But we need not think of ground projects as so exceptional or extraordinary 
undertakings. Responding to Williams, Wolf warns that, although helpful, his coinage of 
the term ‘ground project’ has the potential to mislead because it is ‘too suggestive of a 
finite, determinate task’. Without suitable caveats, the term’s connotations could mislead:  
 
Among the things that come to mind as projects are certain kinds of 
hobbies or careers, or rather specific tasks that fall within the sphere of 
such hobbies or careers: things that can be seen as accomplishments, like 
producing a proof or a poem or a pudding, the organizing of a union or 
a high school band. (2015 [2007]: 94) 
 
Thinking of projects in these terms generates problems for Wolf, because although ‘project-
like’ activities ‘contribute to the meaningfulness of people’s lives’, there are ‘other forms of 
meaningfulness that are less directed, and less oriented to demonstrable achievement’ 
(2015 [2007]: 94). Interpersonal relationships, Wolf continues, an exemplary kind of 
passionate attachment, are ‘awkwardly described as projects’ both because they are often 
not ‘deliberately take[n] on’, nor are they discrete and achievable tasks. In addition to this, 
even the meaning of those project-like activities we have in our life ‘have the meaning they 
do for us only because of their place in nonproject-like relationships in which we are 
enmeshed and with which we identify’ (2015 [2007]: 94).  
Wolf follows Frankfurt in her view that ‘nonproject-like’ entities like interpersonal 
relationships are the most common things to which we attach ourselves, and both believe 
they often provide a powerful and legitimate source of action-guiding considerations 
relating to the passionate dimension of our practical reasoning. Interpersonal 
relationships, and other passionate attachments, generate ‘reasons of love’ which are 
fundamentally important in resolving the question of ‘how one should live’. Nevertheless, 
Williams’ own characterisation of a ground project suggests that he would be able to 
endorse what Wolf regards as her important caveats to his terminology. Following Wolf’s 
emendations  to the terminology of ground projects further emphasises their all-
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encompassing and heteronymous nature, as well as the ubiquity of such passionate 
attachments.  
As well as agreeing with Frankfurt that this third domain of practical reasoning 
pertains to our practical identities, and generates considerations relating to leading a 
meaningful life, Williams emphasises how ground projects give rise to other kinds of non-
moral action-guiding considerations. Contrary to prudential considerations, ground 
projects can require us to act in ways that are directly contrary to our own interests, either 
in the short or long-term, which we saw most tragically in the example in Juliet. Williams 
explains: 
 
Ground projects do not have to be selfish, in the sense that they are just 
concerned with things for the agent. Nor do they have to be self-centred, 
in the sense that the creative projects of a Romantic artist could be 
considerably self-centred (where it has to be him, but not for him). […] 
There is no contradiction in the idea of a man’s dying for a ground 
project – quite the reverse, since if death really is necessary for the 
project, then to live would be to live with it unsatisfied, something 
which, if it really is his ground project, he has no reason to do. (1981a 
[1976]: 13) 
 
To illustrate how a person’s ground projects may legitimately generate considerations that 
override their moral or prudential considerations, we can reflect on Williams’ famous 
account of a dilemma in the practical reasoning of the nineteenth-century painter Paul 
Gauguin, appearing in his essay ‘Moral Luck’. Here Williams explores how the external 
contingencies involved in a practical dilemma affects our evaluation of its outcome, 
although I will use the example in a different sense. I am not concerned with the question 
of the ‘success conditions’ of Gauguin’s project, but the example can be used to tease out 
our intuitions regarding the legitimacy of acting on considerations pertaining to our 
passionate attachments, especially when these considerations enter into direct conflict with 
moral or prudential ones, or both. 
Gauguin’s decision to abandon his family in Paris to permanently resettle in Tahiti 
is notorious; it has been the theme of a recent biopic, as well as numerous literary studies.28 
Putting these references aside, however, and telling us he will ‘not be limited by historical 
facts’, Williams sets up his example in the following way:  
 
                                               
28 Somerset Maugham’s The Moon and Sixpence (2009 [1919]) is the best known literary study. See 
Edouard Deluc’s movie Gauguin: Voyage to Tahiti (2017). 
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(i) Gauguin is a ‘creative artist who turns away from definite and 
pressing human claims on him in order to live a life in which, as 
he supposes, he can pursue his art’ (1981b [1976]: 22). 
 
(ii) He is ‘concerned about [his moral obligations] and what is 
involved in their being neglected (we may suppose these to be 
grim)’ (1981b [1976]: 23). 
 
(iii) ‘[N]evertheless, [he] opts for [a life] of realising his gifts as a 
painter’ (1981b [1976]: 23) 
 
Although the ‘success conditions’ attached to Gauguin’s undertaking are Williams’ explicit 
focus, the assumption of the example is that there are times when we are justified in 
ignoring or suspending moral or prudential considerations in order to pursue our ‘ground 
projects’, that is, our passionate attachments.  
Few of us would wish to be in Gauguin’s position, but the example is intuitively 
informative as it offers us a stark insight into what might happen if circumstances conspire 
to force us to choose between the three kinds of competing consideration pertaining to the 
Socratic question. Some of us – not just frustrated artists – find it hard to shake off the 
feeling that Gauguin got something fundamentally right, despite behaving so badly. While 
we may not be able to endorse his overall decision, there is something in it which prevents 
us from wholeheartedly condemning the painter. Perhaps the easiest way to bring out 
these intuitions is to show how quickly they alter if we tweak the example. Replacing the 
ground project of travelling to Tahiti to become a painter with a prudential concern related 
to Gauguin’s immediate pleasure or even his overall well-being, quickly changes our 
intuitions. Would our sneaking sympathy for Gauguin’s trip remain if he chose to neglect 
his moral obligations for the sake of going to Tahiti on holiday? If we view the only 
alternative to moral considerations to be self-interested prudential ones, then we are forced 
to posit an equivalence between prudential and passionate considerations, leading us to 
answer this question in the affirmative. But surely we have more reason to think that the 
passionately-painting Gauguin acts in a way that resolves the Socratic question more 
legitimately than the hedonistically-holidaying Gauguin, for instance, and the intuitive 
difference we feel when evaluating his behaviour can be explained by the fact we value 
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ground projects, or passionate attachments, more than purely self-interested 
considerations.29   
Williams sums up these intuitions, telling us that we are ‘sometimes guided by the 
notion that it would be the best of worlds in which morality were universally respected 
and all men were of a disposition to affirm it’, but despite this feeling we have ‘deep and 
persistent reasons to be grateful that that is not the world we have.’ (1981: 23). When 
considering the dilemma that Gauguin faces, it is hard to shake off the thought that his 
decision to give significant weight to the aesthetic or artistic concerns of his ground project 
was an entirely unreasonable thing to do. Even though, on balance, we may think Gauguin 
should have set sail, we may concede there was something right about his action, which 
suggests we can learn something about the nature of practical reason by considering his 
case. We can say that the Gauguin character in Williams’ example suggests that it can 
sometimes be reasonable for us to suspend the authority of moral obligations and to 
consider the importance of those relating to his ground project more seriously.  
We will return to Gauguin’s decision-making process in Ch. 5, when we examine 
how exercises of self-cultivation could be usefully employed in making a decision that 
involves adjudicating between the competing demands of those considerations that 
pertain to the Socratic question. Read alongside Williams’ analysis of the artist’s plight, 
explored in Ch. 1, this yields an unexpected and disconcerting intuition: flourishing does 
not involve acting on moral or prudential considerations exclusively, nor even a 
combination of both these things, as actively pursuing our passionate attachments is also 
fundamentally important. Although Williams is primarily concerned to argue that our 
sympathy for Gauguin ultimately depends on whether he succeeds as an artist, records of 
the artist’s practical deliberation may make us sympathetic to his resolution of the Socratic 
question, one in which he balances a range of considerations of which moral concerns form 
only a minor part.  
Rather than supporting the idea that Gauguin should always privilege and 
prioritise his moral commitments, we find ourselves uncertain about this, even 
countenancing the idea that, whether or not his venture turns out to be successful, his 
decision to set sail for Tahiti attempts to resolve the question of ‘how to live’ in a way that 
                                               
29 Take romantic love, for instance, which is often regarded as the quintessential example of a 
passionate attachment. As romantic comedies and tragedies often depict, a person in a love 
relationship would have good reason to be hurt or outraged if they discovered that their beloved’s 
love for them was instrumental in character. Take, for example, the nefarious protagonist in Mozart’s 
Don Giovanni, who initially persuades his conquests that he loves them, before breaking their heart 
by using them instrumentally for his sexual gratification.  
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gets something fundamentally right. This is not to say that Gauguin gets everything right, 
of course –  far from it, we may say – but it does illustrate how our sympathies can be 
invoked, at least on an intuitive level, to someone whose life is not primarily guided by 
moral or prudential considerations, but rather by some other ‘end in life’, as Gauguin 
himself puts it (1936 [1898]: 18; see epigraph to Ch. 5). Not embarking on such an adventure 
because of weighty moral commitments may be commendable, but those of us who can 
empathise with Gauguin’s response to his dilemma cannot escape the feeling that a life 
dominated by moral considerations would miss something, just as Wolf judged the life of 
the moral saint to be incomplete. Similarly, as we saw Socrates argue in Gorgias, a life taken 
up with the prudential concerns relating to the satisfaction of simple desires would leave 
us questioning whether such a life is flourishing in the fullest sense of the term. 
 
1.4   Wolf on ‘Meaningfulness’ 
 
Like Frankfurt and Williams, Wolf views modern moral philosophers as ignoring ‘many 
of the motives and reasons that shape our lives’ (2010: 2). She claims that among these 
neglected considerations are both those that most closely pertain to ‘activities that make 
our lives worth living’, and that they are most closely linked to the Socratic question (2010: 
2, 12). Wolf expresses regret that all too often commentators treat Williams’ views on 
practical philosophy as either ‘morally subversive or terribly depressing’, and she 
proposes treating his ‘conclusions in a different light’ by focusing on how they generate 
meaningfulness in our lives (2010: 58). Like Williams, she thinks that our motivation to 
seek out meaningful activities cannot be explained in terms of enjoyment or any other story 
relating to prudential self-interest. Focusing on examples of non-project-like passionate 
attachments, she writes:     
 
Much of what we do would be inexplicable, or at least indefensible, if 
its justification depended either on its being a duty or, even in the long 
run, on its maximally contributing to our net fun. Relationships with 
friends and family, nonobligatory aspects of professional roles, and 
long-term commitments to artistic, scholarly, or athletic endeavours 
typically lead us to devote time and energy to things that are difficult or 
unpleasant, and to forgo opportunities for relaxation and enjoyment. 
[…] There is, however, a point – even a self-interested point – to doing 
things that fall outside the categories both of duty and of fun. One can 
find a reason, or at least a justifying explanation, for doing something in 
the fact that the act or activity in question contributes to the 
meaningfulness of one’s life. (2016 [1997]: 124) 
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For Wolf, this observation disqualifies the two models of human motivation which moral 
philosophers typically resort to in order explain and justify our conduct. She tells us that 
the ‘oldest and most popular model’ of human motivation – perhaps thinking of Plato’s 
portrayal of Callicles30 – ‘conceives of human beings as egoists, moved and guided 
exclusively by what they take to be in their own self-interest’ (2010: 1). But as well as a 
unitary conception of human motivation, she notes, ‘there have long been defenders of a 
dualistic model of motivation […], according to which people are capable of being moved 
not only by self-interest, but also by something “higher.”’ (2010: 1; italics added).31  
From this we can see Wolf follows Williams and Frankfurt insofar as she also offers 
a tripartite view of the kinds of considerations which bear upon the Socratic question: 
practical reason does not just comprise prudential considerations, nor a combination of 
prudential and moral ones, but also includes considerations pertaining to our passionate 
attachments. Furthermore she agrees with Frankfurt and Williams that our passionate 
attachments are a source of meaningfulness, and that both these things are a necessary 
aspect of the flourishing life.32 She supports the latter claim with the observation that ‘most 
people […] behave in ways that suggest that they are looking for worthwhile things to do 
with their lives’ insofar as ‘[t]hey actively seek projects or, more typically, happily seize 
upon activities, from among those to which they are attracted, that they believe to be 
worthwhile’ (2016 [1997]: 120). According to Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf, our passionate 
attachments (‘reasons of love’, ‘ground projects’, or ‘meaningfulness’) cannot even be 
accommodated by the bipartite picture of practical reasoning which these philosophers 
                                               
30 See Callicles’ outburst in the Gorgias ‘[L]iving correctly involves allowing one’s appetites to get as 
large as possible and not restrain them. And when they are as large as possible, he ought to be 
competent to devote himself to them by means of his bravery and intelligence, and to fill them with 
whatever he may have an appetite for at the time. […] [W]antonness, lack of discipline, and freedom, 
if available in good supply, are excellence and happiness; as for these other things, these fancy 
phrases, these contracts of men that go against nature, they’re worthless nonsense!’ (Plato 1997 
[Gorgias]: 491e–92c).  
31 We can find such a dualistic model in both major traditions of modern moral philosophy. Kant 
holds that either our inclinations or our reasoning can motivate us, whereas a Utilitarian such as 
Sidgwick holds that human beings can either be motivated by their own immediate self-interest or 
by the interests of others.  
32 Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf are not alone in claiming this. See also Thaddeus Metz’s claim that 
meaning is a ‘gradient and variable final good’ (2013a: 2). Antti Kauppinen puts this even more 
strongly when he tells us that  ‘meaning in life is something […] desirable for its own sake’ (2012: 
288).  
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offer. As Wolf herself puts it, despite meaningfulness having a greater bearing on our 
‘thinking about what to do and how to live’, considerations relating to it are ‘not reducible 
to or subsumable under either happiness, as it is ordinarily understood, or morality’ (2010: 
2–3). Operating outside of the work-a-day distinction between morality and self-interest 
by making space for ‘meaningfulness’, ‘ground projects’, or our ‘reasons of love’ – to run 
together the terminology of these thinkers – has the potential to better understand human 
experience, and can save us from ‘misunderstand[ing] our values, and ourselves, and 
distort[ing] our concerns.’ (Wolf 2010: 6). Contra both the unitary or dualistic views of 
practical reason, Wolf thinks we are motivated by ‘something “higher”’ when we act on 
reasons pertaining to ‘meaningfulness’. So what does she think meaningfulness consist in? 
And does her account of it add anything to the notion of a passionate attachment which 
we have started building from the accounts of Frankfurt and Williams? 
Wolf tells us that her ‘endoxic’ definition of meaningfulness combines two ‘popular 
views’, each of which emphasises different ways of how ‘meaning in life [is an ingredient] 
– sometimes the key ingredients – in a life well lived.’ (2015 [2007]: 90). The first view is the 
‘[f]igure out what turns you on, and go for it’ view, which amounts to the idea that ‘it 
doesn’t matter what you do with your life as long as it is something you love’; the second 
view is that meaningfulness consists in becoming ‘involved in something ‘“larger than 
oneself”’. Wolf links both views, telling us that for an entity to generate meaningfulness it 
must (i) relate to ‘“your passion”’ and (ii) it must relate to ‘“something larger than 
yourself”’ (2010: 10). So far so good, as both views are compatible with Frankfurt’s and 
Williams’ respective accounts of ‘objects of care’ and ‘ground projects’; we are passionately 
engaged with such entities, they are larger than ourselves in the sense that they extend 
beyond our self-interested concerns,33 and because of these two things they imbue our lives 
with a sense of meaningfulness. But Wolf makes the further claim that only entities that 
are  ‘objectively attractive’, that is, ‘“worthy of love”’ can generate meaningfulness. This is 
not because of her stipulation that meaningfulness involves connecting with an entity 
outside of oneself, however, but because of her account of ‘objective attractiveness’. As we 
saw, both Frankfurt and Williams are committed to the idea that our passionate 
attachments are the source of meaningfulness, and these entities are resolutely outside 
ourselves.  
                                               
33 Nagel offers some informative examples of the latter view. He writes, ‘[t]hose seeking to supply 
their lives with meaning usually envision a role or function in something larger than themselves 
[such as] society, the state, the revolution, the progress of history, the advance of science, or religion 
and the glory of God’ (Nagel 1979: 16).  
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She notes that the idea of viewing ‘some objects but not others as being “worthy of 
love” may be thought to be contentious’ (2010: 8), but claims – in contradistinction to 
Frankfurt and Williams34 – that even if a person is ‘gripped, excited, interested, engaged, 
or […] loves something’ this does not mean that the entity in question can be a passionate 
attachment that is capable of sustaining meaningfulness. She provides two examples:  
 
A person who loves smoking pot all day long, or doing endless 
crossword puzzles, and has the luxury of being able to indulge in this 
without restraint does not thereby make her life meaningful. (2010: 9) 
 
Contentious or not, Wolf is right that not everything is ‘“worthy of love”’, but she gives the 
wrong reasons for this view: it is not because getting stoned on a daily basis, or doing 
crossword puzzles, are objectively unworthwhile activities, but rather the nature of the entity 
means that we cannot establish a passionate relationship with it. Again, although Wolf is 
right to say that we cannot establish passionate relationships with these kinds of things, by 
replacing her account of objective worth with an account which explains why the nature 
of certain objects makes them incapable of being passionate attachments, we can come to 
understand passionate attachments better. So why cannot a daily weed habit or a constant 
crossword puzzling be passionate attachments? And if Wolf’s account of ‘objective 
attractiveness’ cannot explain this, how can we define what passionate attachments are?  
To answer these questions we need to add to the criteria for passionate 
attachments offered by Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf. In the following subsections (1.5.1–
1.5.4), I will pick out what distinguishes passionate attachments from other kinds of 
considerations without an appeal, pace Wolf, to ‘objective worth’. I will do this by 
introducing a number of constraints on what passionate attachments can be, one of which 
will relate to their social nature which guards against importing too much caprice and 
voluntarism regarding the notion the things we choose to be passionate attachments, while 
also being wary of being overly conservative. We can, therefore, reframe Wolf’s complaint 
regarding crossword fanatics and potsmokers: rather than following her account of 
objective worth to explain why these kinds of activities cannot be passionate attachments, 
we can offer different reasons for her conclusions, ones which do not require the same 
                                               
34 Frankfurt shows his subjectivist tendency when he says that a ‘person’s life is meaningful […] only 
to the extent that it is devoted to pursuing goals that are important to that person’ (1999 [1992]: 90). 
Wolf tackles Frankfurt on this point in her essay ‘The True, the Good, and the Loveable: Frankfurt’s 
Avoidance of Objectivity’ (2002: 227–44). Cf. Frankfurt’s response to Wolf in the same volume (2002: 
245–52). 
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metaphysical baggage. Wolf is right to say that many kinds of activities cannot fulfil the 
role of passionate attachments in our lives (or fulfil it badly), but she is wrong about why 
this is the case. If we wish to solve the problem by introducing metaphysical complications 
relating to objectivity, however, we must further stipulate the criteria that ensures an entity 
can take up the role of a passionate attachment in a person’s life. This account will explain 
why the objects and activities Wolf uses as examples cannot engender meaningfulness, 
although we need not accept the reasons she gives why these activities cannot be 
passionate attachments.35  
 
1.5   What are Passionate Attachments? 
 
So far I have used the term ‘passionate attachment’ as a term of art to designate love objects 
that provide us with a crucial source of action-guiding considerations, without being moral 
obligations or prudential concerns. Our conduct is typically informed by many kinds of 
reasons, but these three dimensions are fundamentally important insofar as they generate 
essential considerations pertaining to the Socratic question, and flourishing involves 
adequately responding to all these considerations. From examining the accounts of 
passionate attachments in Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf, we can identify five broad 
similarities in how they understand these entities, as well as some important differences.  
First, each thinker agrees that our passionate attachments are irreducible to moral 
or prudential concerns, although Frankfurt and Wolf both emphasise that moral projects 
can become passionate attachments, depending on the role they have in the life of a person. 
Second, all three agree that our passionate attachments are non-instrumental because they 
are only pursued for the sake of the passionate attachment concerned. Unlike prudential 
concerns, passionate attachments are not necessarily connected to our well-being, and 
neither is there a further end for the sake of which we pursue them, but – rather like moral 
considerations – they are necessarily ends-orientated, constituting a terminus that renders 
further explanations unnecessary. Third, each agrees that passionate attachments are 
integral to the flourishing life, which motivates their complaints against modern moral 
philosophy – à la Anscombe – and their claims that our love relationships should be 
reinstated as centrally important in practical philosophy – à la Murdoch. Fourth, each 
                                               
35 Wolf herself hints at the fact that there may be other considerations aside from objective worth 
when she notes the importance of engaging with our passionate attachments in the right way. She 
tells us that the ‘relationship between the subject and the object of her attraction must be an active 
one’ and that ‘mere passive recognition and a positive attitude toward an object’s or activity’s value 
is not sufficient for a meaningful life’ (2010: 9). 
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views our passionate attachments as connected with our sense that our lives are 
meaningful, that is, how we view our lives to be purposeful or significant. Instead of the 
idea that only the existence of a divine being can underwrite the existence of a meaningful 
life-world – memorably attacked by Nietzsche’s mocking lament ‘God is dead’36 – all think 
that our experience of our lives as meaningful can be underwritten by the fact we pursue 
passionate attachments. Fifth, all indicate that experiencing our life as meaningful is a 
necessary condition of human flourishing: neither hedonistically enjoying ourselves, nor 
consistently acting virtuously allows us to flourish in the full sense of the term. Rather we 
need to pursue things we love, and not just because pursuing this or that passionate 
attachment is a worthwhile thing to do – but because the very pursuit of passionate 
attachments is connected to our flourishing.   
These overlappings alone would allow us to articulate a workable notion of a 
passionate attachment, but Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf each bring their own distinctive 
contribution to the notion, enriching it over and above the conceptual commonalities they 
share. Each distinctive aspect can be viewed as addressing an insufficiency in the other 
accounts, so adding each of these aspects creates a composite account of the passionate 
attachments that is immunised against criticisms which each account taken alone might be 
thought to inherit. Taken together we get a more robust and comprehensive account of a 
passionate attachment, one which is sensitive to the problems the others encounter.  
I examined Frankfurt’s proposal that we should think of passionate attachments 
in terms of identification in 1.2, showing that, in his terms, we identify with our passionate 
attachments, sharing their wins and suffering their losses. This distinguishes them from 
prudential considerations which we only care about instrumentally insofar as they allow 
us to reach further goals concerned with our well-being. Frankfurt’s emphasis of 
identification is an important part of my definition, and both Williams and Wolf agree that 
it is an essential aspect of how passionate attachments function. Nevertheless, in 1.3 I 
showed that Williams usefully extends the notion of identification by emphasising how it 
must be understood as personalised. In his celebrated attack on Utilitarianism, I showed 
that he regards one of the dangers of blindly following the guidance of the Utilitarian 
Calculus is that it obviates the distinctively personal investment we have in any given project 
                                               
36 Thaddeus Metz calls views such as the one Nietzsche criticises ‘supernaturalism’ (that ‘one’s 
existence is significant just insofar as one has a certain relation with some spiritual realm’). See also 
his account of how meaningfulness can be generated by our moral commitments. Frankfurt and Wolf 
would agree with him that a moral project – as opposed to merely meeting moral obligations – could 
generate meaningfulness, but only insofar as the project functioned as a passionate attachment in the 
person’s life (2013b: 19).   
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(n.26). On Williams’ account, this is required for identification, especially if it is to be a 
sufficiently motivating feature for a perilous undertaking. Lastly, Wolf refines and expands 
Williams’ notion of a ground project, noting that such entities need to be understood as 
firmly embedded within ‘flesh and blood’ relationships with other persons because our 
project-orientated engagement with the world must be understood as involving other 
people. This stipulation allows us to broaden the understanding of how passionate 
attachments are involved in the generation of meaningfulness bequeathed to us by 
Williams, bringing us closer to Frankfurt’s emphasis on how loving relationships with 
other persons are especially important in how we decide to lead our lives.  
Now that I have outlined how Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s conceptions of 
passionate attachments usefully bolster one another, I am ready to complete my definition 
of the notion with some extra features. Doing this allows me to avoid weaknesses that can 
be found in (i) Wolf’s and (ii) Frankfurt’s and Williams’ positions. On the one hand, Wolf 
argues that crossword puzzles and smoking cannabis cannot generate meaning because 
they are not ‘objectively worthwhile’.37 On the other, Frankfurt and Williams tell us that 
‘what we care about’ and ‘ground projects’ can only be – in Wolf’s words – ‘subjectively 
attractive’. Following Frankfurt and Williams would mean that any subjectively attractive 
entity could function as a passionate attachment (even crossword puzzles and smoking 
cannabis); whereas following Wolf would require giving an account of ‘objective worth’. 
In what follows, I suggest that passionate attachments: need a certain magnitude and 
complexity (1.5.1), require a certain amount of exclusive attention (1.5.2), require a robust 
social dimension (1.5.3), as well as examining why certain entities make for inappropriate 
or toxic passionate attachments that are incompatible with the flourishing life (1.5.4). 
Adding these extra features to the notion of a passionate attachment shows why crossword 
puzzles and smoking cannabis do not fit the requirements to be passionate attachments 
without appealing to Wolf’s notion of ‘objective worth’. It also helps us understand what 
passionate attachments are, distinguishes them from other superficially similar entities, as 






                                               
37 I pass over this question, because whether one’s passionate attachments are objective or subjective 
does not directly bear upon the question of whether one should cultivate them, and would lead to 
metaphysical issues that could only be fully addressed with lengthy digressions.  
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1.5.1   Magnitude and Complexity of Passionate Attachments 
 
Entities which are suitable candidates to be passionate attachments must exceed a 
threshold magnitude, in the sense that they must be able to sustain a wide range of 
interactions without exhaustion or onerous repetition, and they must exceed a threshold 
complexity for the same reasons. This means that one would struggle to make the eating 
of an ice cream cone into a passionate attachment, because this activity simply does not 
have enough scope – it is neither sizable nor complex enough – to support the requisite 
level of interest and engagement. Of course, the eating of an ice-cream cone could occur in 
the context of a passionate attachment involving, say, gastronomic pleasure, but in that 
case the reasons for eating the cone would be prudential because they would be concerned 
to fulfil a further aim, even if this aim related to a passionate attachment. Gastronomic 
pleasure could be a passionate attachment, because it has a suitably greater magnitude 
than merely eating a cone. It involves many different possibilities relating to its fulfilment. 
If a person wanted to make the eating of a cone into a passionate attachment, then they 
would have to develop an overriding interest in cones, sample different kinds of gelato 
from different regions in Italy, say, learn about the history of cone-making, et cetera. Unless 
the extent of their interest was suitably impressive, however, we would have to resist 
saying that ice cream cone eating could be a passionate attachment at all. 
It is also important that only entities above a threshold level of magnitude and 
complexity are able to fulfil the other criteria for passionate attachments, which I located 
in the work of Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf. One cannot identify as an ice cream cone eater 
on account of the limited scope of this activity, but one could identify as something larger 
as a ‘foodie’ or gourmand. For this reason we would resist understanding ice cream cone 
eating as a passionate attachment because it does not fit with Frankfurt’s insistence on 
identification, and thinking about how we can only identify with something of a sufficient 
scale shows us why: identities must be publicly shared, which rules out private and 
idiosyncratic activities, as I explore in the next section.    
Finally, we can say that the fact that passionate attachments must exceed a 
threshold level of magnitude or complexity is also implied if we consider it as relating to 
the question of ‘how one should live’. It would make no sense to say that one has resolved 
the Socratic question by deciding to eat an ice cream cone, whereas it would make better 
sense to say that one had devoted one’s life to the pleasures of food. Even bona fide 
passionate attachments vary in magnitude and complexity, but an attachment that was 
below the required threshold for either of these things would be so quickly expendable 
that it may well mitigate against us choosing it as a passionate attachment in the first place.  
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1.5.2   Social Dimensions of Passionate Attachments 
 
As well as exceeding a threshold magnitude and complexity, passionate attachments must 
be collectively understood and socially shared. Again, this social dimension has already 
been implied by what Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf say about how our passionate 
attachments are integrally involved in the formation of our practical identities, and I 
touched on some of the reasons why this is so above. Since our practical identities involve 
sharing our desires, beliefs, and values with others, they must be understood socially, and 
a passionate attachment which did not have a social dimension would not allow us to do 
this. Our passionate attachments are tokens which are used to exchange information about 
ourselves, and it would be difficult to say we understood a person if we did not understand 
their passionate attachments (see n.58 below). 
We get another clue about the social dimension of passionate attachments insofar 
as we see them as connected to the generation of meaning, at least in the subjective sense. 
Meaningful activities are deeply entangled with our social lives; they allow us to share our 
lives with one another. Wolf has already hinted at this when she qualifies Williams’ 
terminology regarding ground projects, which she claims must be understood within the 
context of socially embedded relationships; ground projects only assume this status insofar 
as they have a social context, even in the case of Gauguin who could be said to paint for 
posterity. All of these reasons should lead us to view passionate attachments as eminently 
social endeavours. Wolf’s caveat underlines how many commonly-held passionate 
attachments have a social dimension, but let’s consider two examples of apparent 
passionate attachments, which do not seem to be social – at least not at first glance.  
Take for example, Jasmine, a person who learns how to play a long-disused 
musical instrument. Let us say she is the only person who knows how to play this 
instrument, and has to explore archives containing musical scores and playing instructions 
in order to learn how to do this. Since Jasmine is the only person who engages in this kind 
of activity, it is not obvious how it can be social, but there are reasons why we should 
consider it in this way. Obviously, it is not social in the sense that she can play a duet or 
trio with others, but it is so in the sense that there are existing practices and conventions 
concerning the playing of the instrument. This is because there is some social momentum 
within this practice already. A person who learns to play this instrument, does so by 
reconstructing the historical conventions and knowledge available to them. This need not 
mean they involve other people directly, but they must be involved insofar as practices 
and conventions concerning the thing have been previously established, and are involved 
in the pursuit of the passion attachment concerned. Alternatively, the playing of this 
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instrument could be incorporated into the instrument players practical identity insofar as 
it is still within the category of music-playing, an activity which is socially-shared with 
others who play different kinds of instruments. While the details of this long-neglected 
instrument may no longer be known, it can still be informatively understood in terms of 
music-making which ensures the playing of this long-lost instrument retains a social 
dimension.   
The player of this long-lost musical instrument can be informatively contrasted 
with the case of a person who takes on a similar-seeming asocial attachment, albeit one 
which genuinely does not meet the social criterion that passionate attachments must have. 
Take for example, Jake, a hoarder of junk. Jake’s pursuit of junk may well meet the criteria 
of magnitude and complexity (variety of junk is suitably wide in scope; prima facie junk is 
a complex enough entity), but in this case the social dimension of the attachment is lacking 
in a way that is not amenable to our charitable reconstruction as was the case of Jasmine, 
the long-lost instrument player. There is no tradition of practices relating to hoarding as 
each hoarder employs their own rules and idiosyncratic schemas regarding what items to 
collect. This means the activity of hoarding has no public criteria of correctness; it is entirely 
at Jake’s whim whether he hoards this or that item, as there is no recognised code of 
hoarding which determines whether an item should be collected or left on the street. This 
prevents Jakes’s hoarding from functioning as part of his practical identity, as well as 
disqualifying his activity from being meaningful except in an analogous sense of the term. 
Although Jake’s activity could be extremely meaningful to him (indeed the nature of 
hoarding requires that it must be) upon interrogation the sense that the hoarder is engaged 
in a purposeful activity which would be difficult to establish because it has no external 
validation.  
 
1.5.3   Exclusivity of Passionate Attachments 
 
Whereas the previous two subsections have dealt with the qualities that entities need to be 
passionate attachments, this section deals with requirements relating to how such entities 
feature in the life of the person in order to qualify as a passionate attachment. The idea is 
that two people could strive to make the same kind of entity into a passionate attachment, 
with one doing this successfully and the other failing to do so because of differences in 
how each person attempted to integrate the attachment into their life, rather than anything 
to do with the nature of the potential passionate attachment they intend to take up. Take 
the examples I explored in 1.5.1: the ‘foodie’ with a passionate attachment to gastronomic 
experience. For this to be a passionate attachment, the person who pursues it must 
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persevere in this pursuit, as well as it featuring to a significant extent in their passionate 
character. Just as with magnitude and complexity, both are connected. Because we 
persevere with our engagement with passionate attachment, there is reason to think it will 
take up a significant amount of time; because the attachment takes up this amount of time, 
there is reason to think that it will have a somewhat exclusive hold on our attention and 
activities. Someone who tried to love something, which would be otherwise capable of 
being a passionate attachment, may fail to establish the right kind of love relationship with 
it by not devoting enough time to it, or by overly sharing time that could be devoted to it 
with their pursuit of other entities.  
Frankfurt touches upon the first of these features of passionate attachments when 
he discusses the difference between desires pertaining to what we care about, and those 
pertaining to what we desire although do not care about at all. He writes:  
 
[A] person can care about something only over some more or less 
extended period of time. It is possible to desire something, or to think it 
valuable, only for a moment. Desires and beliefs have no inherent 
persistence; nothing in the nature of wanting or of believing requires 
that a desire or a belief must endure. But the notion of guidance, and 
hence the notion of caring, implies a certain consistency or steadiness of 
behaviour; and this presupposes some degree of persistence. (1998 
[1982]: 84) 
 
Here Frankfurt alerts us to something important about the nature of passionate 
attachments: these kinds of entities, and the considerations they generate, require us to 
engage with them the required way, one which involves closely attending to them over a 
protracted period of time. A person who was not willing or able to persevere in their 
engagement with an entity that would otherwise make for a suitable passionate attachment 
cannot claim that this thing has the status of a passionate attachment in their life. We would 
have good reason to be suspicious of a person who claims to be passionately attached to a 
thing without engaging in those activities which would maintain, foster, and further 
strengthen this relation. For example, it is reasonable to think that someone who said they 
were passionate about playing the violin, is required to put in the requisite amount of 
practice. Of course, there is much room for complacency in the way we treat our passionate 
attachments. We often become distracted regarding the pursuit of our passionate 
attachments, even using the word ‘dilettante’ to describe someone who makes the claim 
that an object or activity is a passionate attachment, while not persevering in their 
engagement with the thing, or without it having a dominant role in their resolution to the 
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Socratic question. In these kinds of cases, what is salient is that the object would make for 
a perfectly good passionate attachment – that is, it would meet all the criteria outlined 
above – but for how the person engages with it.  
 We can also understand why this might be the case by considering some of the 
stipulations regarding passionate attachments I have made above. Considerations 
pertaining to our passionate character feature in a meaningful way in our resolution to the 
Socratic question. Although we may blithely assume that an entity is our passionate 
attachment, without affirmative action on our part, this entity cannot informatively 
contribute to resolving the question of ‘how one should live’. In this case we would do well 
to disabuse ourselves of the fantasy that the entity in question is a passionate attachment 
for us. Just as we do not attempt to re-answer the Socratic question each day, so too our 
passionate attachments must be longer lasting, and cannot be engaged with on a sporadic 
or an intermittent basis.  
 Related to the question of how a person engages with a certain passionate 
attachment is the question of how powerfully it features in the person’s resolution of the 
Socratic question. While it is likely that a person has more than one passionate attachment 
in their life, we would be suspicious if a person claimed to have an extremely large number 
of passionate attachments because this would indicate that were not able to engage with 
them with the requisite level of perseverance. Too large a number of passionate 
attachments may indicate that none of them is a genuine passionate attachment for the 
person, that they are not truly committed to them, or that they do not have the requisite 
time and resources to pursue them properly, which is important given the magnitude and 
complexity of passionate attachments, as I showed in the previous section.  
 
1.5.4   Toxic or Inappropriate Passionate Attachments 
  
In my above outline of what passionate attachments are, I have only discussed those that 
could be said to have a positive effect on our flourishing, partly because I have followed 
Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf in arguing that these entities have been neglected in the 
account of the good life offered by modern moral philosophy. Nevertheless, it is important 
to acknowledge that some passionate attachments hamper or thwart our flourishing, and 
it is useful to outline such toxic or inappropriate passionate attachments in order to prepare 
for my account of why we have reason to cultivate our passionate character in the next 
chapter. Toxic or inappropriate passionate attachments meet all the above criteria for being 
passionate attachments, but nonetheless negatively impact upon our flourishing, so it 
would be inadvisable to take them up. Passionate attachments can be toxic or 
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inappropriate for at least three reasons. They may (i) directly or indirectly contravene our 
moral obligations; (ii) they may directly or indirectly jeopardise our prudential concerns; 
or (iii) the passionate attachment’s very nature may directly thwart us from establishing a 
satisfying relationship with it.  
An example of (i), a passionate attachment that directly compromises the 
protagonist’s moral obligations, is Vladimir Nabokov’s depiction of Humbert Humbert’s 
sexual pursuit of 12-year-old Dolores Haze in Lolita. Not only is Dolores a minor, but to 
ensure his pursuit is successful Prof. Humbert resorts to kidnapping and drugging the 
child so his sexual relationship with her is unhindered and undetectable. Dolores meets all 
the criteria for a passionate attachment laid out above. Prof. Humbert’s conquest of her is 
an integral part of his practical identity, one which sustains a deep sense of meaningfulness 
in his life. Furthermore, his pursuit of Dolores is of sufficient magnitude and complexity, 
and Prof. Humbert goes to great lengths to discuss precedents for age differences within 
relationships, at least attempting to lend his passionate attachment a legitimate social 
dimension (albeit one at odds by his elaborate subterfuge). While Dolores is clearly a 
passionate attachment for Prof. Humbert, she must be viewed as an inappropriate one 
because in pursuing her Prof. Humbert contravenes his moral obligations relating to sexual 
consent, duties to minors, et cetera. If flourishing involves resolving the Socratic question 
in a way that satisfies each of the fundamental dimensions of practical reasoning – moral, 
prudential, passionate – then we can say that Prof. Humbert satisfies considerations 
pertaining to his passionate character directly at the cost of those considerations pertaining 
to his moral one.  
Just as passionate attachments can conflict with our moral duties, so too they can 
conflict with our prudential self-interest. An example of this is Severin’s desire to be beaten 
by Wanda in Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs. Again, like Prof. Humbert’s 
desire for Lolita, Severin’s desire meets all the conditions for being a passionate attachment 
as laid out above: it is a part of his practical identity; it provides him with a source of life-
purpose; it is of sufficient magnitude and complexity; it occupies an significant role in 
Severin’s resolution to the Socratic question. By contrast, however, his desire to be beaten 
senseless does not obviously contravene his moral obligations because it is consensual and 
actively prized.38 Nevertheless, as Severin reveals to the narrator at the beginning of the 
                                               
38 Thomas Hurka offers a persuasive account of the motivational economy behind these kinds of 
relationships by distinguishing between direct and indirect pleasure. He writes, we can ‘feel pleasure-
that in a simple pain [which is] what some masochists do. They first feel physical pain, say, from 
being spanked. Then, perhaps because they want the pain, they feel pleasure that they’re feeling it, 
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novel, his relationship with Wanda was deeply inimical to his well-being,39 leading him to 
write an autobiographical account of it to prevent others falling into the same trap.  
Examples such as these differ from the case of Gauguin which we examined in 1.3. 
Here we saw that the pursuit of certain passionate attachments can indirectly affect our 
ability to meet our moral obligations and indirectly jeopardise our prudential concerns. 
Unlike Prof. Humbert’s pursuit of Lolita, there is nothing morally wrong about the 
passionate attachment to painting in itself; it is just that Gauguin’s circumstances require 
that he neglect his moral obligations to his family if he is to pursue his passionate 
attachment to his art. Unlike Severin’s desire to be beaten by Wanda, there is nothing 
inherently imprudent in Gauguin’s enterprise; it is just that in the nineteenth-century a 
voyage to Tahiti was highly likely to impact upon an inexperienced traveller’s well-being. 
In fact, it is because the painter only indirectly neglects his  prudential and moral 
considerations – rather than actively contravening them – that the example was suitable to 
provoke our intuitions regarding the importance of passionate attachments themselves. 
When what is at stake does not involve directly contravening these kinds of considerations, 
we are more disposed to grant priority to the passionate attachment concerned. Although 
not all will be persuaded by the Gauguin example, we may have felt our intuitions twitch 
that there was something right in his decision. Fortunately fewer will feel the same way 
about the example of Prof. Humbert. While it is only unfortunate that Gauguin contravened 
his moral obligations to his family to pursue his passionate attachment, Prof. Humbert’s 
pursuit of Dolores Haze requires that he breaks his moral obligations. 
 
1.6   The Value of Our Passionate Attachments 
 
Contra modern moral philosophy, this chapter has followed Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf 
in arguing that: (i) our passionate attachments are valuable, (ii) they are fundamental to 
resolving the question of ‘how should one live’, and (iii) we should consider them as an 
important aspect of the flourishing life as they ensure that we can experience our lives as 
meaningful, with Williams even arguing that they are a condition for wanting to live at all. 
I have used Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s discussion of these kinds of entities to form 
a composite notion of a passionate attachment, showing where these accounts overlap with 
one another, as well as where they differ. In addition to this, in 1.5, I added some extra 
                                               
or feel good that they’re feeling bad. And if the second pleasure is sufficiently intense, they can end 
up feeling more pleasure than they do pain, so they feel good on balance.’ (2011: 18). 
39 Severin describes himself as being ‘terribly unhappy’ (1921 [1870]: 17).  
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criteria for passionate attachments, ones which clarify and expand upon the notion as 
articulated by Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf. For something to be a passionate attachment: 
(i) it must be above a threshold magnitude and it must have exceeded a threshold 
complexity, (ii) it must command a certain exclusiveness on the activities and attention of 
the person who has it, (iii) it must have a social dimension insofar as it can be shared with, 
or at least recognised by, others. Finally, I argued that some passionate attachments should 
be considered to be inappropriate or toxic, either insofar as they contravene our moral or 
prudential considerations, or because their very nature prevents us from establishing a 
satisfying relationship with them. While passionate attachments are essential for human 
flourishing, some are incompatible with it either because circumstances align in a way that 
means we can only pursue them at the expense of other considerations, or because their 
very nature requires that we trespass upon our moral or prudential considerations. Now I 
am ready to examine whether we can cultivate our passionate attachments, as well as why 
























Chapter 2  
 
 
The Value of Cultivating  
Our Passionate Attachments 
 
Attachments are of great seriousness. Choose you attachments 
carefully. Choose your temple of fanaticism with great care. What you 
wish to sing of as tragic love is just an attachment not carefully chosen.  
 
David Foster Wallace 1996: 106 
 
2.0   Overview:  
 
This chapter argues that cultivating our passionate attachments is valuable. I begin by 
interrogating Frankfurt’s claim that we cannot cultivate our passionate attachments, 
alongside Williams’ and Wolf’s resistance to philosophical theories of passionate self-
cultivation (2.1). After this, I compare the idea of cultivating our passionate attachments 
with the more familiar notions of moral and prudential self-cultivation, each of which 
comes with an informative literature on how we can strengthen and improve these 
dimensions of our characters (2.2). Showing how we cultivate the moral and prudential 
dimensions of our character offers clues about how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments, as well as providing precedents that a philosophical theory of this process 
can follow. Contra scepticism regarding the possibility of cultivating our passionate 
attachments, I argue that this process is not only possible, but also valuable and justifiably 
highly prized (2.3). Reflecting on our practical lives shows we have strong reason to choose, 
reflect upon, interrogate, refine, and hierarchise – that is to say, actively cultivate – our 
passionate attachments because this helps us better resolve the question of ‘how one 
should live’. Showing that we can cultivate our passionate attachments, and why doing 
this is valuable, gives us reason to think that practical philosophers should offer a theory 






2.1   Can We Cultivate Our Passionate Attachments? 
 
Although Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf each stress that modern moral philosophers must 
take considerations pertaining to our passionate attachments seriously in order to 
understand the flourishing life, they are markedly pessimistic about our ability to actively 
cultivate them. While each thinker urges us to return to the Socratic question because they 
claim it better accommodates the essential considerations that guide our practical 
reasoning, none offers a theory of how we could come to what Frankfurt calls a ‘reasonable 
deliberation’ to this question (1999 [1992]: 92), nor do they offer practical guidance on how 
we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Instead, much of their work on this topic is 
concerned with identifying the pitfalls of modern moral philosophy, showing how its 
conception of the flourishing life is incomplete, rather than proposing ways to escape these 
traps. Williams, for example, begins Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by starkly delimiting 
the parameters of his work. He tells us:  
 
This book is principally about how things are in moral philosophy, not 
about how they might be, and since I do not think they are as they 
should be, some of it consists of criticism of present philosophy. […] In 
the course of saying what the present state of affairs is, and complaining 
about it, [however,] I hope to introduce a picture of ethical thought and 
a set of ideas that apply to it, which could also help us to think about 
how it might be. (1985: vii). 
 
Furthermore, Williams makes it clear that he is sceptical about our ability to use conceptual 
resources of the history of philosophy to guide our practical lives, even when discussing 
the Hellenistic tradition specifically. In his review of Nussbaum’s Therapy, he suggests that 
the ‘lethal high-mindedness’ of Stoics regarding the value of external goods precludes 
them from offering a therapeutic account of self-cultivation (1994: 26). 
Adopting a similar tone, Wolf is equally sceptical, although her worry is more 
targeted insofar as it focuses on offering a philosophical account of how we can cultivate 
our passionate attachments. Philosophical inquiry can illuminate and clarify the role and 
importance of those passionate attachments that generate meaningfulness, she suggests, 
but it is beyond its disciplinary parameters to offer us a theory of how we can actively 




[M]ost people manage to live meaningful lives without giving the idea 
of meaning a moment’s explicit thought, and those whose lives are not 
satisfactorily meaningful are not likely to be able to remedy this shortfall 
simply by having it called more explicitly to their attention. (2010: 48–9) 
 
She tells us that the benefits of a philosophical account of meaningfulness will be ‘purely 
intellectual’, and that it is unlikely that ‘our lives [will] become more meaningful as a result 
of thinking about meaningfulness, [as] this will more likely happen by an indirect route’ 
(2010: 49). Thinking back to Wolf’s account, we can see this is closely connected to her 
understanding of meaningfulness itself. Because she views the passionate attachments that 
generate meaningfulness as necessarily outwardly-directed insofar as they are formed 
from objectively worthwhile entities, she says we cannot cultivate these things ourselves, 
either practically or in principle. She writes:   
 
Because meaning requires us to be open and responsive to values 
outside ourselves, we cannot be preoccupied with ourselves. If we want 
to live meaningful lives, we cannot try too hard or focus too much on 
doing so. (2010: 51)40 
 
Wolf’s stipulation aligns with both Frankfurt’s and Williams’ accounts of passionate 
attachments, insofar as she views them as relatively autonomous considerations which do 
not straightforwardly relate to our self-interest. Nevertheless, as I argued in 1.5, we do not 
need to follow her account of objectivity here. What matters for an account of passionate 
self-cultivation is that the passionate attachment in question is valued by the person who 
pursues it, and that it meets the other requirements for passionate attachments which I laid 
out in Ch. 1. So why are Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf so negative about this? And do they 
think that we can cultivate our passionate attachments to any extent at all?  
Although Wolf does not think philosophers can give an account of how we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments, she does think we can practically do this indirectly 
when we arrive at ‘crossroads’ in the flow of our life, one which requires us to make a 
major life decision. It is only at these times that the question of ‘how one should live’ 
emerges for Wolf. At other times our practical reasoning is fully immersed in a world of 
                                               
40 Wolf introduces this claim by telling us that ‘[W]e can recognize a paradox of meaningfulness, 
similar to but deeper than the paradox of hedonism’, and then by comparing her account to Williams: 
‘Bernard Williams [writes], with respect to the question of life’s being desirable, that “it gets by far 
its best answer in never being asked at all.” Similarly, I think, for a person whose life is meaningful, 
the need to think about it might never come up.’ (2010: 31) 
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concerns, where the fundamental issues that bear on the Socratic question have been at 
least provisionally settled. We can think of many specific culturally-endorsed ‘crossroads’ 
when we are required to decide upon our passionate attachments in this sense. Choosing 
a university degree, a profession, a romantic partner, whether to spend time working for a 
charitable project or to travel, and whether to have children are clearly times when we face 
major life decisions which require that we explicitly choose a passionate attachment in Wolf’s 
sense of the term. Nevertheless, as I show in 5.1.4, choosing our passionate attachments 
cannot constitute cultivating them because such deep-seated character change can only be 
the result of an iterative process.   
Moreover, these kinds of major life decisions are often viewed as constituting a 
character-defining ‘rite of passage’ on the path from childhood to adulthood, one that is 
deeply linked to a person’s identity and public persona. While philosophers from Plato 
onwards have often spoken as if the moral dimension of our character best reveals who we 
are, our passionate attachments are often thought to bring who we are into greatest relief. 
The major life decisions we make regarding our choice of romantic partner, the career to 
take up, or whether to procreate, deeply inform how others understand us and, 
consequently, how we understand ourselves.41 Typically we recognise that major life 
decisions regarding these kinds of passionate attachments are not unsullied by moral or 
prudential considerations; marriages are often scrutinised as to whether they are primarily 
motivated by passionate or prudential considerations (often financial ones), for example, 
whereas it is easy to see why the decision to sign up to the army or join the church could 
be viewed as constituted by both moral commitments and deeply-held passionate 
attachments which are effectively impossible to disentangle.  
When we are faced with major life decisions, Wolf argues, considerations 
pertaining to meaningfulness are weighed against one another (‘Which career would yield 
a more meaningful life?’), as well as calibrated in terms of other factors, such as our 
prudential considerations (‘Which partner would provide for me and my future children 
best financially?’) and moral ones (‘Should moral obligations to God or to my nation 
influence my choice of a new career?’).42 Instead of offering a theoretical account of how 
we can judiciously cultivate our passionate attachments, however, Wolf’s project stops 
when she has shown that the passionate attachments that generate meaningfulness are an 
essential component of the flourishing life. Although she concedes that we can scrutinise 
                                               
41 In many ways the strong cultural emphasis placed upon passionate attachments at such ‘rites of 
passage’ is appropriate because our passionate attachments strongly define our personal identity. 
See my account of Nietzsche’s view on this topic in Dennis (forthcoming).  
42 Examples in parentheses are my own.  
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and reflect upon our major life decisions, because she thinks our passionate attachments 
are necessarily outwardly-directed, she does not think there is much to say philosophically 
about the idea that we can actively work on cultivating them. When we are faced with a 
major life decision regarding whether to take up this or that passionate attachment, or how 
to calibrate these attachments with competing moral and prudential considerations, she 
thinks that philosophy can offer no assistance. If there is a disciplinary role in dealing with 
these issues at all, she suggests it will be the province of psychotherapy, or we may find it 
in the advice of those theologians and motivational speakers which I cited her mentioning 
above (1.4). Although I argue it is beneficial for our passionate attachments to be 
continually reappraised in 2.3, and later show why regularly doing this is an important 
aspect of passionate self-cultivation in 5.2.2, Wolf’s contention that there are more and less 
important times to do this is surely right.  
Compared to Wolf, Frankfurt is even more sceptical about the idea of actively 
cultivating our passionate attachments, as he does not even make room for times we can 
choose a specific passionate attachment when we make a major life decision. He tells us that 
as long as our passionate attachments are ‘wholehearted’, then even weighing up whether 
or not to pursue them will ‘not [be] a genuine option’ (2004: 49). In this fatalistic tone he 
writes: 
 
What we love is not up to us. We cannot help it that the direction of our 
practical reasoning is in fact governed by the specific final ends that our 
love has defined for us. We cannot fairly be charged with reprehensible 
arbitrariness, nor with a wilful or negligent lack of objectivity, since 
these things are not under our immediate control at all. (2004: 49). 
 
To illustrate Frankfurt’s view, we could think of how Somerset Maugham portrays Charles 
Strickland, the Gauguin-like protagonist of the Moon and Sixpence. When asked to justify 
why he has left his family, the artist explains, ‘I’ve got to paint. I can’t help myself. When 
a man falls into water it doesn’t matter how he swims, well or badly: he’s got to get out or 
else he’ll drown.’ (2009 [1919]: 47) Like Maugham’s Gauguin, for Frankfurt, we have very 
little autonomy over our passionate attachments. In Frankfurt’s words, it is not ‘within 
[our] power to determine what [our will regarding them shall] be’ (1999 [1991]: 101). 
It is this attitude that Wolf might view us as taking up when she discusses our 
ability to choose our passionate attachments when we make major life decisions. Frankfurt’s 
position is significantly less compromising. He argues that we cannot ‘be authors of 
ourselves’ because the fundamental strength of our passionate attachments makes them 
resolutely ‘unresponsive to [our] sheer fiat’ (1999 [1991]: 101). Frankfurt seems to have in 
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mind situations where there is either no ambiguity regarding our choice of passionate 
attachment (one attachment is clearly stronger than another), or situations when the 
passionate attachments concerned are so constitutive of the deciding person’s identity that 
there is no room for a dilemma to arise. To illustrate the first type of dilemma, we could 
think of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigenia to appease Artemis, thereby ensuring the 
gods provide the wind for his ships to sail to Troy. What should outrage us in Aeschylus’ 
version of the tale is how easily Agamemnon’s love of battle supersedes his love for his 
daughter. The poet describes ‘her supplications and her cries of father / were nothing, nor 
the child’s lamentation / to kings passioned for battle’ (1926: 228).43 To illustrate the second 
we could think of the celebrated lines from Martin Luther’s speech to Charles V, ‘Here I 
stand, I can do no other’. In this case, although Luther is not physically constrained – 
indeed, he had been granted safe passage to speak to the Emperor – he claims that he 
cannot do otherwise because speaking out is simply constitutive of the person he is.  
Despite his scepticism regarding our ability to cultivate our passionate 
attachments, it is important to note that Frankfurt does imply that we have limited power 
to critically evaluate our current passionate attachments. This is hinted at when he claims 
it is ‘within our power to control [what we care about] indirectly’ (2004: 49).44 While we 
cannot do this with the executive power of a ‘sovereign author’ (1999 [1991]: 101), Frankfurt 
concedes that we often find ourselves wondering if we have resolved the Socratic question 
well or badly, and that doing this involves evaluating our current passionate attachments. 
Frankfurt calls this process ‘taking ourselves seriously’. In the opening pages of The Reasons 
of Love, he writes:  
    
Taking ourselves seriously means that we are not prepared to accept 
ourselves just as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our 
choices, and our behaviour to make sense. We are not satisfied to think 
that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by 
transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to 
direct ourselves […] in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate 
norms. We want to get things right. (2006: 2) 
 
                                               
43 See Hursthouse 1999: Ch. 3; and Nussbaum 1986: 32.  
44 Frankfurt’s account of this is interesting, but he gives us no practical account of how we can 
cultivate passionate attachments. For example, he merely tells us that: ‘We are sometimes capable of 
bringing about conditions that would cause us to stop loving what we love, or to love other things.’ 
(2004: 49).  
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Yet despite acknowledging that ‘taking ourselves seriously’ is possible, even important, 
when Frankfurt turns to offer a philosophical account of how this might be done his answer 
is vague and underwhelming. He tells us that ‘taking ourselves seriously’ is ‘not essentially 
a matter of producing [our] character but of taking responsibility for it’ (2006: 7). To do 
this, a person must:   
 
[S]electively identif[y] with certain of his own attitudes and 
dispositions, whether or not it was he that caused himself to have them. 
In identifying with them, he incorporates those attitudes and 
dispositions into himself and makes them his own. (2006: 7) 
  
From this we can see that Frankfurt views ‘taking ourselves seriously’ as a two-part 
process: (i) first, a person introspects to identify which of their ‘attitudes and dispositions’ 
they actually value; (ii) second, a person selects which of these ‘attitudes and dispositions’ 
they wish to actively incorporate into their character. Both these parts of a ‘reasonable 
deliberation’ fit with what I characterised above as Frankfurt’s sceptical claim that ‘what 
we love is not up to us’, as well as his supporting claim that ‘our practical reasoning is […] 
governed by the specific final ends that [this] love has defined for us’ (2004: 49). While we 
cannot cultivate our passionate attachments in the sense of ‘producing our characters’, we 
can come to know the existing attachments that we identify with more clearly, and through 
this extra clarity reorganise our lives so that we can better pursue these things.  
Nevertheless, Frankfurt baulks at offering either a practical or philosophical 
account of how such introspective self-cultivation might work, even dismissing two 
commonsensical ways through which we might understand introspecting to discover what 
our passionate attachments are. First, Frankfurt argues that we cannot uncritically observe 
what it is we care about as we may well identify ‘obsessional thoughts’, rather than those 
pertaining to our passionate attachments. As he points out, we often intensely want things 
that we cannot be said to care about, so ‘[s]heer intensity […] implies nothing as to whether 
we really care about what we want’ (2004: 11). We may intensely crave a cigarette, for 
example, while not caring about smoking at all (indeed, while actively caring about not 
smoking). Second, Frankfurt dismisses the kind of introspection we pursue over a long 
span of time. Observing that non-human animals do this too, Frankfurt notes that ‘patterns 
of interest or of response may be manifestations only of habits or of involuntary regularities 
of some other kind; and it is also possible for them to develop merely by chance.’ (1998 
[1982]: 82) Neither a personal reflection on which passionate attachments we hold dear, 
nor a retrospective analysis of the history of our attachments will do.  
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Frankfurt’s dismissal of the idea that we can ‘produce’ or ‘cause’ the configuration 
of our passionate attachments motivates the charge that his view is conservative, as it 
suggests that our existing passionate attachments are impervious to self-directed change. 
The only sense in which we can be said to cultivate our passionate attachments, on his 
account, would be in the sense of endorsing the existing attachments which we identify. 
Whereas Wolf grants us some limited autonomy when we make major life decisions, for 
Frankfurt, we cannot actively change those deep-seated commitments we already have. 
We can only come to know, identify with them, and then let them inform our resolution to 
the question of ‘how one should live’. From this we can see that there is a limited sense in 
which Frankfurt thinks we can engage with our passionate attachments, one which does 
not amount to cultivating them. This concerns devoting attention to knowing our existing 
passionate attachments better, especially by distinguishing them from other kinds of 
considerations  
I now leave Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf to examine the case for a theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments that goes beyond the times that – à la Wolf – persons 
choose their attachments in the context of a major life decision, one which is more active 
that merely introspecting – à la Frankfurt. I begin by comparing the philosophical 
literatures on moral and prudential self-cultivation, both of which hold valuable clues for 
determining how a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments could operate. After 
this I examine the reasons we might need to engage in a process of cultivating our 
passionate attachments, and why doing so rightly regarded as an important aspect of the 
flourishing life. Establishing this justifies why we should devote concerted philosophical 
attention to constructing a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments.    
 
2.2   Comparisons to Moral and Prudential Self-Cultivation 
 
One reason we may regard Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s scepticism about the 
possibility of cultivating our passionate attachments as overly sceptical is because accounts 
of how we cultivate the moral and prudential dimensions of our characters are alive and 
well in practical philosophy. Not only do many philosophers deem it appropriate to devote 
explicit philosophical attention to how we cultivate ourselves in these domains, but they 
agree that strengthening our practical reasoning in these domains – especially in the moral 
one – is of the utmost importance. While moral and prudential self-cultivation each have 
their own distinct characteristics, the wealth of historical and contemporary literature on 
these two areas, provides insights into what an analogous account of cultivating our 
passionate attachments could look like. Indeed, this should come as no surprise, as I have 
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already shown that our passionate attachments often straddle the moral and prudential 
domains.45  
 Promisingly for a project of enlisting the conceptual resources for a theory of 
passionate self-cultivation from ancient philosophy, the ancient source material well 
accommodates the composite and overlapping nature of considerations that inform the 
Socratic question. Compared to modern moral philosophy, it does not focus exclusive 
attention on our moral considerations, nor does it rigidly distinguish between the various 
dimensions of practical reasoning. For example, Aristotle views a flourishing human life 
as containing a mixture of moral, prudential, and passionate elements, and his emphasis 
on friendship, childrearing, financial security, and political status all suggest attachments of a 
specifically passionate kind. I return to these kinds of attachments when comparing the 
Stoic and Peripatetic views on passionate attachments in Pt. II.  
 As well as explicit ancient discussion about which concrete passionate attachments 
are required for a flourishing life, the importance of our passionate character could be said 
to be implied in the ancient discussion of the virtues. Aristotle’s own list of virtues 
illustrates this. These character traits do not only pertain to the moral dimension of our 
characters, but they have a significantly wider remit, incorporating aspects of our 
characters that would be badly described as moral ones. This explains some of the 
difficulties many modern virtue ethicists have had in taking on his list of cardinal virtues 
wholesale, and why they have had to truncate or expand upon his original list. For 
example, it is often lamented that the virtue of compassion is missing from Aristotle’s 
pantheon, and it has also been observed that the virtue of pride is superfluous and 
anachronistic.46 
Moreover, the centrepiece of Aristotle’s discussion of the virtuous life, his account 
of practical wisdom [phronesis], seems to include explicitly passionate elements, ones 
relating to entities we love. As Philippa Foot notes, practical wisdom has two parts because 
the ‘wise man knows the means to certain good ends; and secondly he knows how much 
particular ends are worth’ (2002 [1997]: 5). On Foot’s reading, one part of practical wisdom 
is intellectual; it is similar to other skills that Aristotle mentions, such as building or playing 
                                               
45 In 1.2 I followed Williams’ and Frankfurt’s claims that a moral project can take on the status of a 
passionate attachment – not in the sense of a project pursued by a moral saint as Wolf describes it – 
but insofar it meets the criteria of passionate attachments laid out in 1.5. See n.23. 
46 Some Aristotelean components of the good life receive remarkably little attention within 
contemporary virtue ethics, which is perhaps because they do not easily fit within the parameters of 
modern moral philosophy. I identify a comparable problem in virtue ethics in the General 
Introduction.  
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the lyre. The second part of practical wisdom is value-orientated, however. Foot explains 
that it ‘has to do with a [person’s] attachments’, allowing us to discern ‘which pursuits are 
more worthwhile than others’, which are ‘trivial’ and which are ‘important [to] human life’ 
(2002 [1997]: 6–7). Of course, the attachments which practical wisdom views to be 
choiceworthy need not be passionate ones. Nevertheless, many of Foot’s examples fit with 
the account of passionate attachments that I have outlined in 1.5, or at least include 
passionate elements. The wise person knows the fleeting value of ‘social position’, ‘wealth’, 
and the ‘good opinion of the world’, and knows that they are ‘too dearly bought at the cost 
of health or friendship or family ties’ (2002 [1997]: 6). Foot’s examples here are telling 
because they include a mix of entities that the wise person regards as choiceworthy: both 
moral and passionate entities. From this we can see that practical wisdom cannot be 
understood as a virtue that is only directed towards the moral dimension of our practical 
reasoning. Instead, there are passionate elements ineluctably mixed into it, and exercising 
phronesis requires us to act on the basis of considerations that are generated both by moral 
obligations and by choiceworthy passionate attachments.   
In the next two sub-sections I pick out salient features of theories of moral and 
prudential self-cultivation for a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments, 
as well as noting those features that make passionate self-cultivation distinctive. To do this, 
in 2.2.1, I show why the self-directed cultivation of our moral character has advantages over 
other-directed moral cultivation.  
 
2.2.1   Cultivating Ourselves Morally  
 
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams expresses his unease at the notion of moral 
self-cultivation when distinguishing between the cultivation of our moral characters in the 
first- and third-person senses. For Williams, while moral philosophers have typically taken 
their lead from Aristotle insofar as they focus on ‘socialisation or moral education’ of 
persons in ‘third-personal form’, the idea that we can cultivate our own virtues, that is, 
cultivate them as a ‘first-personal exercise’ has something ‘suspect about it’, something – 
he speculates – connected to ‘priggishness or self-deception’ (1985: 12). We might worry 
that the main problem with such first-personal accounts of moral cultivation is that 
thinking ‘in this way is to think about oneself rather than about the world and other 
people’, but for Williams the problem with cultivating the moral virtues is that the process 
is ‘not self-directed enough’ (1985: 12). He writes: 
 
Thinking about your possible states in terms of the virtues is not so 
much to think about your actions, and it is not distinctively to think 
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about the terms in which you could or should think about your actions: 
it is rather to think about the way in which others might describe or 
comment on the way in which you think about your actions, and if that 
represents the essential content of your deliberations, it really does seem 
a misdirection of the ethical attention. (1985: 12)47 
 
On Williams’ view, the moral self-cultivator is most motivated by their wish to be seen as 
moral in the eyes of others, instead of being motivated by the object of our moral concern, 
or even about our status as a moral agent. 
Despite Williams’ scepticism, moral self-cultivation has had a long tradition in 
European philosophy, as well as a significantly longer one in Asian thought.48 This term is 
used equivocally in the literature, however, which brings us to the first point of comparison 
between the self-directed cultivation of our moral character and the self-directed 
cultivation of our passionate one. Examining the moral self-cultivation literature shows 
that the term is used in two distinct senses. In the first sense it refers to the act of cultivating 
the self – either our own self, or somebody else’s – and makes no claim regarding who or 
what does the cultivating. Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of moral development fall into 
this category. Both philosophers – using Williams’ terminology – offer ‘third-personal’ 
accounts of moral cultivation, accounts which only focus on how our character is cultivated 
by others from our birth to our adolescence. In Laws, for instance, Plato tells us ‘virtue and 
vice first enter the soul’ via the ‘earliest sensations [of pleasure and pain] that a child feels 
in infancy’, and that moral cultivation involves channelling these sensations in the ‘right 
courses before [a child] can understand the reason why’ (1997 [Laws]: 653b). For Plato, only 
once a child is old enough to successfully engage in moral philosophy do ‘his reason and 
his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of 
appropriate habits’ (1997 [Laws]: 653b). Aristotle was highly influenced by his mentor on 
this point.49 When discussing how we acquire the virtues he tells us: ‘it makes no small 
                                               
47 Referring to Frankfurt, Williams writes, ‘[s]ome ethical thought, particularly if it is self-critical, will 
of course do that. More than one writer has recently stressed the importance of our capacity to have 
second-order desire – desires to have certain desires – and its significance for ethical reflection and 
the practical consciousness. Deliberation toward satisfying those second-order desires must be in a 
special degree directed toward the self.’ (1985: 12). 
48 For recent studies see Slote & Angle (2013), Ivanhoe (2000). 
49 Aristotle writes, ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as 
Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right 
education’ (1984 [NE]: 1104b4).  
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difference […] whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it 
makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference’ (1984 [NE]: 1103b26). 
 As I followed Foot in showing in 2.2, as well as having an intellectual component, 
Aristotle views practical wisdom [phronesis] as comprising moral and passionate elements. 
This explains why he thinks the task of learning to ‘feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly’ 
must be begun as early as possible, as he tells us that our attraction towards attachments 
which have ‘grown up with us all from our infancy’ become ‘difficult to rub off’ and 
eventually ‘engrained […] in our life’ (1984 [NE]: 1105a–1105a7). For both Plato and 
Aristotle, then, the cultivation of our moral characters has two essential parts: first, we are 
directed towards suitably chosen passionate attachments by those who raise us as infants. 
Second, we learn why these passionate attachments are worth loving through the moral 
education we receive in early adulthood. Moreover, for both thinkers, the possibility of 
post-adolescent self-cultivation is severely restricted, and any remedial work is impossible 
after around the age of thirty-five. As Aristotle reminds us, for those whose early moral 
cultivation was unsuccessful (or inexistent) there is no longer any possibility of virtue, and 
there is only – as he rather ominously puts it – ‘the law’.  
In Ch. 4 I show that the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation require the 
cognitive and emotional faculties of adulthood, and these exercises were explicitly offered 
as correctives to retrain those who have not had a comprehensive moral education. Contra 
Aristotle’s insistence that our moral cultivation largely depends on forces that are outside 
of our control, the philosophers of the Hellenistic world understood self-cultivation in the 
second sense, a model in which the ‘self’ in ‘self-cultivation’ refers to what is cultivated and 
to what does the cultivating. The sense of self-cultivation as the cultivation of the self by itself 
is succinctly captured by Michael Slote when he writes:   
 
The idea of moral self-cultivation entails a process that an individual 
can take charge of and accomplish largely through his or her own 
efforts. When we talk of self-education in specific school subjects, we 
mean that an individual learns more and more geography or 
mathematics largely (though not necessarily entirely) on his or her own, 
and the same is true across a quite wide range of reflexive verbs. (2016: 
195) 
 
Outside the virtue traditions there is evidence for the model Slote describes in which the 
self is both the active subject and the passive object of cultivation in the founding texts of both 
the deontological and utilitarian traditions, as both Kant and Mill regard this kind of self-
cultivation as a vital aspect of moral development. Kant’s account is buried deep within 
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the Metaphysics of Morals. He tells us that we have a duty to strive towards our moral 
perfection, which involves cultivating two aspects of our practical reasoning: first, 
‘cultivating one’s capacities (or one’s natural predispositions), the highest of which [he tells 
us] is understanding’; second, one is duty-bound to cultivate one’s ‘moral cast of mind’ (1991 
[1797]: 191 [387]). It is by cultivating these things simultaneously that humans make good 
on their ‘duty to raise [themselves] from the crude state of […] nature, […] more and more 
toward humanity’ (1991 [1797]: 191 [387]). Similarly, in the utilitarian tradition, 
historically-minded scholars have recently attended to the strong emphasis on the self-
cultivation of utilitarian virtues. For these commentators, we can better attune ourselves to 
the demands of the utilitarian calculus by cultivating ourselves, even by taking part in 
those narrative arts that shake us from our own single-minded perspective and cause us to 
regard our lives as one lived perspective among many.50  
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that philosophers who approach the 
cultivation of the self in this second sense view it as not involving others at all. As I discuss 
in 4.2.3, others were involved in many of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation: from 
spiritual directors, to correspondents, to friends, to the members of the Hellenistic 
communities.51 
From this we can distinguish that philosophers approach cultivating our moral 
characters in two senses: first, our moral characters can be passively cultivated as Plato and 
Aristotle describe when they stress that our moral disposition must be cultivated in our 
youth because the window to effectively influence it is small. Second, as Kant, Mill, and 
contemporary virtue ethicists like Slote contend, the self can be actively cultivated in a self-
                                               
50 As Wendy Donner notes, Mill’s distinction between ‘morality, prudence, and aesthetics’ in The Art 
of Life, includes the idea that our moral character can be self-developed through exercising our 
aesthetic faculties. For Donner, ‘one role of the perspective of aesthetics is to offer methods for 
moving beyond egoism to facilitate selflessness and compassion and wider identifications of self and 
others’ (2010: 146).  
51 Philosophers who warn against any involvement of others in self-cultivation are rare. Nietzsche 
experiments with the idea when he writes, ‘one should speak only of self-education. The education 
of youth by others is either an experiment carried out on an as yet unknown and unknowable subject, 
or a levelling on principle with the object of making the new being, whatever it may be, conform to 
the customs and habits then prevailing: in both cases therefore something unworthy of the thinker, 
the work of those elders and teachers whom a man of rash honesty once described as nos ennemis 
naturels. One day, when one has long since been educated as the world understands it, one discovers 
oneself: here begins the task of the thinker; now the time has come to call on him for assistance—not 
as an educator but as one who has educated himself and who thus knows how it is done.’ (1996 
[1880]: 374 [267]).  
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directed process of moral character development. Understanding the term self-cultivation 
in this restricted sense fits with how I construct a theory of cultivating our passionate 
attachments in Ch. 5. This latter kind of self-cultivation is taken up by the Hellenistic 
philosophers, which is one reason they provide the best conceptual resources for this 
study. Contra Aristotle’s insistence that our moral cultivation largely depends on forces 
that are outside of our control, the philosophers of the Hellenistic world understood self-
cultivation in the self-directed sense, a model in which the ‘self’ in ‘self-cultivation’ refers 
to what is cultivated and to what does the cultivating. 
 
2.2.2   Cultivating Ourselves Prudentially  
 
Most moral philosophers acknowledge the vital role prudential self-interest plays in our 
practical reasoning, although few have viewed how we cultivate our prudential character 
as worthy of detailed attention.52 Kant argues that we neither need a philosophical account 
of the fact that we can cultivate our prudential interests, nor how we cultivate them, because 
he thinks, like all sentient creatures, humans have a natural propensity to look after 
themselves. In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ he cautions that our ‘own happiness is an end [that 
we have] by the impulses of [our] nature, [so] this end can never without self-contradiction 
be regarded as a duty.’ (1991 [1797]: 190 [385]).53 Our self-interested inclinations, he thinks, 
naturally ensure that we look after themselves, and we do not need an account of how they 
operate in our practical philosophy, as explaining our moral duties and obligations 
deserves most philosophical attention.   
Given Kant’s forbidding diagnosis, it is perhaps unsurprising that theoretical 
accounts and practical methods of self-cultivation concerning the cultivation of our 
prudential interests are typically more developed outside of philosophy. Cultivating our 
bodily well-being is covered by the literature on dietetics, exercise regimes, and medicine, 
whereas those concerning the self-directed improvement of our mental well-being is the 
                                               
52 There are some exceptions to this. Simon Blackburn’s ‘Looking Out For Yourself’ in his Ruling 
Passions gives a lively history of the modern philosophical literature on this topic (2000: 122–160). 
John Cooper summarises a common view about how satisfying prudential desires is intimately 
connected to flourishing when he writes, ‘[t]his view holds that, ultimately, the quality of a human 
life, for better or worse, is simply constituted by the degree and balance of desire-satisfaction or 
desire-frustration that it contains.’ (2012: 184)  
53 Duties, for Kant, can only applied as a ‘constraint to an end [that is] adopted reluctantly’, so it is 
‘self-contradictory to say that [we are] under obligation to promote [our] own happiness with all [our] 
powers.’ (1991 [1797]: 190 [385–6]). 
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province of the literature on meditation, psychotherapy, and self-help. Some self-help 
teachers encourage us to understand prudentially cultivating ourselves in an even wider 
sense, one which includes our possessions, our occupation, our friends, and our family 
relationships. This can be illustrated by the self-help literature that purports to deal with 
these themes. While the first-wave of literature predominantly concerned practical 
strategies to be successful in a worldly sense,54 this has now been succeeded by a second-
wave of literature which focuses on those non-moral character traits that are understood 
as able to satisfy our self-interested desires.55  
Building on this interest in the cultivation of non-moral prudential character traits, 
psychologists such as Thomas Lickona and Matthew Davidson argue that, as well as the 
traditional interest in ‘moral character’, we also need to develop an account of what they call 
‘performance character’ to explain ‘the qualities that are necessary for excellent performance 
in any domain’, such as the non-moral virtues of ‘diligence’ ‘perseverance’, ‘self-
discipline’, and ‘conscientious effort’ (2007: 2–3). For Lickona and Davidson, these 
character traits are primarily important because excellence in these areas enables us to 
satisfy our desires more readily, which in turn increases our prudential well-being. What 
all these disparate ways of understanding the cultivation or our prudential character have 
in common is that they aim to further our own well-being: they are what Foot calls ‘“self-
regarding” pursuits’ (2001 [2010]: 68; cited n.6 above), those activities that Williams tells 
us relate ‘merely to comfort, excitement, self-esteem, power, or another advantage of the 
agent’ (1985: 13; cited n.6 above). 
Thinking about theories of cultivating our prudential character, along with 
practical methods that allow us to do this, shows how the cultivation of our passionate 
character differs from the cultivation of our prudential one. Passionate self-cultivation is 
not connected to our prudential well-being because pursuing passionate attachments can 
be deeply inimical to our prudential character. We first saw this in 1.3, when I noted that 
Gauguin’s decision to paint in Tahiti not only required that he break his moral 
commitments in terms of providing for his family, but it required him to embark upon a 
perilous voyage, one which jeopardised his prudential well-being.  
The difference between a prudential attachment and a passionate one is well 
illustrated by Wolf’s approach to the question of why we regard passionate attachments 
as more choiceworthy than prudential ones, especially evident when she emphasises how 
                                               
54 Dale Carnegie’s How to Make Friends and Influence People (1936) epitomises this theme.  
55 A forerunner into self-directed prudential character development was Steve Covey’s The Seven 
Habits of Highly Effective People (2013 [1989]); more recently see Paul Tough’s How Children Succeed: 
Grit, Curiosity, and the Hidden Power of Character (2013), and David Brooks’ The Road to Character (2015).  
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major life decisions are often strongly guided by ‘explicit thought about worth or meaning 
of the activity concerned’ (2016 [1997]: 120). While such decisions may not be everyday or 
commonplace, they are not philosophically interesting because of their magnitude, but 
rather because of the summative processes of rationalisation that leads up to them, 
especially how these processes often explicitly eschew self-interest in favour of something 
they perceive to be more ‘worthwhile’.56 She writes:   
 
Some people decide to have children because they think it will give 
meaning to their lives. Others decide not to have children because they 
fear that the attendant responsibilities will deprive them of the time and 
resources and peace of mind that they need for other things in which 
they do find meaning. Deliberations about whether to pursue a 
particular career, or any career, may similarly involve concerns about 
whether the job is worthwhile, or whether it would demand time and 
energy that would distract one from what is worthwhile. Even many 
who do not talk explicitly in terms of meaning or worth make choices 
that are best explained by reference to them. In other words, our 
behaviour, including some of our speech, seems to reveal a preference 
for a meaningful life. (2016 [1997]: 120).  
 
For Wolf, the outcomes of these kinds of deliberations are often inexplicable on the surface 
because of the magnitude of the trouble that will be endured in order to pursue our 
cherished passionate attachments. Given that passionate attachments are in our self-
interest, like other more immediately rewarding concerns, it should be no surprise that 
they are often preferred, but it is the all-encompassing and onerous sacrifices that persons 
can willingly make that are startling. Although Wolf concedes that we can debate whether 
‘any of these choices advance our happiness (in the broadest sense, our fun) in the long 
run’, she argues that they are often evaluated within a framework where it is conceded that 
they do not. She notes:  
                                               
56 As Williams notes, ‘[o]ne obvious reason why my desires do not all have as their object my pleasure 
is that some of my desires aim at states of affairs that do not involve me at all: I am not mentioned in 
a full specification of what would satisfy such a desire. There are self-transcending desires. They are 
not all altruistic or benevolent—they may be malicious or frivolous. Those who make provisions in 
their wills to mortify their relatives or to promote some absurd object do not usually believe that they 
will be there to enjoy the outcome; yet it is the outcome they want, not merely the pleasure of thinking 
about it now. For all these reasons, the line between self-concern and other-concern in no way 
corresponds to a line between desire and obligation.’ (1985: 50) 
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Relationships with friends and family, nonobligatory aspects of 
professional roles, and long-term commitments to artistic, scholarly, or 
athletic endeavours typically lead us to devote time and energy to 
things that are difficult or unpleasant, and to forgo opportunities for 
relaxation and enjoyment. (2016 [1997]: 124) 
 
While we may be able to explain some of these kinds of activities in terms of them 
‘maximally contributing to our net fun’ over the course of our lives (and often these 
decisions will be made on this basis), we may cut ourselves off from understanding them 
if we think of them exclusively in terms of our self-interest. As Wolf notes, by defending 
our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’ by invoking reasons relating to our 
‘fulfilment’ – whether deep fulfilment in terms of ‘meaningfulness’ or more fleeting 
fulfilment in terms of ‘pleasure’ – may skew the problem overly in favour of ‘hedonistic 
interpretation’ because it collapses the distinction between acting on considerations 
pertaining to meaningfulness and acting on considerations pertaining to pleasure (2016 
[1997]: 120–21).57  
 
2.3   The Case for a Theory of Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments 
 
I now explore the reasons why (i) we might think that our passionate attachments are 
something we can – indeed should – actively cultivate (contra Frankfurt) and, therefore, 
why (ii) this process merits a philosophical theory explaining how best to do this (contra 
Wolf). In the previous section, 2.2, I explored several circumstantial reasons for both (i) and 
(ii) by examining the long-established theories of moral and prudential self-directed 
character change in practical philosophy. Examining the literature on self-cultivation in the 
moral and prudential domains, I argued, reveals that we have reason to think we can 
cultivate these dimensions of our characters, and consequently philosophers have devoted 
concerted attention to creating theories on how to do so. This alone gives us reason to think 
both (i) and (ii) are possible. First, unless there are other overriding reasons to think that 
                                               
57 Wolf continues, ‘[t]o choose something because it is fulfilling is, after all, to choose it because of a 
qualitative character of one’s experience – and though fulfilling activities are not always as much fun 
or intensely pleasurable as  some of the alternatives, it may be that in the long run (taking into account 
Mill’s differences in the quality as well as the quantity of pleasure, as it were), a fulfilling life is 
qualitatively better, and thus happier in the truest sense, than a life with as many or more pleasures 
but no fulfilment.’ (2016 [1997]: 120–1). 
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self-directed character development does not apply to the cultivation of our passionate 
attachments, then we can justifiably assume that our passionate attachments are amenable 
to this kind of self-cultivation, in the same way as we can cultivate ourselves morally or 
prudentially. Second, if it is possible to cultivate our passionate attachments, then – unless 
for some reason this kind of cultivation is impervious to theoretical analysis – then we 
should be able to offer a philosophical account of how we do this. In fact, given that our 
passionate attachments are so deeply connected to our flourishing as I established in Ch. 
1, we have good reason to think that a theory of how we can cultivate them will be 
beneficial insofar as it provides philosophical insight into something that holds the 
potential to facilitate a greater measure of flourishing.  
 Nevertheless, in 2.2 I did not just establish that there are two philosophical 
traditions devoted to theoretically explaining how we cultivate our moral or prudential 
characters, I showed how features of these traditions provide precedents for a theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments. First, in 2.2.1, I showed that the literature on moral 
self-cultivation makes room for the idea that we can cultivate our moral characters 
ourselves in a self-directed process of character development. Here I examined those self-
directed and reflexive practices of self-formation in which the self takes itself as both the 
active subject that is responsible for this process, as well as the passive object of the cultivation 
concerned. Contrary to Aristotelian moral cultivation which emphasises the fashioning of 
one’s moral character at an early age by one’s teachers, I argued that cultivating our moral 
characters after adolescence allows us to make use of critical and imaginative faculties that 
are unavailable to us at an earlier age. Second, in 2.2.2, I showed that, although 
philosophers tend to lump considerations concerning our prudential well-being together 
with those concerning our passionate attachments, there is good reason to pull them apart 
because our passionate attachments can be deeply inimical to our prudential well-being. 
In fact, those philosophers who argue most vociferously against the inclusion of an account 
of our prudential reasoning within moral philosophy, such as Kant, are also those who 
prioritise the moral dimension of our character in their practical philosophy. Instead of 
distinguishing a class of motivations that motivate us precisely because of the love they 
generate in us, and the horizon of meaningfulness with which they surround our lives, 
these philosophers run passionate attachments and prudential concerns together in a way 
that fails to acknowledge their fundamental differences.  
From this we can see that both the traditions of moral and prudential self-
cultivation can guide how we construct a theory cultivating our passionate attachments, 
but this will only be of use if we can conclusively establish that our passionate attachments 
can be cultivated at all. Although existing theories of the self-directed cultivation of our 
 62 
moral and prudential characters indicate that these dimensions of character can be 
cultivated, the existence of such theories only provides circumstantial evidence that our 
passionate attachments are similarly susceptible to self-directed development. It might be 
that we can cultivate ourselves morally and prudentially, although we are unable to 
cultivate our passionate attachments, which is Frankfurt’s view. This would mean that any 
theoretical help we can gain from existing theories of moral and prudential self-cultivation 
would be lost, so I now need to show there is evidence that our passionate attachments can 
be cultivated, in order to access the analogical insights from moral and prudential self-
cultivation.  
The final sections of this chapter show that, contra Frankfurt, there is much 
evidence that we value and devote explicit attention to cultivating our passionate 
attachments. In fact, given how important it is to have choiceworthy passionate 
attachments, for the reasons I give in Ch. 1, it is not surprising we are highly motivated to 
cultivate them because this ensures that we have the most satisfying passionate 
attachments possible. Examining the manifold ways people respond to their passionate 
attachments, shows that many of us cultivate our passionate attachments in non-
formalised ways, either unreflectively engaging in practices that result in the development 
of our passionate character, or by employing various non-philosophical methods to do so 
(for instance, psychotherapy or self-help). Showing that we can and do cultivate our 
passionate attachments rebuts Frankfurt’s claim that our passionate attachments are 
impervious to self-directed development. It also undermines Wolf’s claim that we cannot 
form a theory of how we cultivate our passionate attachments, even if we can choose our 
passionate attachments on occasion when we make a major life decision. Contra both 
views, the rest of this chapter aims to show that processes that constitute cultivating our 
passionate attachments are widespread, both those that we engage in with an unreflective 
notion of what we are doing, and those where we employ a certain method to reflectively 
engage in passionate self-cultivation. Establishing this provides the conditions for a theory 
of the cultivation of our passionate attachments. So what reasons do we have to think we 
can cultivate our passionate attachments (contra Frankfurt)? And would this merit a theory 








2.3.1   Knowledge of Our Passionate Attachments  
 
When asking how we can know our passionate attachments we may be struck by the sheer 
variety of processes and procedures aiming at doing this. Perhaps psychotherapy is the 
field of enquiry that purports to offer knowledge of our passionate attachments par 
excellence, insofar as it offers a comprehensive procedure to discover what our passionate 
attachments are, as well as a remedial process of redirecting us towards more suitable 
attachments if our current ones are found to be toxic or inappropriate. Knowing our 
passionate attachments is prized because it is often not obvious, and any psychotherapist 
will report that we are often deceived about which attachments we truly identify with. 
Furthermore, ignorance regarding passionate attachments is rightly regarded as a 
significant source of unhappiness, either because a person is transfixed by pressing 
prudential or moral attachments that masquerade as passionate ones, or because they 
resolve the question of ‘how one should live’ in a way that does not involve the pursuit of 
what they care about.  
Aside from psychotherapy, the idea that knowledge of our passionate attachments 
should be prized underpins much of the work in the self-care industry, reflected by the 
amount of time, money, and attention that this industry enjoys. The starting point for much 
of the literature and many of the motivational speakers within this industry is that we are 
unhappy with our current resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’ because we 
misunderstand our passionate attachments (‘what truly drives us’, ‘what we truly care 
about’, et cetera.), either by mistaking them for less choiceworthy prudential ones or 
overestimating the importance of various other concerns (often moral ones). As I discussed 
in 2.2.2, self-help literature often focuses on how our conduct can be out of sync with our 
passionate attachments, a state of affairs that this literature – agreeing with psychotherapy 
– views as impacting upon our ability to flourish.  
From this we can see that both psychotherapy and self-help start from the 
assumption we can be in a state of ignorance or debilitating self-deception regarding what 
our passionate attachments are. We frequently confuse our passionate attachments with 
moral considerations or prudential ones, and doing so impacts upon our flourishing 
because it prevents us aligning our conduct with how we truly wish to live. Furthermore, 
both disciplines propose that knowledge of our passionate attachments precipitates 
significant changes in how they feature in our resolution to the Socratic question. From this 
we can say that although knowledge of our passionate attachments is not the same as 
cultivating them, it is embarked upon within psychotherapy and self-help because it 
allows us to cultivate them indirectly. For both disciplines, knowledge of our passionate 
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attachments make the considerations they generate action-guiding, allowing us to suitably 
prioritise them in our conduct and our resolution to the Socratic question. Epiphanies, 
realisations, and insights regarding our passionate attachments are treasured precisely 
because they enable us to live in a way that aligns with the considerations that our 
passionate attachments generate. 
For the reasons I gave in 1.5, a flourishing life requires that we pursue passionate 
attachments, so we are highly motivated to know what our passionate attachments are in 
order to make sure we act on considerations pertaining to them. Mistaking moral or 
prudential considerations for those that derive from passionate considerations can create 
problems. For example, mistaking a prudential consideration for a passionate attachment 
could mean that one did not act in a way that suitably prioritised this consideration in one’s 
resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. In other words, only by knowing what 
our passionate attachments are, can we ensure that they are consistently action-guiding, 
and are suitably prioritised in our resolution to the Socratic question. Furthermore, from 
time to time we need to update this knowledge because – as we will see below – our 
passionate attachments inevitably change. This means that knowledge of our passionate 
attachments must be regularly sought to track the various changes we undergo.58 
 
2.3.2   The Chronological Development of Our Passionate Attachments  
 
We begin life with a very limited capacity to cultivate our passionate attachments because 
as infants and children we can only take up whatever is immediately available in our 
vicinity. Yet, all being well, the scope for the cultivation of these kinds of attachments 
steadily increases, and we even develop new capacities that increase our ability to cultivate 
our passionate character, capacities that remain undeveloped until we are mature. As we 
grow, new potential passionate attachments become available to us, ones which it would 
have been inappropriate to take up previously. One reason we might find it odd to be 
sceptical regarding the possibility of cultivating our passionate attachments is because 
these kinds of attachments require us to actively respond to them: we need to be aware of 
how our current passionate attachments may no longer be appropriate, we must always 
be on the lookout for new things to become passionately attached to, and we must 
constantly ensure that our current passionate attachments are appropriate to our stage of 
development. Our resolution of the question of ‘how one should live’ does not remain fixed 
                                               
58 Quassim Cassam views ‘substantial self-knowledge’ (‘knowledge of one’s own values, character 
traits, and what makes one happy’) as ‘necessary for self-cultivation, and makes self-cultivation 
possible’ (Cassam, Dennis, Werkhoven 2018: 222–30).  
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throughout our lives, so our relation to our passionate attachments must be in a state of 
constant re-evaluation. We not only acquire new passionate attachments as we develop, 
but it is important that we are actively involved in this process, choosing, deliberating, 
experimenting with the passionate attachments we eventually take up.  
To understand this, we could think back to the horticultural metaphor of self-
cultivation. Like a blossoming plant, we will naturally grow and develop, but cultivation 
begins when we direct, control, or otherwise regulate this growth, typically in ways that 
we believe to be conducive to our eventual flourishing. Just as the plant has different needs 
depending on its stage of development, so too we must ensure that our passionate 
attachments are appropriate to our stage of chronological development. The passionate 
attachments of infancy, adolescence, and adulthood each have their own distinctive 
character: we find it difficult to enthuse about our passionate attachments from earlier 
periods as we once did, and even in the same developmental stage (adolescence, say) we 
can find ourselves rapidly enamoured with a sequence of different attachments to which 
it is difficult to find a common denominator. 
Consistently flourishing throughout one’s life must include a sequence of 
markedly differing passionate attachments, pursued at various times as the person grows 
and develops. Some of these will have been taken up avidly but will now be long-forgotten 
(a childhood hobby or an ex-lover), some will have been toyed with but then abandoned 
in the face of other considerations (moral or prudential ones, for instance, or perhaps a 
more compelling passionate attachment), others will have appeared at a point in the 
person’s life from which time they will have remained fairly consistent (such as – one hopes 
– attachments to their spouse or children). However we strive to resolve the question of 
‘how one should live’, it is unlikely this resolution will be capable of detailing how this or 
that passionate attachment will inform our resolution to it in a fixed or permanent way. 
The fact that our passionate attachments require us to cultivate them in response 
to our stage of life can be illustrated in cases where a person takes up a passionate 
attachment that is inappropriate to their stage of development. Moreover, such 
chronologically inappropriate passionate attachments are taken so seriously that many 
psychological problems are even defined in terms of our passionate attachments being 
obsessional, overly rigid, or atavistic. The adolescent who cannot break away from the 
passionate attachments of his childhood (toys or computer games, say) will be encouraged 
to take up new attachments more fitting to their current stage of life, whereas the adult 
who regresses to attachments from their childhood or adolescence may well be sent to a 
clinical psychologist. This is not to say that we cannot experience healthy nostalgia or 
forward-thinking ambition regarding our attachments. Far from it, in our desire to form 
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new attachments we are constantly experimenting with potential entities to which we are 
speculatively interested in becoming attached.  
Furthermore, because our passionate attachments develop in chronologically 
prescribed ways, there is a sense in which our cultivation of them can go well or badly. We 
can be criticised for the passionate attachments we choose to take up, which indicates that 
– at least in some sense – we are responsible for them. But we can only legitimately 
understand ourselves to be responsible for them if we exercise some freedom when we are 
cultivating them. This indicates, contra Frankfurt, that there is at least some sense in which 
we are free to cultivate our passionate attachments.  
We do not simply switch from one attachment to another seamlessly at the 
prescribed time, so there must be evaluable skills and traits that relate to these processes. 
The explicit major life decisions we take regarding these attachments must be understood 
as suffused throughout our lives, as we are constantly required to ask ourselves whether 
we should have an affair with that ex-lover whom one did not marry or whether one 
should seek a mid-career change. Just as Murdoch notes that the cultivation of our moral 
characters is ‘something that goes on continually’, so too we should view attending to our 
passionate attachments in a similar manner (2014 [1964]: 36). While Wolf is right to say that 
we have greatest opportunity to change our passionate attachments when we encounter 
major life decisions (Should I marry Jasmine or Julie? Should I study art or architecture?), 
this is not the only time we can do this. Rather, we are constantly evaluating the passionate 
attachment we currently have, comparing these to potential new ones or other kinds of 
considerations, and deciding whether to devote energy to this passionate attachment or 
that. Our capacity to cultivate our passionate character is not only switched on when we 
are faced with making a major life decision.   
 
2.3.3   The Contingency of Our Passionate Attachments  
 
Given that our passionate attachments so profoundly inform the question of ‘how one 
should live’, it is understandable that we should be concerned about whether they are as 
choiceworthy as possible, to minimise their interference with moral or prudential 
considerations, and that they themselves are not inappropriate or toxic. When we evaluate 
our passionate attachments in this way, we compare the worth of them with one another, 
as well as with potential attachments with which we may replace them. We often realise 
we are dissatisfied with the passionate attachments we currently have, and conduct 
ourselves in ways that explicitly open ourselves up to forming new ones. This is why 
Frankfurt’s advice to introspect to see what passionate attachments one happens to have 
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cannot do justice to the strongly experimental component in the process of forming 
attachments, nor does it provide a framework that could support an account of how we 
can actively cultivate them. We can form passionate attachments with vastly different 
things – some choiceworthy, others less so – which means our capacity to cultivate these 
attachments gives a valuable way of orientating ourselves towards those we view as most 
worthwhile.59 Our capacity to evaluate the passionate attachments we have, avoid those 
that are toxic, and orientate ourselves towards ones that are most appropriate to our stage 
of development, means we are highly motivated to confirm that our current passionate 
attachments are the best ones available.   
It would be naive to assume that everyone is equally well-placed to enjoy 
worthwhile passionate attachments. We start in very different places regarding our 
proximity to attachments that are choiceworthy, and we are therefore highly motivated to 
discover the most appropriate entities with which to create this kind of relationship. We 
have a natural propensity to form some passionate attachments and not others given the 
contingent position we are born into, which is well illustrated by our tendency to form 
strong passionate attachments to our parents or children. Because of our likely proximity 
to them, these persons are unquestioningly taken up as passionate attachments, although 
in some cases these attachments may not be benign. Several times in the above discussion 
of the value of certain attachments I noted that family commitments are often thought to 
have a high degree of resilience and consistency. This is not always the case, however, and 
sometimes these kinds of bonds are formed with persons who, on account of their character 
or circumstances, cannot satisfy the basic requirements to be an appropriate or a satisfying 
passionate attachment, or become a kind of toxic attachment, as discussed in 1.5.4. 
Unfortunately, the examples of such toxic passionate attachments must be sought in places 
where we also find the most harrowing kinds of human suffering. The drug-addicted 
father who routinely prioritises his habit over the welfare of his child, the femme fatale 
who systematically destroys each of her prospective suitors, or the noxious political dream 
that inspires the fanatic, are all toxic passionate attachments that require a strenuous 
process of self-cultivation if one is to rid oneself of them. At these times we would do well 
                                               
59 For the reasons outlined in 1.5, I need not think, like Wolf, that choiceworthiness implies ‘objective 
worth’, but that we should understand it as ‘subjective attractiveness’ à la Frankfurt and Williams. 
Even Wolf thinks that ‘subjective attractiveness’ is a necessary for entities that generate 
meaningfulness.   
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to follow Murdoch’s advice to ‘attempt to check being in love’, although she neither offers 
a theory nor practical strategies on how we might be able to go about doing this.60  
Nevertheless, acknowledging that there is a large degree of contingency regarding 
the entities that we are attached to, and that we often find ourselves surrounded by less-
than-ideal attachments reveals something interesting. It shows that we have good reason 
to seek situations where our capacity to choose our attachments can be increased. In 
impoverished situations it may be impossible to find choiceworthy attachments, so the 
next best thing we can do is to actively seek situations where we have a greater range of 
valuable entities to which we can eventually become attached. We can only choose our 
passionate attachments when they are presented to us as options, but the ways that these 
objects are presented to us is often not within our power and is contingently dependent on 
things outside our control. Although we cannot cultivate our passionate character ex nihilo, 
we should not underestimate the extent to which we have the capacity to extend the range 
of passionate attachments that we can choose to cultivate. We can actively situate ourselves 
where it is likely that we can encounter entities that could become passionate attachments 
(joining a dating service), we can decide to experiment with a new potential attachment 
(trying a new sport), and we can use our imaginative powers to envisage whether a 
particular passionate attachment would suit us (imagining life with children). While none 
of these behaviours ensures that we will form a passionate attachment with this or that 
entity, they do increase our likelihood of us doing so. These examples suggest that, 
although we cannot master the contingency that surrounds the process of forming 
passionate attachments, we can influence it.  
 
2.3.4   The Desire to Integrate Our Passionate Attachments 
 
There are two senses in which we could be said to strive to integrate our passionate 
attachments. First, to resolve the question of ‘how one should live’ our passionate 
attachments need to be integrated with our prudential and moral considerations. At this 
level, what I term ‘Gauguin’s Dilemma’ describes the decision-making process that the 
artist may have undergone prior to his journey to Tahiti. The tragedy of Gauguin’s 
situation is that he has to choose between his moral obligations to his family and his 
passionate attachment to become a world-leading artist. Williams acknowledges that his 
example is simplified and schematic. To bring the gravity of Gauguin’s dilemma into relief 
                                               
60 Murdoch notes that in such situations ‘pure will can usually achieve little [because] it is small use 
telling oneself ”stop being in love”’ (2001 [1962]: 54). In Ch. 5 I show that, as well as our intention to 
cultivate our passionate attachments, this process involves other elements such as iterability.  
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it deliberately ignores the fact that Gauguin is likely to have other passionate attachments 
(presumably his wife and children!), which he would have to weigh against his desire to 
pursue his art. As Williams presents things, Gauguin could neither integrate his passionate 
attachment to paint in Tahiti with his other passionate attachments (his family, assuming 
he loves them), nor his moral and prudential considerations. We also noted how 
unenviable Gauguin’s position was. Rather than being able to integrate his passionate 
attachments with moral and prudential considerations, his circumstances put him in the 
tragic position where he was forced to choose his passionate attachment to painting, at the 
expense of all other considerations.  
Nevertheless, there is a second sense in which it is necessary to cultivate our 
passionate attachments in the attempt to integrate them. Unlike the single-minded 
Gauguin in Williams’ example, most of us find ourselves more happily situated within a 
nexus of passionate attachments which requires that we strive to integrate and re-adjust 
these attachments with respect to one another. Like the kind of integration involved in 
Gauguin’s dilemma, integration of our passionate attachments with one another requires 
compromise so that we can maintain salutary passionate relations with more than one 
thing. Furthermore, depending on the passionate attachments concerned this may be more 
or less difficult. Some passionate attachments are clearly compatible, whereas others are 
highly resistant to integration. One thing we may admire about Gauguin’s response to his 
dilemma is his courageous – or perhaps ruthless – response to it: he does not pretend that 
his passionate attachment to Tahiti is compatible with his moral and prudential 
considerations, and he single-mindedly chooses accordingly. This behaviour is strikingly 
different to those who get themselves in all manner of trouble by trying to maintain two or 
more incompatible attachments under the condition of secrecy. The conduct of an 
adulterous politician, for example, is often understood as a moral failure (which it may be), 
but it could also be understood as an irreconcilability of two mutually exclusive passionate 
attachments. Nevertheless, it is because some passionate attachments are difficult to 
integrate, often in the public sphere, which gives us further reason to think that our lives 
could be improved if we were able to cultivate them. Through cultivation we may, for 
example, be able to eventually discern that what appeared to be a bona fide passionate 
attachment is not in fact one at all; or we may discover that they are actually integratable, 
such as when a straying politician renegotiates her marriage vows to include the possibility 
of an open relationship. 
If we agree that integration of one’s passionate attachments, either with one’s 
moral or prudential considerations or with competing passionate attachments, is valuable, 
then this gives us reason to look favourably on the project of cultivating them. While I only 
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begin to explore the nuts and bolts of how we can be said to do this when we turn to the 
Hellenistic tradition in Part II, for now we can acknowledge that cultivating our passionate 
attachments in a provisional sense of reflecting on, calibrating, comparing, evaluating 
them will be indispensable if one wishes to integrate them. Given that we wish to have 
integrated lives in both of the senses explored above, this gives us strong reason to think 
deeply about how we can cultivate them. Failure to integrate our passionate attachments 
makes the Socratic question impossible to decisively resolve. Similarly failing to find a way 
to integrate one’s moral, prudential, and passionate considerations leaves us with an 
unsatisfying resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. Even on the very terms of 
the three thinkers we have examined, when we make a ‘reasonable deliberation’ regarding 
the question of how one should live, we are required to weigh the considerations that these 
kinds of attachments generate against moral and prudential ones.  
 
2.3.5   The Fragility of Our Passionate Attachments  
 
Many of our passionate attachments are fragile, and this makes us eminently vulnerable to 
losing them. Bereavement offers a chilling example of this. Aside from causing intense 
pain, one of the most frequently reported symptoms of bereavement is a profound lack of 
meaning and purpose, which fits with Wolf’s view that our passionate attachments 
generate meaningfulness. I explored this in 1.3 when discussing what motivates 
Shakespeare’s Juliet to commit suicide. Here I argued that, instead of viewing her as just 
motivated by deep unhappiness, a better explanation for her suicide is that she cannot bear 
the prospect of a future life that she believes will have no purpose. Romeo’s apparent death 
causes Juliet to suffer existentially because she believes that the shared future they could 
have had together is destroyed.  
Similarly, what we could call ‘existential suffering’ can be caused when our 
capacities fail in ways that prevent us from sustaining a relationship with one of our 
passionate attachments. This concerns the loss of a mental or physical ability that directly 
impacts on one’s ability to pursue the passionate attachment in one’s life. The increasing 
deafness that Beethoven experienced towards the end of his life could be considered an 
example of this. In these cases, a factor beyond the impacted person’s control destroys a 
cherished passionate attachment or their ability to pursue such an attachment, destroying 
the possibility that it can function in the life of the person in any meaningful way.  
 From what I have said about the value of our passionate attachments in Ch. 1, it 
should be clear that losing our passionate attachments will greatly impact upon our 
flourishing. Moreover, because our passionate attachments are fragile, it is likely that at 
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some point we will lose them, which means that it is likely that our flourishing will be 
impacted at some point. For these reasons, we are highly motivated to cultivate new 
passionate attachments when our current ones are no longer viable. Fortunately, even in 
the face of a crushing blow to our passionate character – the death of a loved one, say – we 
can cultivate ourselves in a way that furnishes ourselves with new passionate attachments. 
In fact, for our character to be able to demonstrate resilience in the face of untoward 
circumstances, then it is important that we have the ability to find new passionate 
attachments, reinventing our passionate character if we lose a central passionate 
attachment.  
 
2.4   Towards a Theory of Passionate Self-Cultivation 
 
In this chapter I have argued – contra Frankfurt – that we have reason to think we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments, and – contra Wolf – we have reason to think we can 
formulate a philosophical theory of how we do this. I began by examining the literature on 
moral and prudential self-cultivation, which shows that there is widespread agreement 
that these dimensions of our character can be cultivated. Philosophers have formed 
detailed theories of how we can cultivate these aspects of our characters. If we can (i) 
cultivate our moral and prudential character, and (ii) can form a philosophical account of 
how we do this, then the mystery is why this does not apply to the cultivation of our 
passionate attachments. Although I will remain open to the possibility that there might be 
special reasons why (i) and (ii) do not apply to the cultivation of our passionate character, 
Frankfurt’s denial that we can cultivate our passionate attachments, and Wolf’s denial that 
we can form a theory of doing so, are difficult to understand without these reasons. 
Furthermore, not only do such theories offer us two analogous models for a theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments, but they also provide philosophical precedents for 
what a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments could look like. First, in the case 
of moral self-cultivation, I argued that the literature in this area shows that self-directed 
character change is at least possible. Second, in the case of prudential self-cultivation, I 
argued that cultivating our passionate attachments differs from cultivating our prudential 
considerations because the former are not self-interested. Following Kant’s arguments that 
cultivating our prudential character needs no philosophical theory because our prudential 
considerations get along quite well by themselves, I suggested that our passionate 
attachments are quite unlike this because they are disinterested, so how we cultivate them 
is in need of theoretical explanation.    
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 In 2.3 I moved to examine the reasons why we might think that cultivating our 
passionate attachments is something we can do, both in principle and in practice. These 
reasons aim to provide the motivation for constructing a theory of how we cultivate our 
passionate character. Here I argued that we are highly motivated to undergo an ongoing 
process of cultivating our passionate attachments for five reasons. First, we seek 
knowledge of our passionate attachments, and regard doing so as highly valuable because 
it allows us to align our conduct with whatever we care about (2.3.1). Second, we strive to 
ensure that our passionate attachments are appropriate to our stage of development 
because it is detrimental to have chronologically inappropriate attachments (2.3.2). Third, 
we start our lives with contingent passionate attachments, so cultivate them to ensure they 
are as choiceworthy as possible (2.3.3). Fourth, we strive to integrate our passionate 
attachments with one another, because we recognise that doing so facilitates our 
flourishing (2.3.4). Fifth, we cultivate our passionate attachments because there are times 
when we lose our passionate attachments, and are highly motivated to engage in a process 
of finding new ones (2.3.5). Taken together this shows that we are not only highly 
motivated to cultivate our passionate attachments, but also that it is possible to think of 
many examples of when we do precisely this.  
Given how important our passionate attachments are to the flourishing life, not 
cultivating them would be to neglect an extremely valuable aspect of our practical lives. 
Psychotherapists and self-help teachers have developed methods to help us do this, but 
we might think that practical philosophers would be well placed to offer a theory of 
cultivating the passionate attachments, one that could complement the existing theories of 
self-directed moral and prudential development. Such a theoretical undertaking could 
have practical benefits. Just as Aristotle claims that knowledge of the good has a ‘great 
influence on life’ insofar as it makes us ‘more likely to hit upon what we should’, so too a 
theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments will benefit this aspect of our 
practical lives (1985 [NE]: 1094a18). In Pt. II, I propose that we can find the conceptual 
resources for a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments in the Francophone 
interpretations of the Hellenistic tradition. These conceptual resources power the theory of 
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In the opening pages of The Therapy of Desire Martha Nussbaum claims that ‘[t]wentieth-
century philosophy, both in Europe and North America, has, until very recently, made less 
use of Hellenistic ethics than almost any other philosophical culture in the West since the 
fourth century BCE’ (2009 [1994]: 16).61 Nussbaum aims to remedy this neglect by attending 
to what she argues is the singular nature of the Hellenistic conception of philosophy, the 
complexity and unfamiliarity of which she believes has chronically hampered previous 
efforts to understand this tradition. By re-situating Hellenistic texts within a context that 
views philosophy as an eminently practical undertaking, one which understands itself as 
an exercise in self-cultivation, she argues, Hellenism is a ‘very helpful way of balancing 
[modern moral philosophy’s] interest in common human problems’ while ‘illuminating 
our own contemporary circumstances’ (2009 [1994]: 16). In the preface to the 2009 edition 
of Therapy, Nussbaum tells us that in contrast to what she regards as the obtuseness of 
much modern moral philosophy, she believes that the Hellenists offer: 
  
A practical and compassionate philosophy […] that exists for the sake of human 
beings, in order to address their deepest needs, confront their most urgent 
perplexities, and bring them from misery to some greater measure of 
flourishing. (2009 [1994]: 3)  
 
                                               
61 Since Nussbaum wrote this in 1994, both scholarly and non-scholarly interest in Hellenistic 
philosophy has increased exponentially. I refer to much of this new wave Hellenistic scholarship 
below, but it is worth noting that many non-scholarly initiatives on Hellenistic thought have recently 
begun, especially on Stoicism. One of the most popular of these is Stoic week, which since its 
inauguration in 2012 focuses on how the insights of Stoic philosophy can be applied to modern life. 
There is now a growing popular literature on this topic, including informative popular works by 
William Irvine (2009) and Massimo Pigliucci (2017). 
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Not only do the Hellenists have the conceptual resources to reinvigorate modern moral 
philosophy by offering a practical account of how to attain the flourishing life, Nussbaum 
suggests that historically speaking the Hellenistic schools intentionally orientated their 
practical philosophy around the Socratic question. For the Hellenists – as for Frankfurt, 
Williams, and Wolf – asking ‘how should one live’ is an eminently practical question, one 
which is central to the kind of creatures that are prospectively deciding upon (and 
retrospectively evaluating) their conduct, constantly striving to do justice to many, 
potentially competing, action-guiding considerations that jostle for attention. Nussbaum 
writes: 
 
[Hellenistic] philosophy tends to be more sensitive to [philosophically 
understanding human need and motivation] than contemporary moral 
philosophy […]; for asking how to live is never, in the Greek traditions, a 
merely academic exercise, nor philosophy a merely academic subject. 
[…] [F]rom all of these attempts contemporary moral philosophy has 
much to learn, if it wishes to move beyond the academy to take its place 
in the daily lives of human beings. (2009 [1994]: 484) 
 
Yet despite these auspicious words, the way in which Nussbaum urges us to take up the 
philosophical resources of Hellenistic philosophy primarily involves deepening our 
understanding of considerations that affect our ability to cultivate ourselves morally. 
Although she tells us that modern moral philosophy has much to learn from the Hellenists, 
Nussbaum writes within an Anglophone tradition that primarily interprets these 
philosophers as viewing strong emotions [pathē],62 and the passionate attachments which 
generate them, as deeply inimical to our flourishing, which is why we need ‘philosophical 
therapy’ to rid ourselves of them. Compared to more traditional scholars within the 
Anglophone tradition, however, Nussbaum’s project of mining Hellenistic ethics for the 
philosophical resources to contribute to debates in contemporary moral philosophy is 
significant because it does two novel things: first, as shown above, she explicitly applies 
                                               
62 I translate the term ‘pathē’ as ‘emotion’ – instead of the more commonly-used term ‘passion’ – 
reserving the term ‘passionate attachment’ for the kind of love objects I outline in Ch. 1. This aims to 
avoid confusing the entity that gives rise to pathē with pathē themselves. As I argue, although the 
Hellenists viewed the passionate attachments as generating pathē, these kinds of attachments were 
not solely responsible for this, as they regarded any deep-seated attachment as capable of generating 
pathē, including cherished moral or prudential ones. See Daniel Russell’s helpful etymology of pathē 
(2012: 184), and Nussbaum on the advantages of translating it as ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’ (2009 [1994]: 
n.4, 319). 
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the resources of Hellenistic philosophy to the question of ‘how one should live’, claiming 
it responds to the demands of human life more adequately than the concerns of modern 
moral philosophy. Second, she emphasises the key role of exercises of self-cultivation, in 
the face of fierce opposition from scholars such as John Cooper. Third, although she views 
pathē as a potential source of moral error, she argues that passionate attachments that 
generate them had a more ambivalent status in the Hellenistic world than Anglophone 
scholars traditionally suggest. 
Despite these innovations, Nussbaum shares two assumptions with traditional 
Anglophone scholarship which remain central to her account: first, she tends to view 
Hellenistic self-cultivation as applicable to our contemporary circumstances insofar as it 
offers opportunities for exercises in self-directed moral development, from which her very 
conception of ‘therapy of the passions’ derives. Second, she views philosophical practice as 
constituting the true locus of Hellenistic self-cultivation, primarily because of its role in 
extirpating pathē, and roundly criticises those interpreters who do not share this view. 
These last two points require that I move beyond Nussbaum’s focus on pathē or strong 
emotions in order to enlist the conceptual resources of Hellenism in a theory of how we 
cultivate our passionate attachments. To do this, I examine thinkers in the Francophone 
tradition who also claim that the conceptual resources of Hellenism can help us, while also 
offering a broader and richer account of the ancient practices of self-cultivation, one which 
does not view them exclusively in terms of the suppression of pathē. Both Michel Foucault 
and Pierre Hadot believe that the ethics of the Hellenistic world provide the resources to 
pursue a programme in practical philosophy that is not limited to moral development, 
with Foucault arguing that the practice of philosophy is only one of several ways to 
cultivate the self.  
Pt. II examines Foucault’s and Hadot’s powerful claims regarding the value of 
Hellenistic philosophy for both contemporary philosophy and contemporary life, claims 
which I argue make a vital contribution to the question of how we cultivate our passionate 
attachments. Before focusing on these claims in the second half of Ch. 3, I should note that 
both of these Francophone thinkers make strong claims regarding the possibility and 
desirability of employing the conceptual resources of Hellenistic philosophy in 
contemporary philosophical debate, claims that go beyond Nussbaum’s own. Foucault 
tells us, for example, that the Hellenists harbour a ‘treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, 
procedures that, [although] cannot exactly be reactivated, at least constitute […] a certain 
point of view which can be very useful as a tool for analysing what’s going on now – and 
to change it’ (1997b [1983]: 261), and in the research summary to his 1980–81 lectures at the 
Collège de France, he writes: 
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The most useful line to follow for this inquiry seems to be what could 
be called ‘techniques of self’, that is to say the procedures, such as no 
doubt exist in all civilizations, that are recommended or prescribed to 
individuals for fixing, maintaining, or transforming their identity in 
terms of certain aims and thanks to relations of self-mastery or self-
knowledge. (2017 [1980–81]: 293) 
 
Although more expansive and elliptical, Foucault’s remarks follow the earlier work of his 
acknowledged influence Hadot. Throughout my discussion of the Francophone 
interpretations of the Hellenistic tradition, I show that there is indeed much overlap in the 
work of these thinkers, and both approach the problem of how the conceptual resources of 
Hellenism can be employed in a contemporary context in ways that complement one 
another.  
Perhaps Hadot is more fervent in his support for a renewed interest in Hellenism, 
but Foucault’s – albeit cryptic – comments will be shown to be more useful for the leading 
question of this thesis. In contrast to Foucault’s equivocation regarding the question of 
whether Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation can be reactivated (see above; ‘cannot 
exactly be reactivated’), Hadot affirms that ancient conception of philosophical self-
shaping ‘could still be reactualised [since] these models correspond to permanent, 
fundamental attitudes which all human beings find necessary when they set about seeking 
wisdom’ (2002 [1995]: 277–8). One reason Hadot says this, which I will explore in detail in 
3.1, is that he believes that Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation can be ‘detached from 
their antiquated cosmological and mythical element’, a view he supports by observing that 
the different schools used precisely the same exercise for vastly different philosophical 
purposes (2002 [1995]: 277–8). For this reason, he suggests, the ‘plurality of ancient schools 
is precious’ because they offer an account of self-cultivation that is readily amenable to 
transplantation or reactivation. He calls this attitude of borrowing one exercise from one 
tradition and applying it to another ‘eclecticism’, a term that he concedes is ‘often rather 
poorly viewed by philosophers’, but also one that harbours the possibility of making the 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation available to us today (2011: 102).63 
                                               
63 Asked by philosopher Arnold Davidson about the present importance of ‘philosophical 
eclecticism’, Hadot tells us, ‘[t]his attitude of eclecticism is potentially of great importance in the 
contemporary world, in which the schools no longer exist and in which one feels reticent to let oneself 
be influenced by any kind of school.’ (2011: 102). 
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In a similar vein, in response to the question of whether ‘ancient philosophy can 
have something to teach modern man, have meaning for him, and help him guide his 
conduct’, Hadot replies in the affirmative, arguing that the public feedback he has received 
in response to his publications on this topic strongly endorses this view (2011: 147).64 
Furthermore, he claims to be working within a broader tradition of seeking the 
philosophical or cultural resources from the ancient world to help with contemporary 
problems. Citing a passage from Nietzsche’s Nachlass, used as the epigraph of the next 
chapter, he argues that the German philosopher ‘considered the schools of Greek 
philosophy to be an experimental laboratory from which we can still benefit’. In short, 
Hadot sees the influence of the ancient world everywhere in contemporary life. Drawing 
an analogy between how recent work in ancient anthropology has been used to ‘inspire 
our modern democracies’, he asks why this should also not be the case ‘when it comes to 
the experience of ethics and of philosophical life?’ (2011: 102–3). In this spirit, I seek the 
conceptual resources for a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments in his account 
of Hellenistic self-cultivation. 
Before examining Foucault’s and Hadot’s respective contributions to the question 
of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments, I should clarify the research 
parameters I observe in this part of the thesis. The first research parameter concerns 
Hadot’s claim that, for the Hellenists, philosophy was viewed as a way of life, as well as 
his proposal that today’s philosophers ought to return to this model. This is one of Hadot’s 
most celebrated claims, and modified versions of it have been developed by Cooper65 and 
                                               
64 Question posed by the classicist Jeannie Carlier. In response to it Hadot tells us: ‘[i]t is up to the 
reader to decide. One is free to believe or not to believe, to act or not to act. If I judge on the basis of 
the numerous letters I have received, written by very different people, from France, Germany, and 
the United States, telling me that my books have helped them spiritually someone even wrote to me, 
“You have changed my life” – I think that the method is good, and I have always been able to respond 
to these people, with reason, that it is not me but the ancient philosophers who brought them this 
help.’ (2011: 147–8) 
65 Cooper acknowledges Hadot’s influence regarding this matter (2012: x, 8), although he builds his 
account independently from the ancient source material. Like Nussbaum, Cooper emphasises the 
primacy of reason in ancient self-cultivation, which he thinks ancient philosophers viewed as 
creating a link between one’s philosophical commitments and the way one led one’s life. He writes: 
‘It is by adopting [the] assumption that [the capacity for reasoning does have an inherent power of 
moving us to action] that ancient philosophers are able to make plausible, and to work out, in their 
different theoretical constructions, their conceptions of philosophy as a way of life.’ (2012: 12) I return 
to Cooper’s account of the rational processes involved in self-cultivation when discussing Nussbaum 
and Hadot on this theme in Ch. 4.   
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John Sellars.66 Hadot stresses that he does not intend his contribution only ‘to be relevant 
to an historical analysis of ancient philosophy’ because it is ‘also an attempt at defining an 
ethical model which modern man can discover in antiquity’ (1995 [1987]: 208). In What is 
Ancient Philosophy?, he dramatises this idea with a series of non sequiturs, asking: 
 
Why not define the philosopher not as a professor or a writer who 
develops a philosophical discourse, but, in accordance with the concept 
which was constant in antiquity, as a person who leads a philosophical 
life? Shouldn’t we revise the habitual use of the word ‘philosopher’ 
(which usually refers only to the theoretician) so that it applies to the 
person who practices philosophy, just as Christians can practice 
Christianity without being theorists or theologians? Do we ourselves 
have to construct a philosophical system before we can live 
philosophically? (2002 [1995]: 275) 
 
Hadot’s point here is that the exercises of self-cultivation he details in Philosophy as a Way 
of Life and What is Ancient Philosophy? should be understood as so integral to philosophy 
that engaging in them actually constituted what it was to be a philosopher in the Hellenistic 
world. Moreover, his claim is not only a historical one about how Hellenistic philosophers 
understood themselves: he thinks that modern philosophers can and should take up this 
‘ethical model’, so that a requirement of calling oneself a philosopher would be that one’s 
life expresses the principles to which one is philosophically committed. 
                                               
66 Sellars offers a restricted version of Hadot’s claim, one which more plausibly accommodates 
patently theoretical themes in the Hellenistic corpus. Understanding the Hellenistic conception of 
ethics, for Sellars, fits with a traditional conception of philosophy insofar as ‘λόγος is a necessary 
component’, although he adds that it must include the idea of ‘philosophical exercise or training 
(ἄσκησις)’ (2003: 7). For Sellars, then, the Hellenists conceived philosophy as an ‘art (τέχνη), 
[involving] both rational principles (λόγοι) and practical training (ἄσκησις) (2003: 107). This means 
that it is essential that we do not follow those like Hadot (and Nussbaum) who ‘identify spiritual 
exercises with philosophy itself’ because these exercises are ‘merely the second, although essential, 
stage of philosophical education coming after an initial stage devoted to philosophical principles 
(λόγος).’ (2003: 118). This is an original departure from Hadot’s view, as the latter implies when 
Hadot writes, ‘[d]espite my attempts to avoid it, some of what I have written about spiritual exercises 
in general may suggest that spiritual exercises are added to philosophical theory, to philosophical 
discourse, that they would be practice that merely complements theory and abstract discourse. In fact, 
all philosophy is an exercise-instructional discourse no less than the inner discourse that orients our 
actions.’ (Hadot 2011: 88) 
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The second and third research parameters of this thesis are interpretative and 
hermeneutical. The former relates to the Hellenistic source material. In the next chapter, I 
will examine the strikingly different ways the Hellenistic texts have been interpreted, not 
just across the Anglophone and Francophone traditions, but also within these traditions, 
as on occasion the various protagonists I examine advocate markedly different positions 
concerning the reading of the same key text. Such clashes are  partly due to the fact that 
the extant Hellenistic source material is often genuinely equivocal. For example, 
concerning the question of whether Hellenistic philosophers viewed philosophy as a ‘way 
of life’, even strong advocates of this position such as Cooper are forced to insert lengthy 
caveats in order to counter off-the-shelf objections to his key claims. He writes:  
 
[F]or many philosophers of almost all periods of antiquity we have no 
evidence to suggest that their philosophy was considered as offering, or 
being, a way of life. Their work seems to have been motivated by 
nothing more than what motivates most philosophers nowadays. They 
seem to have found philosophical ways of thinking, and the questions 
philosophy addresses, simply interesting, even engrossing. They 
enjoyed logical analysis and argument, and were fascinated by logic and 
paradox, as philosophers of all ages have always been. They found some 
of the questions of philosophical debate at their time fascinating and 
worth thinking about, for their intrinsic intellectual value. In their 
approach to their work they did not differ from such other intellectuals 
of their time as mathematicians or medical researchers, even if we, and 
they, might agree that those other sorts of work could have more 
immediate practical applications and so were less purely theoretical 
than theirs. (2012: 24)  
 
Although such an astonishing admission illustrates that the source material rarely lends 
itself to definitive interpretation, this does not concern the key aim of my thesis. The 
historical questions of whether or not the Hellenists understood philosophy as a ‘way of 
life’, or to what extent (if any) they prioritised exercises of self-cultivation, are fascinating 
on their own terms, but the purpose of this thesis is to deploy the conceptual resources of 
this period to shed light on the question of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments. The only exception to this is where I adjudicate between interpretations on 
the basis of the internal consistency of the account concerned. To some extent, I do this in 
4.1, for example, when I scrutinise Nussbaum’s attack on Foucault, both because I believe 
her trenchant criticisms of him can be deflected by attending to his work carefully, and 
because doing this elucidates the scope of Foucault’s account of self-cultivation.   
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Furthermore, the scholarly interpretations on which I focus have been chosen 
because they gather and expand upon the Hellenistic source material in a way that is highly 
apposite to the project of formulating a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments. A critical analysis of whether Hadot or Foucault get the Hellenistic account 
of self-cultivation right or wrong would be the topic of another project, and indeed there 
is already a wealth of informative literature available on the historical veracity of both their 
readings.67 For example, in 3.2, I will raise some of Cooper’s stringent objections to Hadot’s 
use of the Hellenistic source material, regarding whether the Hellenistic philosophers 
prioritise exercises of self-cultivation at all. While these worries are interesting, and allow 
us to understand Hellenistic philosophy in greater depth, I pass over them relatively 
quickly, because my aim is not to analyse readings of Hellenistic texts, but to locate and 
deploy the conceptual resources to answer a question in contemporary practical 
philosophy.  
The third research parameter of this thesis is related to the second insofar as it also 
concerns an issue of hermeneutics and interpretation, one mentioned in my General 
Introduction. Not only will I refrain from adjudicating whether Anglophone or 
Francophone scholars are more accurate readers of the Hellenistic source material, neither 
will I ask how Hellenism connects to, for instance, Foucault’s philosophical project as a 
whole. Much valuable work on Foucault aims to do precisely this, partly because his 
writings on the Hellenists is unfinished, and his comments on their significance for our 
own era are typically fleeting. Although I will draw lightly on some of this excellent 
scholarship – especially Stuart Elden’s Foucault’s Last Decade (2016), Edward McGushin’s 
Foucault’s Askesis (2007), Timothy O’Leary’s Foucault and the Art of Ethics (2002) –  I 
primarily use Foucault’s reading of the Hellenists to inform my discussion of how we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments. Instead of reconstructing Foucault’s suggestive 
remarks on the contemporary relevance of the Hellenistic tradition, I offer a way of 
applying his work to the guiding question of this thesis, one that concentrates on locating 
the conceptual resources for a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. 
In other words, instead of speculating about what Foucault had in mind in his intriguing 
comments on how Hellenistic ethics can answer contemporary ethical, political, and 
philosophical problems, I scrutinise what he says about self-cultivation within this 
                                               
67 For a critique of Foucault’s use of ancient source material, see Patricia O’Brien (1989: 25). For a 
comprehensive summary of Hadot’s reception by classicists, see Daniel del Nido’s (2018: 7). Rather 
than engage with these critiques, I follow Laura Cremonesi’s view that both Hadot and Foucault 
suggest a ‘useful redefinition [of the spiritual exercises], allowing us to enact today a renewed 
practice of the self’ (2015: 196). 
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tradition in order to show that his reading of the Hellenists allows us to access their 
conceptual resources in a way that allows us to answer the questions I raised in Ch. 1 and 
Ch. 2.    
Similarly, with respect to Hadot, Pt. II does not pursue his contention that the 
Hellenistic philosophers understood their discipline as a way of life, nor Cooper’s or 
Sellars’ versions of this claim. Nor will it pursue the – admittedly fascinating – idea that 
the Hellenistic conception of philosophy as a ‘way of life’ can be reactualised today.68 
Rather, my work on Hadot and Foucault aims to employ the conceptual resources of 
Hellenism in a theory of how we cultivate our passionate attachments, one which 
contributes to debates in practical philosophy by supplementing Frankfurt’s, Williams’, 
and Wolf’s claims regarding the value of passionate attachments outlined in Ch. 1, and my 
own arguments on the value of cultivating them in Ch. 2. In sum, my aim is to improve 
our philosophical understanding of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments, but 
it does not advance the further point – proposed by Hadot – that contemporary 
philosophers should replace a conception of philosophy that is concerned with 
philosophical theories [logos] with a practical one which emphasises how these theories are 
expressed in the life [βῐ́ος] of the philosopher who holds them. Instead, this part argues 
that Hellenism can underwrite a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments. It does not claim that philosophy is the way to cultivate the self par excellence, 
nor that cultivating the self could be – in a special sense – philosophy. If Pt. II can do this, 
then significant progress in answering the questions raised in Pt. I will have been made. 
 
Overview of Pt. II 
 
Pt. II follows the spirit of Nussbaum’s claim that the study of Hellenism has much to offer 
contemporary practical philosophy insofar as it countenances a greater range of 
considerations that affect our practical reasoning, some of which are especially important. 
Nevertheless, locating the conceptual resources for a theory of how we cultivate our 
passionate attachments requires me to part company with Nussbaum for two reasons: first, 
she emphasises moral self-cultivation; second, her claim that philosophical self-cultivation 
                                               
68 Hadot’s claims that we should do this are – at least for me – often highly persuasive. He writes, 
‘philosophy has progressively entrenched itself on this purely formal path, in the search for novelty 
in itself at all costs. For the philosopher, it is a question of being as original as possible, if not by 
creating a new system, at least by producing a discourse that makes itself complicated in order to be 
original. The more or less skilful construction of a conceptual edifice will become an end in itself. 
Philosophy thus has progressively distanced itself from the concrete life of humans.’ (2011: 55) 
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was viewed as the primary instrument of self-directed character change in the Hellenistic 
world. Doing this leads to seek the bulk of the conceptual resources for my theory from the 
Francophone account of Hellenistic self-cultivation, while following the research 
parameters discussed above. This allows me to engage with Hadot and Foucault without 
speculating on the correctness or otherwise of their interpretation of the source material, 
neither asking how Hellenistic self-cultivation fits into their respective philosophical 
projects. Moreover, I do not pursue Hadot’s claims regarding ‘philosophy as a way of life’, 
which have been intriguingly developed by Cooper and Sellars. Instead, from the second 
half of Ch. 3 onwards, I interrogate Foucault’s and Hadot’s respective conceptions of 
Hellenistic self-cultivation, focusing especially on the exercises they view as crucial for this 
kind of self-development. This aims to show that, on the Francophone reading, the 
Hellenistic exercises are at least compatible with the idea that they can be used to cultivate 
our passionate attachments. In Ch. 4 I investigate the exercises themselves, providing the 
conceptual resources for both my theoretical and practical accounts of cultivating our 





















So far as praxis is concerned, I view the various moral schools as experimental 
laboratories in which a considerable number of recipes for the art of living 
[Kunstgriffen der Lebensklughheit] have been thoroughly practised and lived to 
the hilt. The results of all their experiments belong to us, as our legitimate 
property. Thus, we will not hesitate to adopt a Stoic recipe just because we have 
profited in the past from an Epicurean one.  
 
Nietzsche: KSA 9.15 [59]69 
 
3.0   Overview 
 
This chapter explores the dominant interpretations of Hellenistic ethics in Anglophone and 
Francophone scholarship to prepare for an account of how the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation can provide the conceptual resources for a theory of cultivating our passionate 
attachments. While there is significant interpretative crossover in these traditions, for the 
most part they have remained separate, perhaps because they emphasise significantly 
different themes in the Hellenistic corpus. I start by discussing how Anglophone scholars 
emphasise that the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation were moral exercises that aimed 
to extirpate emotions [pathē].70 These scholars view pathē as caused by a range of things, 
but they are especially suspicious of the passionate attachments on account of their 
propensity to generate these damaging emotions. I propose that this suspicion of the 
passionate attachments arises from three interconnected Hellenistic doctrines, each of 
which has been influential in the Anglophone tradition. First, most straightforwardly, the 
Hellenistic recognition that passionate attachments are especially prone to generating 
pathē, and their advocacy of ways of life that minimised these things (3.1.1). Second, the 
                                               
69 Cited by Hadot 2002 [1995]: 277 and 2011: 102. Hadot returns to this theme regularly. Later he 
writes, ‘Nietzsche remarked, this could happen because the ancient schools were a kind of 
experimental laboratory, thanks to which we can compare the consequences of the various types of 
spiritual experience they proposed (2002 [1995]: 277–8). 
70 See n.62 of the Introduction to Pt. II. I translate the term ‘pathē’ as ‘emotion’ – instead of the more 
commonly-used term ‘passion’ – reserving the term ‘passionate attachment’ for the kind of love 
objects I outline in Ch. 1. 
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claim that virtue alone is sufficient for flourishing (3.1.2). Third, the Hellenistic 
endorsement of a minimal conception of prudential attachments, coupled with routine 
criticism of those who take up more attachments than are strictly necessary (3.1.3). As a 
foil to these arguments, I also discuss Nussbaum’s significantly more positive conception 
of the passionate attachments, one for which she offers reasons that are independent of the 
source material, and one which eventually leads her to reconsider (and part company with) 
the Stoics. It is Nussbaum’s more sophisticated appraisal of the passionate attachments 
that distinguishes her from other Anglophone scholars. As mentioned above, due to her 
insistence on the importance of philosophical self-cultivation, I furnish my theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments with the conceptual resources of the Francophone 
tradition, one which views the exercises of self-cultivation as having a significantly wider 
remit.  
The second half of the chapter charts the remarkably different direction taken by 
the Francophone scholarship. Although commentators in this tradition acknowledge the 
suspect nature of the passionate attachments for Hellenistic philosophers, those whom I 
scrutinise in depth – Hadot and Foucault – claim that the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation have much to contribute to contemporary philosophy, along with the power to 
transform contemporary ways of living (3.2.1–3.2.2). While I do not reconstruct or 
speculate what Hadot and Foucault had in mind regarding this, I show that their exegesis 
of Hellenistic ethics offers an account of the Hellenists exercises of  self-shaping that is 
especially well-suited to a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments.   
   
3.1   Extirpating Pathē in Anglophone Philosophy    
 
Before Nussbaum’s influential publications on Hellenism in the mid-1990s, it would be 
little exaggeration to say that Anglophone scholars were single-mindedly negative when 
discussing how the Hellenists assessed any entity capable of generating pathē. These 
scholars were united in the belief that the Hellenists were invariably suspicious of any 
worldly entity to which one could become deeply attached – whether it be prudential or 
passionate – because they interpreted Hellenistic philosophers as viewing such relations 
as undermining a life devoted to rational activity and morality, two ways of life these 
philosophers viewed as deeply entwined. This literature typically focuses on the role of 
the emotions [pathē] in Hellenistic thought, rather than the various kinds of attachments 
we pursue, because it is the pathē that inhibit flourishing directly. On the Anglophone view, 
Hellenistic thinkers regarded pathē as generated in two ways: first, by our attachment to 
the wrong things; and, second, by our attachment to the right things in the wrong way. In the 
 85 
former case, as I show Nussbaum argues below, the Hellenistic account of which 
attachments are valuable (and which must be judiciously avoided) is more complex than 
it seems.  
While Anglophone commentators have felt safe assuming that Hellenistic 
philosophers regarded any strong attachment with suspicion, Nussbaum’s work 
precipitated uncertainty about whether we can assume that such a blanket attitude existed 
in the Hellenistic corpus. Moreover, Nussbaum’s own view of the value of the attachments 
capable of generating pathē is what makes Therapy much more than a straightforwardly 
historical account of the Hellenistic period. She claims that we can find traces of 
‘ambivalence’ regarding the value of deep-seated attachments such as ‘friendship’, ‘love of 
spouse [,] children [,] city [,] country’ in Hellenistic philosophers from Epicurus to 
Lucretius to Seneca (2009 [1994]: 10), even when these philosophers fiercely defend their 
hostility towards such passionate attachments against their Peripatetic contemporaries, as 
I show in 3.1.2. Furthermore, Nussbaum makes it clear that she has her own philosophical 
dog in the fight, telling us that, although it is ‘easy to accept the conclusion that in living a 
life with deep attachments one runs the risk of loss and suffering’, we  should ‘confront 
these arguments’ because, she argues, it is difficult to understand flourishing without these 
things (2009 [1994]: 10). This is strongly emphasised in her 2009 edition of Therapy. Here 
Nussbaum tells us that she has ‘changed [her] mind’ regarding the Stoics. While both 
editions present the Stoics as significantly more outward-orientated than the Epicureans, 
in her new preface she notes that even the Stoics give ‘too little space to nonderivative 
loyalty to family, friends, loved ones, even nation’. In a claim echoing the thinkers we 
examined in Ch. 1, she goes on to claim that ‘[w]ithout such attachments, life becomes 
empty of urgency and personal meaning.’ (2009 [1994]: xvi) 
Contrary to this, on the traditional Anglophone view, all the Hellenistic schools 
were united in regarding pathē as deeply inimical to our flourishing, an attitude routinely 
applied to any entity that generates such strong emotions. The upshot of this is that the 
virtuous person must curtail, or at least minimise, all kinds of deep-seated attachments in 
order to free themselves from the tyranny of resulting emotions. Instead of focusing on the 
entities that generate them, this emphasis on the Hellenistic disavowal of strong emotions, 
is evident throughout the Anglophone literature, both in content and emphasis. Annas tells 
us that the Stoics viewed the ‘virtuous person is apathēs, unfeeling, and [that they believed] 
that virtue requires apatheia, absence of feeling or emotion’ (1993: 61), and this view is 
endorsed by Anglophone Hellenistic specialists from A. A. Long to John Procopé. Long 
tells us, ‘[i]n the Stoic universe, passionate emotion, pitting strictly personal and subjective 
affect against the divinely determined course of events (including the inevitability of death, 
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sickness, and so forth), is taken to be irrational, pointless, a gross failure to live in 
accordance with the necessary facts of life.’ (2006: 389) Procopé puts it even more strongly. 
He writes, ‘[t]he Stoa maintained that human passions are intrinsically wrong, a 
malfunction of human reason, from which the wise man will be free.’ (1998: 171) Here the 
primary focus is on pathē, of course, so if there is a role for cultivating passionate 
attachments that generate these powerful emotions, we can infer it will be a negative one, 
concerned with extirpating all but the most essential attachments for life itself.  
In his article, ‘Stoic Inhumanity’, Terence Irwin vividly sketches what we could 
view as an extended visual metaphor for the Anglophone approach when he proposes that 
Virgil’s famous depiction of Aeneas offers a ‘familiar picture of the “inhuman” Stoic’ (1998: 
219). Unresponsive to Dido’s entreaties that he continue their romantic relationship in 
Carthage, Aeneas commands his men to prepare their ships and sail away into the night. 
For Irwin, the image of Aeneas indifferently contemplating the sight of Dido’s burning 
suicide pyre – his ‘mind remains unmoved; the tears rolling down [his face] empty’ – 
exemplifies Stoicism’s approach to attachments of a passionate kind (Virgil 2008: 4.449; 
cited by Irwin 1998: 219). On Irwin’s view, Aeneas exemplifies Stoic sagacity for two 
reasons: first – as Irwin emphasises – Aeneas displays no emotion, abandoning Dido 
without flinching and seemingly with no regret. Aeneas’ indifferent attitude confounds 
our intuitions because it contrasts so starkly with the blossoming romantic relationship 
that Virgil describes him as sharing with Dido in books 2–3 of the Aeneid. Instead of being 
distraught by Dido’s self-immolation, as one might expect, Aeneas maintains his 
tranquillity, regarding his lover’s suicide as merely another part of the causal sequence of 
nature. What is commendable about Aeneas’ actions from a Stoic point of view is that he 
manages to free himself from his attachment to Dido without falling victim to concomitant 
pathē. 
In addition to this, there is another important reason why an Anglophone scholar 
such as Irwin views Aeneas as emblematic of the Stoic way of life, one which pertains to 
how easily the warrior prince dispenses with his passionate attachments when they 
conflict with other considerations. By decisively acting upon Mercury’s advice to leave 
Carthage, Aeneas implies that his conduct can only be affected by the moral imperatives 
of the gods, rather than by reasons generated by his earthly passionate attachments. On 
Aeneas’ view, even a cherished passionate attachment such as his lover, Dido, does not 
give rise to legitimate considerations that are capable of informing his resolution to the 
question of how to live. Indeed, Irwin supports his contention by quoting Virgil’s 
description of the serene appearance of Aeneas (‘his mind remains unmoved; the tears 
rolling down [his face] empty’). For the more human-all-too-human of us – after all, Aeneas 
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was the son of Venus – our passionate attachments are extremely important for the reasons 
given in Ch. 1. From this we can see that Aeneas’ ability to resist acting on considerations 
deriving from his passionate attachment to Dido gives Irwin a second reason to regard him 
as a Stoic exemplar.71 He recognises that the passionate attachments are highly antithetical 
to our rational and moral capacities, so he dispenses with his lover with little hesitation.72    
Extant historical source material on the way of life in the Hellenistic schools 
supports the Anglophone contention that both Epicureans and Stoics viewed strong 
emotions as hampering our passage to the flourishing life. The basic problem for both 
schools was that forming deep-seated attachments to worldly entities generates pathē 
which inhibit our capacity to reach the ethical ideals of ataraxia, in the Epicurean case, or 
apatheia in the case of the Stoics. The more profoundly we are attached to an entity, the 
more we are vulnerable to pathē because we are inevitably affected by the fate of what we 
care about, a phenomenon I explore with Frankfurt’s discussion of love in Ch. 1. We can 
see how pathē and the attachments that generate them are connected throughout the 
Hellenistic tradition. Diogenes Laertius, for example, notes that the Stoics identify four 
cardinal emotions – ‘pain, fear, desire, pleasure’ – and then claims that each is generated 
by a faulty ‘judgment’ about whatever the emotion is connected to. The pathē of ‘greed’, he 
writes, is based on the ‘supposition that money is honourable’ (Inwood and Gerson 2008: 
110–1). This shows how the Hellenists viewed pathē as deeply connected to the passionate 
or other deep-seated attachments they are generated by, insofar as the latter simply derives 
from an incorrect estimation of the value of the former.  
In contrast to Aeneas’ imperviousness to grief or sorrow, I argued in 2.3.5 that 
losing one or more of our passionate attachments invariably impacts upon our flourishing 
because these entities are deeply connected to our ability to live a purposeful life. Although 
losing our passionate attachments certainly causes deep distress, we may not only seek to 
retain them to avoid such distress, but also because we recognise that leading a purposeful 
life is necessary in order to lead one that could be said to flourish. Nevertheless, even if we 
disagree with what seems to be the Hellenists’ pessimistic diagnosis of how passionate 
attachments feature in the flourishing life, we may well agree that these kinds of 
                                               
71 As I showed in Ch. 1, Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf view our passionate attachments as a source 
of reasons. I should note, however, that the Stoics regard pathē as non-rational desires that are action-
guiding. See Stobaeus’ and Diogenes Laertius’ accounts of the how ‘[d]esire is an irrational striving’, 
and how this also applies to the pathē these desires generate (‘hatred, quarrelsomeness, anger, sexual 
love, wrath, spiritedness’) (Inwood and Gerson 2008: 113, 10).  
72 Porter illustrates this. He claims that the Epicurean exercise of ‘purging oneself of the false beliefs’ 
should be understood as a ‘moral injunction’ intended to eliminate pathē (2003: 226).  
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attachments make us vulnerable to experiencing strong emotions, on account of how 
deeply we are affected by the rise and fall in fortunes of the entities we care about. 
Moreover, the very fact we are so strongly affected by the fate of such entities lends support 
to my claim in Ch. 1 that passionate attachments are valuable.  
Nussbaum’s reading of both the Stoics and the Epicureans echoes this thought. 
She tells us that ‘[t]o cherish something, to ascribe to it a high value, is to give oneself a 
basis for the response of profound joy when it is present; of fear when it is threatened; of 
grief when it is lost; of anger when someone else damages it’ (2009 [1994]: 370). For this 
reason, all the Hellenistic schools warned of the dangers of ascribing a high value to 
‘unstable worldly items such as loved friends, city, possessions’ make us ‘hostages to 
fortune’ (2009 [1994]: 370; cf. 366). Interestingly, Nussbaum herself is ambivalent on 
whether passionate attachments are worth pursuing, although she is sympathetic to the 
idea that they might be. She tells us that:  
 
It is likely that there will remain deep division – among human beings 
and, perhaps, within each human being – over these questions. For 
vulnerability is indeed painful, and the life of passionate attachment to 
externals a perilous and, at times, a harmful, unjust life. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to dismiss the thought that these attachments 
contribute something without which life – and perhaps even virtue itself 
– is not complete. (2009 [1994]: 484; emphasis added) 
 
While in Ch. 1 I showed that Frankfurt and Nagel also acknowledge the price of having 
passionate attachments can be devastatingly high, Frankfurt’s conclusion – along with 
Williams and Wolf – is that they are so integral to the flourishing life that they must be 
pursued. On the traditional Anglophone reading of the Epicureans and Stoics, however, 
such a high price cannot be worth paying, unless we can somehow insulate ourselves from 
the pathē. So how did the Hellenists think pathē could be cultivated? And how did their 
distrust of the passionate attachments affect their views about how to do this?  
Unless they were judiciously cultivated, all the schools regarded strong emotions 
as inevitably clouding our judgements to act on other weighty considerations – especially 
the prerogatives of morality – in a zero sum game that the emotions would invariably win 
unless they were systematically weakened or extirpated. This could either be done directly 
or indirectly. In the first case, pathē could be extirpated themselves, rendering us less 
susceptible to experiencing these strong feelings. This process has been the focus of the 
bulk of the Anglophone literature. In the second case, one could manage one’s emotions 
indirectly by cultivating whatever deep-seated attachments gave rise to emotions, rather than 
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cultivating the emotions themselves. It is the marginal Hellenistic interest in this process 
that provides the most resources for a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. In 
the next three sections I focus on the places that Hellenistic philosophers discuss 
cultivating the passionate attachments, while recognising that this is closely tied to the 
project of extirpating pathē. First, in 3.1.1, I outline how Anglophone scholars have 
described the Hellenistic distrust of love relationships, including their cautionary 
comments on many of the passionate attachments I discuss in Pt. I. Second, in 3.1.2, I 
examine the Stoic view regarding whether virtue is sufficient for flourishing. Third, in 
3.1.3, I examine how narrow the scope of permissible attachments was in the Stoic and 
Epicurean schools. 
 
3.1.1   Flourishing Without Passionate Attachments 
 
One of the most striking images from the Hellenistic world is that of Epicurus’ garden, at 
once a school for teaching Epicurus’ doctrines, a residential community, and a haven for 
those intent on escaping the pathē generated by the unsatisfied desires of everyday life. For 
the Epicureans, removing deep-seated attachments, either prudential or passionate ones, 
allows us to avoid pathē because such deleterious emotions are only generated when we 
are disappointed in our pursuit of this thing or that. Furthermore, in the Epicurean 
literature, the garden functioned as a metaphor for the ethical ideal of ataraxia, variously 
translated as ‘equilibrium’ or ‘tranquillity of soul’ (Peters 1967: 28). To achieve ataraxia, 
Annas writes:  
 
[The] Epicurean will have no passionate attachments to particular 
people. He or she will have untroubling affectionate relationships, 
distributing his or her affections among a circle of friends without 
strong dependence on or attachment to any in particular. (1991: 196; 
emphasis added).  
 
Taking a similar view, Nussbaum elaborates on the carefully curated environment in 
which Epicureans lived. Like the Stoics, she writes, Epicurus viewed the ‘objects of desire’ 
(‘wealth, luxury, power, love’) as the ‘central cause of human misery’ (2009 [1994]: 105). To 
remedy this, living in the Epicurean community required that one leaves one’s ‘usual 
occupations in the city’ leaving cherished passionate attachments such as one’s ‘career’, 
‘children’, and other ‘loved entities’ behind (2009 [1994]: 118). She describes the garden as 
a ‘placid, cheerful, apolitical world […] suspicious of all external ties’, in which the 
community offers ‘its own replacements for familial, societal, and civic relationships’, 
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replacements which aimed to exchange one’s own passionate attachments with the shared 
and disinterested values of the community (2009 [1994]: 121). In contrast to the more 
outward-orientated Stoics, the Epicurean solution to managing the pathē was preventative 
and local. They believed that the best way to prevent them arising was to remove the 
conditions for forming strong, personal passionate attachments (or at least substituting 
these for the public ones of the community), along with living in an environment which 
merely provides the minimum prudential attachments capable of sustaining life. Evidence 
of this modus operandi can be found in the doxological reports on the life of Epicurus, as 
well as in his extant writings. As the philosopher tells us when discussing sexual 
attachments, for example, by ‘taking away the chance to see and talk and spend time with 
[the beloved], then the passion of sexual love is dissolved’ (Inwood 1994 [VS]: 37; square 
brackets supplied by Inwood). This typifies the Epicurean attitude of dealing with the pathē 
indirectly. Strong emotions are vanquished by creating an environment which inhibits 
forming any kind of deep-seated attachment, whether this be directed towards a treasured 
passionate attachment or a prudential one.  
 While Anglophone scholars view the Epicureans and the Stoics as agreeing that 
the passionate attachments should be regarded as a dangerous source of pathē, we cannot 
view each school’s overarching disapproval of these kinds of attachments in precisely the 
same way, which is reflected in the strikingly different methods with which they propose 
to deal with them. Rather than ‘nudging’ their initiates into living without pathē by 
removing potentially-tempting attachments from their immediate environment, the Stoics 
proposed dealing with entities that they regarded as especially prone to generate pathē in 
ways which were notably more liberal. For the Stoics, certain passionate attachments could 
still be maintained (children, spouses, a political role in the city), but only on condition that 
one was attached to these entities in the correct way, one which is markedly dispassionate.73 
This is well illustrated in the Stoic attitude towards marriage and childrearing. Citing 
Chrysippus, for example, Diogenes Laertius notes ‘the wise man will participate in politics 
unless something prevents him; citing Zeno, he tells us that the Stoic ‘will marry […] and 
have children’ (Inwood and Gerson 2008 [Lives]: 122). Similarly, Stobaeus notes that the 
Stoic sage should not be considered immune to the ‘love of music’, ‘of horses’, ‘of hunting’, 
et cetera. (Inwood and Gerson 2008 [Antho.]: 129). In fact the Stoics roundly criticised the 
                                               
73 For example, as Diogenes Laertius notes, the Stoics view the ‘wise man as “free from passions” 
because he is not disposed to them’, whereas the ‘base man is “free from passions” in a different 
sense, which means the same as hard-hearted and cold.’ Regarding childrearing, for example, the 
Stoics viewed ‘love for one’s children [as] natural to them’, noting that it ‘does not exist among the 
base’ (Inwood & Gerson 2008: 121).    
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Epicureans’ hostile attitude to both marriage and child-rearing, viewing them as 
permissible and – at least in theory – compatible with the flourishing life, with influential 
Stoics even pointing out that both Socrates and the founders of their school were all 
conjugally entwined.74 
Nevertheless, we cannot view the Stoics’ account of how we can maintain 
passionate attachments (even in the right kind of way) as evidence that they approved of 
them, or even showing that they viewed them as contributing anything to the flourishing 
life. Anglophone scholars are right to emphasise this. Even Nussbaum tells us that the 
‘Stoic does not hesitate to describe the wise person as totally free from passion’, adding – à 
la Irwin’s account of Virgil’s Aeneas – that this means free from ‘fear, distress, pity, hope, 
anger, jealousy, passionate love, intense joy, and all of the many relatives and subspecies 
of these’ (2009 [1994]: 390; emphasis added). For Nussbaum, the ‘Stoics teach […] that the 
passions should be not moderated but extirpated’, a difference she illustrates with a 
powerful passage from Seneca, one which could be said to decisively distinguish the Stoic 
view from that of the Aristotelians. While for Aristotle, Nussbaum tells us, one ‘can form 
passionate attachments and still regard [oneself] as [one’s] own to govern’, for Seneca: 
 
Love itself is a dangerous hole in the self, through which it is almost 
impossible that the world will not strike a painful and debilitating blow. 
The passionate life is a life of continued gaping openness to violation, a 
life in which pieces of the self are groping out into the world and pieces 
of the world are dangerously making their way into the insides of the 
self; a way of life appropriately described in the imagery of bodily 
violation, implosion, explosion; of sexual penetration and unwanted 
pregnancy. (2009 [1994]: 442) 
 
                                               
74 Nussbaum’s concise summary of Stoic criticism emphasises this. She writes, ‘Epictetus repeatedly 
asserts, as if referring to a famous (or, from a Stoic point of view, infamous) position, that the 
Epicurean will neither marry nor have children (Disc. 3.7.19, 20; 1.23.3; 1.23.7); he condemns this 
teaching as ruinous for the city, and exclaims that Epicurus’ parents, even had they known he was 
going to say this, would not have exposed him (1.23.10). Seneca reports the same view, with a slight 
qualification: the sage will marry only raro, “since marriage is mixed up with many inconveniences” 
(fr. 45 Haase). And Clement concurs, ascribing to both Epicurus and Democritus a rejection of both 
marriage and childrearing (Strom. 2.23.138). (Cf. Us. 19, 521, 523.) Epicurus himself, the paradigmatic 
wise man, did not marry.’ (2009 [1994]: n.26; 152–3). For the Stoic view on creative activities, see 
Nussbaum on their ambivalence regarding poetry (1993: 98–9). 
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To support her claim, Nussbaum cites Lactantius, who describes how strong emotions 
must be ‘pulled out root and branch’; quoting Cicero she tells us that not only must we ‘cut 
out the external manifestation’ of the pathē concerned, but we must also tear out its roots; 
and finally returning again to Seneca, she notes that he tells us that whereas the 
‘Peripatetics moderate [pathē]’,75 the Stoics ‘drive [them] out altogether [expellunt]’ (2009 
[1994]: 389).76  
 From this we can see that there is copious evidence for Anglophone scholars to 
draw on to support their view that passionate attachments were regarded with inveterate 
suspicion in both the Epicurean and Stoic schools. Although there are important differences 
between the schools, there is much evidence that the Hellenistic attitude towards anything 
that generates pathē – whether passionate attachments or deep-seated prudential ones – 
was overwhelmingly negative. I now turn to the two formalised doctrines which 
Anglophone scholarship view the Stoics and Epicureans as sharing, both of which support 
the negative evaluation of passionate attachments because of their tendency to give rise to 
insidious pathē. I suggest that these doctrines explain the negative assessment of the 
passionate attachments, and help us understand the ways the schools proposed dealing 
with them, which I explored in this section. To make best use of the extant source material, 
I focus on the Stoics to illustrate the first doctrine (that virtue is sufficient for the flourishing 
life); to illustrate the second (that our attachments should be strictly limited to prudential 
ones) I examine the Epicureans.  
 
3.1.2   Virtue as Sufficient for Flourishing 
 
Since the doctrine that virtue is sufficient for flourishing is so widespread in the Stoic 
corpus, it is perhaps unsurprising that so much Anglophone scholarship has been devoted 
to it. Daniel Russell, to take a recent example, assigns over a third of his Happiness for 
Humans to explaining why the ‘sufficiency thesis [was] the watershed issue in [Stoic] ethics’ 
(2012: 107, see especially 178–96), an assessment which is representative of the most 
influential Anglophone literature (for example, see Cooper 2012: 194–8). Evidence for this 
claim can be found throughout the Stoic corpus. In Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes 
Laertius records that Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoic school, were both 
committed to the doctrine that ‘[virtue] is sufficient for happiness’ (Inwood & Gerson 1997 
[Lives]: 202). Following these early thinkers, Cicero offers two dialogues listing the reasons 
why ‘virtue alone is sufficient for the happy life’ (1945 [Tusc. Disp.]: 437–585 [V]), as does 
                                               
75 Nussbaum’s reference: Ep. 116.1 = SVF III.443. 
76 Nussbaum’s reference: Cic. TD 3.13ff.; cf. 61–3. 
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Seneca (2004 [Epist.] 118–24 [85]) and Epictetus (2008 [Dis.] 185 [4.1.90]). Illustrating the 
point in his Paradoxa Stoicorum – titled with the spoiler, ‘That Virtue is Sufficient for 
Happiness’ – Cicero describes the dreadful death of the legendary Roman general, Marcus 
Regulus. He writes:    
 
[H]is greatness of soul was not tortured by the Carthaginians, nor his 
dignity, or his loyalty, or his consistency, or any of his virtues, nor even 
his soul itself. […] No one can fail to be supremely happy who relies 
solely on himself and who places all his possessions within himself 
alone (1985 [Para. Stoic.]: 19–20 [2]) 
 
But the idea that virtue is sufficient for human flourishing originated earlier than either the 
writings of Zeno or Chrysippus because the idea is originally a Socratic one, and the Stoics 
make much of this heritage.77 It features in Socrates’ final words before he drinks the 
hemlock, when he tells the jury that a ‘good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death’ 
(Plato 1997 [Apol.]: 41d), and Plato argues for it forcefully in Republic. Here Glaucon is 
shown to be unable to refute Socrates’ claim that a ‘just person [who is] whipped, stretched 
on a rack, chained, blinded with fire, and, at the end, when he has suffered every kind of 
evil, […] impaled’ nonetheless flourishes (1997 [Rep.]:  361e). In the same way as Cicero 
describes the death of Marcus Regulus in the quotation above, in Plato’s account of the 
dying Socrates, his flourishing is both maximal and complete because he is virtuous. So 
what exactly is the doctrine? And why is it connected to the suspicion of passionate 
attachments, which I have sampled from the Hellenistic literature above?  
Perhaps the best way to understand the Stoic version of the doctrine is to situate it 
in relation to Aristotle’s more accommodating view of how many different types of 
passionate attachments are essential in the flourishing life. I already touched on this briefly 
in 2.2 where we noted that Aristotle’s understanding of human flourishing includes the 
pursuit of what can be viewed as passionate attachments, as I outlined in Ch. 1. Fame, 
children, and wealth are all intimately connected with flourishing on the Aristotelian view, 
and all these things fall under the definition of passionate attachments which I gave in 1.5. 
This goes some way to explain why even some moral philosophers of a virtue ethical stripe 
have not been able to incorporate all the elements of his system. Because they consider 
some of the attachments Aristotle lists – for example, the vast wealth that is necessary in 
                                               
77 For example, as Diogenes Laertius records, ‘[Antisthenes] held that virtue to be sufficient in itself 
to ensure happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of Socrates’ (1931 [Lives]: 13 [VI]; 
emphasis added). 
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order to exercise the virtue of magnanimity – as outside the remit of moral philosophy, 
character excellences with a non-moral component have received less attention than those 
with more obviously moral connotations such as courage or prudence (Annas 1996: 237–8; 
Swanton 2003: 71). The Stoics were also well-versed on Aristotle’s views on this matter, 
and it provided the material for them to engage in a long-running debate on it with 
Hellenistic Peripatetics. Cicero summarises this debate in On Moral Ends. He writes:    
 
The Stoics argue that there is nothing good except what is moral, the 
Peripatetics claim that there are certain bodily and external goods as 
well, even while attributing by far and away the greatest value to 
morality. Here we have a truly honourable contest, a tremendous clash. 
The whole dispute centres on virtue and its value. (2004 [Fin.]: 49 [II, 
64]) 
 
Here Cicero acknowledges that Aristotelians view ‘certain bodily and external goods’ as 
necessary for flourishing. For the Aristotelians, while moral virtue is necessary for humans 
to flourish, it is not sufficient, as flourishing necessarily includes other external goods too. 
For the Stoics, by contrast, all that is strictly required for flourishing is the upstanding 
nature of our moral character, expressed through the active exercise of our moral virtues. 
Unlike the Epicureans, as we saw in the previous subsection, the Stoics did not entirely 
exclude passionate attachments such as a spouse or children from the flourishing life, 
although they did emphasise that our attachments to these things should be minimal, and 
we must be continually beware of the pathē they generate. Unlike Aristotle, however, the 
Stoics did not think of these things as necessary for flourishing, regarding them as a 
potential source of danger, and calling them as ‘preferred indifferents’. I explore this 
further below.   
Aristotle’s account of external goods appears early in the Ethics when he lists the 
things he views as relevant to our flourishing. This list includes attributes we possess but 
do not control (being well-born, good looking), as well as things we have limited control 
over but do not depend on us in the strong sense that he and the Stoics view our moral 
characters as doing (wealth, friendship, begetting children). In contrast to the Stoics, 
Aristotle views both the non-moral goods which do not depend on us and those which we 
have some partial control over as decisively impacting upon our capacity to flourish in two 
ways: either they have an instrumental use insofar as they ‘support and facilitate [our] 
activity’, or they are ‘desirable for their own sake’ insofar as they add to what Aristotle 
describes as the ‘lustre of blessedness’ (1984 [Nico. Ethics]: 11–12 [1099b]).  
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Although Nussbaum ultimately sides with a modified Aristotelian view, one that 
recognises the passionate attachments as essential for the flourishing life,78 she would 
surely agree with Russell’s synopsis. Like Russell, she also thinks that Aristotle ‘sets out 
worldly conditions of the good life’ which makes ‘virtuous activity dependent […] upon 
material and educational conditions that are beyond the individual’s control’ (2009 [1994]: 
10). The upshot of this difference is that Aristotle has to offer an account of how the external 
goods required for flourishing should be distributed, since he ‘assigns to politics the task 
of bringing [the external] conditions [of flourishing] to people’,79 whereas the Stoics do not 
need to do this because, Nussbaum explains:    
 
Instead of arranging to bring the good things of this world to each and 
every human being, [the Stoics] focus on changes of belief and desire 
that make their pupil less dependent on the good things of this world. 
They do not so much show ways of removing injustice as teach the pupil 
to be indifferent to the injustice she suffers. (2009 [1994]: 10) 
 
This may well remind us of the complaint that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf make of 
modern moral philosophy. Like the modern moral philosophers we criticised in Ch. 1, for 
the Stoics only our moral character contributes to flourishing; everything else is extraneous 
and may even impede our passage to the flourishing life. 
 
3.1.3   The Only Kinds of Attachments Worth Having  
 
The last major doctrine which leads Anglophone scholars to emphasise that the Hellenistic 
philosophers rejected deep-seated attachments in toto consists in fully theorised accounts 
of the various kinds of attachments that are available to human beings, the desires 
appropriate to them, alongside prescriptive guidance on how these various attachments 
are capable of hastening or retarding our passage to the flourishing life. The first, a 
typology of the various kinds of desires to which human beings are susceptible, is found 
                                               
78 See Nussbaum, ‘[t]he bold Stoic attempt to purify social life of all its ills, rigorously carried through, 
ends by removing, as well, its finite humanity, its risk-taking loyalty, its passionate love. Abandoning 
the zeal for absolute perfection as inappropriate to the life of a finite being, abandoning the thirst for 
punishment and self-punishment that so frequently accompanies that zeal, the education I 
recommend looks with mercy at the ambivalent excellence and passion of a human life.’ (2009 [1994]: 
510)  
79 For Aristotle, Nussbaum writes, the ‘good political arrangement is the one “in accordance with 
which each and every one might do well and lead a flourishing life.’ (2009 [1994]: 10) 
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in the Epicurean fragments; it distinguishes desires that aim at choiceworthy entities from 
those that aim at non-choiceworthy ones. The second, a classification of external 
attachments found in the Stoic literature, details the various entities to which we may 
become attached, and endorses a small portion of these as worthy of pursuit. Just as there 
is copious extant evidence for the Stoic ‘sufficiency of virtue’ thesis, there is much textual 
support for these positions in the Hellenistic corpus, so Anglophone scholars have much 
source material to draw upon. Nevertheless, attending to the nuances of the Stoic and 
Epicurean positions reveals that their conceptual resources may be more compatible with 
the project of formulating a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments than their 
overtly hostile attitude towards pathē might lead us to suppose.     
 Unlike some of Epicurus’ other doctrines that have had to be reconstructed from 
corrupted or missing textual evidence, Hellenistic scholars have a relative wealth of 
information regarding his typology of desires. In ‘Principle Doctrines’, Epicurus claims 
there are three kinds of desires, the ‘natural and necessary’, the ‘natural but unnecessary’, 
and the ‘neither natural nor necessary’ (Inwood & Gerson 1994 [Prin. Doct.]: 34 [XXIX]).80 
An undated and unattributed scholium to this fragment in Diogenes Laertius’ citation of 
the maxim helpfully adds:  
 
[B]y natural and necessary Epicurus means those that bring relief from 
pain (e.g. drink when we are thirsty); by natural but not necessary he 
means those that merely vary the pleasure, without removing the pain 
(e.g. expensive food); and by neither natural nor necessary (e.g. garlands 
of honour and the setting up of statues). (Inwood & Gerson 1994 [Prin. 
Doct.]: 34 [XXIX])   
 
Epicurus’ description of the various kinds of desires to which humans are susceptible is 
followed by prescriptive advice about how we should deal with them, advice which 
explains the purposely bland features of the Epicurean communities I described in 3.1.1. 
Here I showed that the Epicureans sought to tackle the effects of the pathē by removing 
deep-seated attachments from the community because they viewed the presence of such 
attachments as inevitably precipitating turbulent emotions that cut us off from flourishing. 
In line with this strategy, Epicurus advises:  
                                               
80 Cf. Epicurus’ ‘Letter to Menoeceus’: ‘We should reflect that of desires some are natural, some 
empty. Of the natural, some are only natural and some are necessary. Of the necessary, some are 
necessary for happiness, some for comfort of the body, and some for life itself.’ (Inwood & Gerson 
1994 [Ep. Men.]: 29–30 [127]) 
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We should not force our nature, but persuade it; and we shall persuade 
it in satisfying the necessary desires, and the natural ones if they do not 
harm, and by harshly refuting the harmful ones. (VS 21)  
 
For the Epicureans, desires pertaining to ‘natural and necessary’ entities (food and water, 
et cetera.) should be embraced, unlike ones which are ‘neither natural nor necessary’ 
(garlands of honour, statues) which should be shunned. ‘Natural but unnecessary’ desires 
are to be indulged with caution and in strict moderation. While all three of Epicurus’ 
desires relate to ‘prudential attachments’ of various kinds (see my definition of these kinds 
of entities in n.6 above), only those desires that are neither natural nor necessary could 
orient themselves towards passionate attachments. This suggests that the Epicureans 
would frown upon any way of life that included passionate attachments. Indeed, as James 
Porter notes, ‘Epicurus was notoriously hostile’ to inessential activities such as ‘music, 
poetry, and the like’, all of which are the object of ‘neither natural nor necessary desires’ 
(2003: 223; cf. Nussbaum 1993: 97). For the Epicureans, then, attachment to neither natural 
nor necessary entities, and the desires that pertain to them, have no part in the flourishing 
life because they neither relieve the pain we suffer when one of our natural desires remains 
unfulfilled, nor are necessary insofar as they cause us to act against our prudential 
interests. From our definition of passionate attachments in 1.5, it should be clear that such 
desiderata are subject of desires that are ‘neither natural nor necessary’. Under such a 
schema, Gauguin’s risky journey to Tahiti to pursue his passionate attachment to painting 
would clearly be prohibited.   
 The Stoics had a comparable classification of desires, one which deals even more 
directly with the various kinds of entities to which we can become attached, rather than the 
desires pertaining to these entities. Just as for the Epicureans, after countenancing a broad 
range of potential attachments, the Stoics offer a very narrow account of those which are 
permissible and conducive to our flourishing. Since the Stoics view virtue as sufficient for 
flourishing, they viewed any other so-called ‘goods’ merely as ‘preferred indifferents’ 
[adiaphora],81 entities that may be pleasant but are not necessary for flourishing, ones that 
may even divert or distract us from what is truly important. For example, after listing the 
various moral virtues that expedite (and the vices that thwart) flourishing, Diogenes 
Laertius tells us that the Alexandrian Stoic, Arius Didymus, proposes that: 
 
                                               
81 For a comprehensive account of adiaphora see Russell (2012: 182). 
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Preferred indifferents are things like this: life and death, good and bad 
reputation, pleasure and pain, wealth and poverty, health and disease, 
and things similar to these. (Inwood & Gerson 2008 [Prin. Doct.]: 125 
[VII.102–7]) 
 
Comments like these have led Anglophone scholars to conclude that for the Stoics the 
entities that generate pathē must be relegated to the realm of preferred indifferents, and 
therefore should be viewed with suspicion. In his account of the Stoic distinction, for 
example, Russell tells us that, while it may be ‘natural’ to suppose that ‘lovers, families, 
rewarding careers, things we love to do’ are ‘important for our happiness’, for the Stoics 
none of them is ‘strictly speaking good’ (2012: 184). Similarly, Cooper writes: 
 
[T]he Stoics seem to have classified all defective desires as instances of 
‘passionate’ or ‘emotional’ attachment. They are all of them excessive 
desires, in the sense that they desire something as if it were good 
– possessed of a higher value – when in fact it is, at most, only something 
possessing the value of being ‘preferred’. They overvalue these merely 
naturally valuable things, as if they were good (or their opposites bad). 
(2012: 205) 
 
From this we can conclude that, the Stoics would regard passionate attachments as 
‘preferred indifferents’, which, while they might appear desirable, will have a detrimental 
effect on our flourishing. I now turn to the Francophone tradition.  
 
3.2   Hellenistic Self-Cultivation in Francophone Philosophy  
 
In the Introduction to Pt. II, I surveyed Hadot’s and Foucault’s cryptic claims on the 
potential contemporary importance of the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. Going 
further than Nussbaum’s remarks on how the philosophy of this era has the potential to 
reinvigorate modern moral philosophy, both thinkers propose that the Hellenists also offer 
us a set of practical exercises that can be enlisted in debates in contemporary philosophy 
and practical life. These exercises, they claim, are both valuable for rethinking theoretical 
problems in philosophy and our practical lives, although Hadot insists that these tasks are 
connected, advocating that we can take up the Hellenistic conception of philosophy as a 
way of life. In the Introduction to Pt. II, I stressed that I would not explore Hadot’s claim 
that Hellenistic philosophers understood their discipline to be a way of life, nor his claim 
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– as provocative as it is intriguing – that contemporary philosophers should return to this 
conception of philosophy. Moreover, I noted that I would not dispute the reading of 
specific passages in the Hellenistic texts, but rather would focus on the different emphases 
within the Anglophone and Francophone traditions to show how the latter rather than the 
former better isolates the conceptual resources required for a theory of cultivating our 
passionate attachments. As I showed when discussing Cooper’s lengthy exegetical caveats, 
this is because the textual evidence is often equivocal, so adjudicating between the various 
possible interpretations of it would require a separate book-length study, one which would 
distract from my task of formulating a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments.  
Aside from interpretative differences between the Francophone and Anglophone 
commentators, even Hadot and Foucault sketch out very different research programmes 
to incorporate the insights of the Hellenists into contemporary thought and action. 
Although neither thinker attempts to offer a theory of cultivating our passionate 
attachments, the aim of the rest of this chapter is to show how the conceptual resources 
that they isolate from Hellenism allow us to do precisely this. This is not to say that the 
theory of passionate self-cultivation I offer in Pt. III is especially Foucauldian or Hadotian 
in inspiration. Far from it. I am neither aiming to provide a robust exegesis of the work of 
either of these thinkers, nor a historically accurate reconstruction of the role of self-
cultivation in Hellenistic philosophy; rather I am aiming to identify the conceptual 
resources that  Foucault and Hadot can provide, one which is based on their emphasis on, 
and detailed exegesis of, the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation.  
 
3.2.1   Building upon Anglophone Interpretations 
 
Before exploring the exegetical differences between Foucault and Hadot, it is important to 
acknowledge that neither thinker denies that, historically speaking, the Hellenists did 
worry about how morally damaging pathē are generated by misguided attachments, either 
prudential or passionate ones. Hadot, for instance, patently shares some of the 
interpretative views of Anglophone scholars such as Annas and Irwin. He tells us that in 
the Hellenistic world ‘[o]ne conception was common to all the philosophical schools’: they 
were united in the belief that ‘people are unhappy because they are the slave of their 
passions’ (1995 [1987]: 102). Furthermore, he concurs with Anglophone scholars insofar as 
he sees such pathē as directly caused by one’s deep-seated attachments to those things – 
whether prudential or passionate – that are ‘exterior, alien, and superfluous’ to us, even 
explicitly describing the purpose of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation in these 
terms (1995 [1987]: 102). He writes: 
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The goal of such exercises was to help people free themselves from the 
desires and passions which troubled and harassed them. These needs 
and desires, it was thought, were imposed on the individual by social 
conventions and the needs of the body. The goal of philosophy was to 
eliminate them, so that the individual might come to see things as nature 
herself sees them, and consequently desire nothing other than that 
which is natural. (1995 [1987]: 242) 82 
 
For the Hellenistic philosophers, on Hadot’s view, it is only ‘with the help of [the spiritual] 
exercises’ that we can escape the ‘state of alienation into which [we have] been plunged by 
worries, passions, and desires’ (1995 [1987]: 103). Nevertheless, this should not lead us to 
conclude that this was the only role of the exercises in the Hellenistic world. In fact, Hadot 
stresses that removing pathē is only a means to a further end for Hellenistic philosophers: 
it provides the conditions for living in conformity with the ethical ideal of the school 
concerned. He tells us:        
 
All schools agree that man can be delivered from this state. He can 
accede to genuine life, improve himself, transform himself, and attain a 
state of perfection. It is precisely for this that spiritual exercises are 
intended. Their goal is a kind of self-formation, or paideia, which is to 
teach us to live in conformity with the nature of man, which is none 
other than reason. (1995 [1987]: 102) 
 
For Hadot, therefore, while the removal of pathē was one of the explicit aims of the 
Hellenistic spiritual exercises, this was only a means to the further aim of attaining the 
ethical ideal of the school concerned, which he glosses as living in ‘conformity with the 
nature of man’ (cited above). Furthermore, as cited in the Introduction to Pt. II, he also 
endorses the claim that the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation have ‘something to teach 
modern man, have meaning for him, and help him guide his conduct’, which I have shown 
we need not only interpret as advocating a contemporary renewal of interest in extirpating 
pathē (2011: 147).  
From this we can see that Hadot’s project is composed of two – at least 
conceptually – separable ones: first, he is concerned to contribute to our historical 
understanding of the Hellenistic conception of philosophy, and how the spiritual exercises 
                                               
82 Hadot often glosses these ideals as ‘living in conformity with one’s rational nature’, although each 
of the Hellenistic schools had different understandings of what this means. For example, the 
Epicureans thought this meant ataraxia; whereas the Stoics understood this in terms of apatheia.   
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are connected to this; second, he is concerned to show the possibilities this has for 
contemporary philosophy and practical life. Hadot views these projects as closely 
connected insofar as he is interested in a contemporary renaissance of the Hellenistic 
conception of philosophy as a way of life. Nevertheless, the next two sections aim to show 
that they are distinguishable insofar as his reasons for advocating this renaissance also 
underwrites the mobility of the exercises in a way that allows us to deploy them to answer 
contemporary philosophical questions. So what arguments does Hadot offer for his view 
there are aspects of Hellenistic philosophy that may be re-actualisable? And can the 
reasons he adduces for using Hellenistic conceptual resources for contemporary purposes 
be used to justify the project of deploying them to underwrite a theory of how we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments?  
 
3.2.2   Transposing the Hellenistic Exercises of Self-Cultivation 
 
When discussing the turn to Hellenistic philosophy in his final works, Foucault connects 
his previous interest in the passive shaping of the subject by external forces with his later 
concern with how the subject can actively cultivate itself. This requires, he proposes, 
investigating the historical development of ‘technologies of the self’, exercises of self-
cultivation which intend to facilitate self-directed character change. Such technologies, he 
writes: 
 
[P]ermit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of 
operations on their bodies, their own thoughts, their own souls, their 
own thoughts, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to 
transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state 
of happiness, perfection, purity, supernatural power. (1997 [1981]: 177) 
 
Using a similarly expansive definition in one of his final interviews in 1984, he tells us that 
technologies of self-cultivation, what he also calls the ‘exercise of the self on the self’, enable 
the practitioner to ‘develop and transform [themselves]’ in a way that allows them to 
‘attain to a certain mode of being’ (1997 [1984]: 282). From this we can see that Foucault 
views these technologies83 as providing a practical account of self-directed character 
change that can serve a variety of different purposes. In fact, on his view, technologies of 
the self have historically fulfilled a variety of different aims (‘happiness, perfection, purity’, 
                                               
83 In his emended version of this interview, Foucault uses the French term ‘technologie’ to maintain 
the etymological connection with the Greek one, ‘technē’.  
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et cetera), aligning with Hadot’s arguments for the transposability of the Hellenistic 
spiritual exercises, discussed below. Like Hadot, Foucault thinks that Hellenistic exercises 
of self-cultivation were not limited to extirpating pathē, but rather had a variety of 
purposes, ones which included the cultivation of character more generally. For Foucault 
the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation were a strand of ancient interest in the ‘care of 
the self’, which included many different cultural practices. Most importantly for the aims 
of this thesis, however – again like Hadot – Foucault’s claim that the exercises of self-
cultivation have historically fulfilled a variety of terms underwrites his proposal that 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation can be abstracted from their original setting and be 
enlisted to answer contemporary theoretical and practical problems. I cited some of these 
claims in the Introduction of Pt. II. Here we saw that Foucault views the texts of the 
Hellenistic era as harbouring a ‘treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, procedures’ that can 
be a ‘very useful tool’ for contemporary philosophy (‘analysing what’s going on now’) and 
for practical life (‘how to change it’) (1997b [1983]: 261). Although Foucault claims this can 
be done, however, he offers no arguments for it, which is why I seek the justification for 
applying the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation from Hadot.  
Compared to Foucault’s relatively fleeting comments on the potential value of 
Hellenistic philosophy for contemporary philosophy and practical life, Hadot elaborates 
at length on this topic, offering two arguments why Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation 
can be deployed in a way that takes them beyond their original aims and objectives. First, 
he claims that, historically speaking, the spiritual exercises were viewed as transposable 
because they were used for vastly different purposes by the Hellenistic schools, even 
underwriting significantly different doctrines. Second, when Hadot turns to define the 
term ‘spiritual exercises’, his careful framing of it shows that he envisages it as more 
encompassing than either (i) exercises for the self-directed development of our moral 
character; and (ii) exercises that were predominantly geared towards extirpating the pathē 
(two tasks Anglophone commentators view as connected, as discussed in 3.1). Rather, the 
scope of Hadot’s spiritual exercises makes them compatible to many aspects of character 
development, including – potentially – the project of cultivating our passionate 
attachments, which I show in Ch. 6. For now, however, I examine each of these arguments 
in turn, noting the places in which analogous arguments appear in Foucault’s oeuvre, so 
we can gauge how closely he follows Hadot on this topic. While we saw in the Introduction 
to Pt. II that Foucault claims that the conceptual resources of Hellenistic philosophy have 
contemporary use, these remarks are schematic. Foucault simply states the claim, 
presumably intending to elaborate upon it in future works, which he never had the 
opportunity to write. For this reason, his account of how this can be done can be usefully 
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supplemented by the reasons Hadot offers for transposability of the Hellenistic exercises 
of self-cultivation that I discuss below.  
Hadot first argues for his claim that the spiritual exercises have contemporary 
relevance by noting that, at their very inception, these exercises were regarded as 
transposable across the Hellenistic schools because they were used to support remarkably 
different doctrines. This was ‘Cicero’s position’, Hadot tells us, whom although often 
corralled into the Stoic school, viewed himself as free to choose ‘what seems to be the best 
solution each time, whether it be inspired by Epicureanism, or Stoicism, or Platonism, or 
any other model of life.’ (2011: 102). For Hadot, Cicero’s ‘eclecticism’ should lead us to 
conclude that:  
 
[P]hilosophical practice is relatively independent from philosophical 
discourse. The same spiritual exercise can be justified after the fact by 
widely different philosophical discourses, in order to describe and 
justify experiences whose existential density ultimately escapes all 
attempts at and systematizing (2002 [1995]: 275) 
 
The exercises that the Stoics and Epicureans advocated illustrate this. For example, Hadot 
tells us, ‘for various and almost opposite reasons’, each of these schools ‘advised their 
disciples to live always aware of the imminence of death, freeing themselves from the 
worry of the future and the weight of the past’ (2002 [1995]: 275). Similarly, ‘[f]or 
completely different reasons’, Hadot writes, philosophers in both schools ‘urged their 
disciples to concentrate their attention on the present moment, and free themselves from 
worries about the future as well as the burden of the past’ (1995 [1987]: 212).84 This 
demonstrates, Hadot concludes, that it is ‘not necessary, in order to practice these exercises, 
to believe in the Stoics’ nature or universal reason’ (1995 [1987]: 212)85  
                                               
84 Regarding the exercise of the ‘view from above’ (explored in detail in 4.3.3), Hadot tells us that: 
‘Stoics, Epicureans, and Platonists, each for their own reasons, exhorted their disciples to raise 
themselves to a cosmic perspective, to plunge into the immensity of space and time, and thereby 
transform their vision of the world’ (2002 [1995]: 275).  
85 Reaffirming this point in his response to Carlier, Hadot elaborates, ‘the spiritual exercise of 
concentration on the present exists in the Epicureans and the Stoics, with slight difference but for 
entirely different reasons. Thus I think that this spiritual exercise of concentration on the present 
moment has a value in itself: independently of the theories; I have practised this exercise rather often, 
but this does not imply that I believe, as the Stoics did, in the eternal return, a doctrine that can be 
connected to this exercise.’ (2011: 160).  
 104 
From this we can see that, for Hadot, spiritual exercises were used to fulfil a variety 
of different functions in the Hellenistic world, ones that need not be related to the ethical 
ideal of the school concerned. Rather the exercises were used to sharpen the practitioner’s 
practical reasoning in general: they did not consider there to be – nor need there be – any 
logical connection between the spiritual exercises and (i) the philosophical position, nor (ii) 
the way of life of the school concerned. Nevertheless, given that Hadot’s account of ancient 
philosophy often purposely groups the Hellenistic schools together to home in on the 
aspects of the worldview they share, I need to dismiss the possibility that he only thinks 
these exercises could be transposed between schools because each school shared the 
common goal of extirpating pathē. Nussbaum, for instance, might argue that each school 
employed the very same spiritual exercises because these exercises were geared up to 
extirpating pathē, an aim each school shared, despite having other importantly different 
doctrines. On this view, the spiritual exercises would be only useful for extirpating pathē, 
and might be useless for another self-formative process with a different aim. Hadot’s 
definition of spiritual exercises eliminates this possibility, however. Not only are the 
spiritual exercises doctrinally independent of the Hellenistic school that employed them, 
Hadot views them as applying beyond the removal of pathē which we can see by examining 
how his definition of spiritual exercises is crafted. While extirpating pathē was certainly an 
aim of these exercises, Hadot’s definition of spiritual exercises combines a wide range of 
functions relating to self-directed character change. So does his definition of these exercises 
enable us to understand them as applying beyond the removal of pathē?  
Hadot defines ‘spiritual exercises’ as ‘voluntary, personal practices meant to bring 
about a transformation of the individual, a transformation of the self.’ (2011: 87) Rather 
than viewing them as only aiming to extirpate pathē, with the purpose of strengthening the 
moral dimension of our character, he views them as aiming to cultivate our character in a 
more holistic way. Hadot’s view on this topic is revealed when he explains his motivation 
for using the term ‘spiritual exercises’, dismissing other candidate terms for the Hellenistic 
exercises of self-cultivation one-by-one. After acknowledging the very term ‘spiritual 
exercises’ may be a ‘bit disconcerting for the contemporary reader’ because of its mystical 
resonances, he explains why no other potential candidates for these exercises would cover 
‘all the aspects of the reality we want to describe’ (1995 [1987]: 81). Other potential 
candidates include the terms ‘”psychic,” “moral,” “ethical,” “intellectual,”’ or compounds 
such as ‘“exercises of thought”’ or ‘“exercises of the soul”’ (1995 [1987]: 81). The problem 
with all these terms is they do not delineate the aspect of the self that Hellenistic 
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philosophers were concerned to cultivate: each is too narrow, specifying a particular aspect 
or domain of our character to the exclusion of others that are also involved.86  
Hadot is also careful to rule out two other terms for Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation, further clarifying the scope of the exercises is useful ways. First, he tells us that, 
although ‘”ethical exercises” is a rather tempting expression’, this will not do because it 
would present ‘too limited a view of things’ (1995 [1987]: 82). Although the spiritual 
exercises ‘contribute in a powerful way to the therapeutics of the passions’, he stresses we 
should not think that this is done simply to improve one’s moral conduct because the 
exercises aim to improve the entire ‘conduct of life’ (1995 [1987]: 82). On Hadot’s view, 
therefore, Hellenistic self-cultivation is significantly more inclusive than Nussbaum’s 
account: these exercises do not only aim to extirpate pathē that corrupt our moral character, 
they aim at cultivating our character in its entirety. This makes it easier to resist criticism 
from Hellenistic scholars in the Anglophone world who primarily understand the exercises 
as aiming at our moral development through the extirpation of pathē. Instead, following 
Hadot’s analysis of the spiritual exercises as laid out above, shows that in the Hellenistic 
world these exercises were aimed at cultivating our character as a whole. This is reflected 
in Hadot’s enthusiastic description of the wide scope of the exercises: they apply to, in his 
words, the ‘metamorphosis of our personality’, to the ‘transformation of our vision of the 
world’, to changes in our ‘entire psychism’ (1995 [1987]: 82). From this we can see that there 
are two reasons underpinning Hadot’s claim that the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation have contemporary relevance: first, he views the spiritual exercises as 
transposable throughout the schools; second, the scope of his notion of spiritual exercises is 
wide enough to capture many practices of self-directed character shaping, including but 





                                               
86 Hadot is not alone in this worry. He cites Paul Rabbow employing the same terminology (1954. 
Cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 127), and upon returning to this theme in Conversations he notes that 
both the work of Jean-Pierre Vernant (1965. Cited by Hadot 2011: 87) and Louis Gernet (1968. Cited 
by Hadot 2011: 87) supports his wider usage. Rabbow writes, ‘[b]y “moral exercise,” we mean a 
procedure or determinate act, intended to influence oneself, carried out with the express goal of 
achieving a determinate moral effect, so the ‘spiritual exercises’ of the Hellenistic world ‘resemble 
moral exercises like a twin’ because they belong to ‘the religious sphere’, dealing with the purpose 
or meaning of our existence (1954. cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 127).  
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3.2.3   Appropriating the Hellenistic Exercises of Self-Cultivation 
 
From this we can see that Hadot’s work offers two compelling reasons for thinking that 
the Hellenistic exercises can be transposed to serve different theoretical and practical 
functions. First, because different schools practised precisely the same spiritual exercise for 
markedly different purposes, he suggests that the exercises themselves do not have any 
substantive content, and were – and still are – capable of being transposed to serve different 
philosophical functions. Not only was there eclecticism in the schools, he tells us that:    
 
[M]odern man can practice the spiritual exercises of antiquity, at the 
same time separating them from the philosophical or mythic discourse 
which came along with them. The same spiritual exercise can, in fact, be 
justified by extremely diverse philosophical discourses. These latter are 
nothing but clumsy attempts, coming after the fact, to describe and 
justify inner experiences whose existential density is not, in the last 
analysis, susceptible of any attempt at theorization or systematization. 
(1995 [1987]: 212) 
 
On Hadot’s account, we can enlist the resources of Hellenistic philosophy to tackle 
contemporary problems without obliging us to also endorse what he follows Raymond 
Ruyer in calling ‘the gangue’ [la gangue] that surrounded the exercises themselves (2011: 
160). Rather, ‘modern humans do not have to accept all the metaphysical presuppositions 
or the mythological representations of Stoicism, or of Epicureanism, or of Cynicism’, 
because the emancipatory core of the ‘spiritual exercises [allows us to practice them] 
independently of the discourse that justifies or counsels them’ (2011: 160).  
As well as arguing that the exercises were transposed between different schools, 
Hadot offers three further arguments that show why the spiritual exercises apply to 
contemporary life specifically, ones that underwrite the claim about transposability in his 
account, but can also be applied to Foucault. Hadot’s first argument attempts to show that 
spiritual exercises are transposable into a contemporary context because they do not 
‘correspond to specific social structures or material conditions’ (1995 [1987]: 282). Instead, 
since they appear to be heterogeneous cultural practices that offer prescriptive guidance 
on ‘how one should live’, we can think of them as transposable to our own era (1995 [1987]: 
282). His second argument argues that spiritual exercises can even be found in the work of 
modern philosophers who do not share the Hellenistic world view. Finally, his third 
argument proposes that we can already locate manifold examples of spiritual exercises in 
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modern contexts, once again indicating that the exercises have applicability outside the 
Hellenistic world view.  
Hadot begins his first argument by noting that spiritual exercises of one kind or 
another ‘have been, and continue to be, practised in every age’, even in the ‘most widely 
diverse milieus and in widely different latitudes’ (1995 [1987]: 282). His examples of the 
non-Hellenistic ‘diverse milieus’ are multifarious. He notes that spiritual exercises have 
been practised by ‘Christians, Muslims, and Jews’, as well as noting they have been 
practised in places as diverse as ‘China, Japan, India’ (1995 [1987]: 282). This shows that, 
on Hadot’s view, there is nothing inherently Hellenistic about the exercises, as they are 
found in many traditions that propose very different resolutions to the question of ‘how 
one should live’.  
Hadot proposes we can find the idea that our character can be cultivated in a self-
directed way by using spiritual exercises in the history of practical philosophy. While these 
arguments are intended to lay the ground for Hadot’s celebrated contention that ancient 
philosophers primarily understood their discipline as a ‘way of life’, they also show how 
the spiritual exercises can have a wide variety of functions. The figures Hadot claims offer 
exercises of self-cultivation are scattered across the philosophical canon, belonging to no 
underlying outlook or theoretical position. For example, he notes that: 
 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant declares that the exercise of virtue 
must be practised with Stoic energy and Epicurean joie de vivre. This 
conjunction of Stoicism and Epicureanism can be found in Rousseau’s 
Reveries of a Solitary Walker, in which there is both the pleasure of existing 
and the awareness of being part of nature. Goethe describes beings who, 
by their innate tendencies, are half Stoic and half Epicurean. (2011: 102) 
 
Following this, referring to Nietzsche’s Nachlass fragment used as the epigraph to this 
chapter, Hadot notes that ‘one must not be scared of adopting a Stoic attitude after having 
benefited from an Epicurean recipe’ (2011: 102). The very fact that Hadot invokes 
Nietzsche, a philosopher who often speaks highly of the cultivation of strong emotions, 
should leave us with no doubt that there is no necessary connection between the spiritual 
exercises and the extirpation of pathē.  
 Hadot’s third argument that the Hellenistic spiritual exercises can be applied to 
contemporary theoretical or practical problems offers examples of spiritual exercises that 
have neither a historical connection to the Hellenistic tradition, nor aim at removing pathē. 
To do this, he claims that we can find examples of how the spiritual exercises have been 
applied to the self-directed cultivation of human flourishing in a variety of ways, leading 
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him to conclude that spiritual exercises are ‘still alive in contemporary consciousness’ (1995 
[1987]: 82). From this we can see that versions of the spiritual exercises not only apply to 
the various cultural practices in different historical epochs, nor do they only appear within 
philosophical works within different traditions, but they also have been employed in the 
cultivation of human flourishing more widely.87  
Citing a passage from a diary-entry in the final work of the French sociologist 
Georges Friedmann, Hadot notes that the professor recommends the merits of a ‘“spiritual 
exercise” every day either alone or else in the company of someone who also wants to 
improve himself’, telling us that Friedmann’s remark reads like a ‘pastiche of Marcus 
Aurelius’, one which could have ‘been written by a Stoic of antiquity’ (Friedmann 1970: 
359; cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 70, 81). Similarly, he finds evidence for spiritual exercises 
in the writings of the nineteenth-century educator Jules Payot. In L’Éducation de la volonté, 
Hadot writes, Payot discusses ‘spiritual retreat […] as an exercise for the examination of 
conscience’ (2011: 37). Both these examples show that Hadot thinks that spiritual exercises 
– including those loosely based on the Hellenistic tradition88 – can be employed in 
contemporary thought and practical life.  As well as Hadot’s arguments for the legitimacy 
of transposing Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation to contemporary life – examined in 
3.2.2 and mentioned above – I have examined how he strongly endorses applying the 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation in a contemporary context, ones that are far 
removed from his project of resuscitating the notion of philosophy as a way of life. Both 
Friedmann’s and Payot’s uses of the spiritual exercises relate to, in Friedmann’s words, the 
goal of ‘improving oneself’ (Friedmann 1970: 359; cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 81), and by 
referring back to Friedmann’s original text, Hadot shows that he primarily understands 







                                               
87 Prefiguring Hadot’s claim about the ubiquity of such exercises, Murdoch suggests that ‘prayer’, 
‘reading literature’, and the ‘appreciation of beauty in art or nature’ could be viewed as ‘spiritual 
exercises’ (2001 [1962]: 63; 67). 
88 See Sellars on why Hadot’s spiritual exercises ‘would hardly fit under the modern label 
“psychotherapy”’, primarily because of their connection to the ‘individual and the cosmos’ (2009 
[2003]: 115). 
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3.3   Revaluing Hellenism 
 
This chapter explored the differences between the interpretations of Hellenistic philosophy 
in the Anglophone and Francophone traditions. While I have shown that traditionally 
Anglophone scholarship has tended to focus on how the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation were aimed at extirpating pathē, Francophone thinkers such as Hadot and 
Foucault understand these exercises significantly more broadly, understanding extirpation 
of strong emotions as only one of the functions of the exercises. Moreover, both thinkers 
claim that the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation have relevance for contemporary 
philosophy and for practical life, although they understand this potential contribution in 
markedly different ways. Hadot views these exercises as potentially contributing to a 
renewal of philosophy as a way of life, although he also provides arguments relating to the 
transposition of the exercises that could be used to justify many different uses of them. 
While Foucault only hints at what he envisages the contemporary relevance of the 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation to be, his own understanding of these exercises is 
more expansive. He thinks that the Hellenistic account of self-shaping can apply to 
problems in contemporary philosophy and in practical life.  
Although I do not explore Hadot’s contention that contemporary philosophy can 
and should return to the model of a way of life, I do make use of the arguments he offers for 
the transposability of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation. First, in 3.2.2, I note that 
both Hadot’s interest in philosophical eclecticism, and his very definition of spiritual 
exercises, implies that the exercises are not conceptually attached to their historical 
function in the Hellenistic world, so there is no conceptual incompatibility in applying them 
elsewhere. Second, in 3.2.3, I propose that Hadot’s claim that the exercises are independent 
of ‘social structures and material conditions’, that they have been used by practical 
philosophers for vastly different functions, and they have even been used to offer practical 
guidance outside philosophy about ‘how one should live’, all suggest that these exercises 
can be enlisted into the project of cultivating our passionate attachments. While Hadot 
clearly intends these arguments to further his project of renewing philosophy as a way of 
life, they not only constitute reason to support this claim, but they also support those who 
also wish to employ the conceptual resources of Hellenism in different ways. Here I 
claimed that both Foucault’s sketches for a contemporary renewal of theoretical and 
practical interest in self-shaping, and my own project of enlisting the resources of 
Hellenistic philosophy to offer a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments, can be directly supported by the arguments Hadot offers.  
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In contrast to the traditional Anglophone view, we have reason to think that 
historically the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation had a wider remit than simply 
extirpating pathē. Anglophone thinkers are right to say that the Hellenists were suspicious 
of any kind of deep-seated attachment, because they viewed such attachments as giving 
rise to pathē, which is implied by the three Hellenistic doctrines I examined in 3.1. 
Nevertheless, as Nussbaum makes clear, while pathē were invariably viewed negatively by 
the Hellenists, we can detect some ambivalence about the deep-seated attachments that 
generate them. While excessive attachment to prudential attachments was always 
regarded with suspicion, some passionate attachments – friendship and family bonds, for 
instance – were recognised to be valuable, especially for the Roman Stoics. Rather than 
banishing these kinds of attachments completely, discussion often centred around how to 
minimise pathē these things would inevitably generate. In her own practical philosophy, 
Nussbaum eventually sides with the Hellenistic Peripatetics on this matter since she thinks 
that even the Roman Stoics were too grudging in accepting the value of passionate 
attachments, in a way that could be said to mirror Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s 
objections to the conception of human flourishing at work in modern moral philosophy. 
From this we can see that there is no conceptual incompatibility with the idea that the 
Hellenistic account of self-directed character change could be used to provide an account 
of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. While the passionate attachments 
were regarded with caution, even suspicion, Nussbaum shows that the Hellenists had this 
attitude precisely because they recognised the importance of these entities. I now move to 
examine how the Hellenists understood self-shaping to function in general, as well as how 
each of the major Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation operated in particular. This 
provides both the theoretical resources (Ch. 5) and the practical method (Ch. 6) for a theory 
















Hellenistic Exercises of Self-Cultivation 
 
As wood is the material of the carpenter, bronze that of the statuary, so 
each individual’s own life is the material of the art of living [technē tou 
biou].  
 
Epictetus [Dis.]: 1.15.2 
 
4.0   Overview 
 
This chapter offers a combined account of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation by 
comparing the interpretations offered by Nussbaum (4.1), Foucault (4.2), and Hadot (4.3). 
Although each of these thinkers situate the exercises at the core of their interpretation of 
Hellenism, they disagree markedly about their nature and function, especially on the 
extent to which they should be viewed as philosophical. While I only adjudicate between 
these interpretations on the basis of their internal consistency, comparing them side-by-
side provides a comprehensive overview of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation, as 
well as showing why Hadot and Foucault have most to offer a theory of how we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments. Defending these two thinkers against Nussbaum, 
Cooper, and other Anglophone detractors reveals three things. First, it shows how 
pervasive the idea of cultivating the self was in the Hellenistic period, one which was not 
limited to the extirpation of pathē. Second, my rebuttal of Nussbaum’s targeted attack on 
Foucault’s interpretation of these exercises shows why we should resist understanding 
them as narrowly philosophical as they lie on a spectrum comprising bodily and mental 
exercises. Finally, my defence of Hadot from the attacks of Cooper shows that the 
Hellenistic conception of practical philosophy was broader than its modern incarnation, 
which suggests – in the spirit of Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf – that we should be more 
imaginative about what we consider practical philosophy to be, rather than criticise 
Francophone thinkers for allegedly straying beyond the bounds of modern moral 
philosophy. By following the Francophone tradition’s interpretation of the Hellenistic 
exercises of self-cultivation, we can find the conceptual resources to construct a theory of 
how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. This will be the task of Pt. III.  
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4.1   Nussbaum’s ‘Philosophical’ Self-Cultivation 
 
While Nussbaum acknowledges that traditional forms of folk self-cultivation formed a 
large part of the Weltanschauung of the Hellenistic era, and that the philosophers at this 
time had much ‘in common with religious and magical/superstitious movements [of] their 
culture’, she insists that: 
 
What is distinctive about the contribution of the philosophers is that 
they assert that philosophy, and not anything else, is the art we require, 
an art that deals in valid and sound arguments, an art that is committed 
to the truth. [Hellenistic] philosophers claim that the pursuit of logical 
validity, intellectual coherence, and truth delivers freedom from the 
tyranny of custom and convention, creating a community of beings who 
can take charge of their own life story and their own thought. (2009 
[1994]: 5) 
 
Other Anglophone commentators follow Nussbaum’s view. Cooper proposes that we can 
only understand the ancient way of life if we acknowledge the ‘central force of the 
fundamental commitment to living a life on the basis of philosophical reason.’ (2012: 19) 
On his view, the philosophical way of life can be distinguished from ways of life based on 
‘religion’ or ‘tradition’ because both of these ways of life rely on ‘mere feeling or conviction 
that some way of living is the right one’ (2012: 18). As well as agreeing with Cooper that 
philosophy was vitally important in the Hellenistic era, Nussbaum also thinks that the 
philosophical dimension of self-cultivation was central to Hellenistic ethics. While she 
begins by commending Foucault for drawing scholarly attention to the ‘extent to which 
[Hellenistic philosophers were] engaging in complex practices of self-shaping’, she then 
argues that her emphasis on philosophical self-cultivation is more historically accurate, and 
that it decisively separates her reading of the period from the one Foucault offers in The 
Care of the Self. For this reason, she views Foucault’s broad interpretation of Hellenistic self-
cultivation as ‘deeply problematic’ (2009 [1994]: 5–6). When scrutinising his reading of the 
Stoics, for example, she complains that his alternative ‘emphasis on habits and techniques 
du soi […] too often obscures the dignity of reason’, and that although ‘many forms of life 
in the ancient world purveyed techniques du soi, […] what sets philosophy apart from 
popular religion, dream-interpretation, and astrology is its commitment to rational 
argument’ (2009 [1994]: 353). 
Nussbaum even cites support for her concerns about the historical accuracy of 
Foucault’s interpretation of Hellenistic self-cultivation from Hadot, who I have showed 
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Foucault openly acknowledges as a pervasive influence on his later works (1986 [1984]: 
241; see also Foucault’s approving references to Ilsetraut Hadot in 1986 [1984]: 50, 244). In 
a footnote Nussbaum approvingly cites the 1987 edition of Hadot’s Exercises spirituels et 
philosophie antique and his translated article from 1990, ‘Forms of Life and Forms of 
Discourse in Ancient Philosophy’, both – like Nussbaum’s own account – go to great 
lengths to distinguish philosophical self-cultivation from the other modes of self-shaping 
which were common in this era.89 For Nussbaum, then, philosophical thought is an integral 
part of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation because of its ability to counteract pathē. 
Moreover, if Nussbaum had waited a year before publishing Therapy, she could have cited 
support for her view from Hadot’s own pointed comments on what he too regards as the 
patent lack of philosophy in Foucault’s final works. In Philosophy as a Way of Life, the 
English translation of the second edition of the original text (including revised translations 
of the two texts Nussbaum cites), Hadot adds an extra chapter which roundly criticises 
Foucault’s neglect of the rational activities which Hadot claims were integral to the 
Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. In this chapter, ‘Reflections on the Idea of the 
“Cultivation of the Self”’, he bemoans the ‘tendency of modern thought’ that views the 
ideas of ‘universal reason’ and ‘universal nature’ as being without ‘meaning anymore’, and 
tells us that Foucault, as a committed advocate of this tendency, found it ‘convenient to 
“bracket” them’ (1995 [1987]: 208).90 Most decisively, however, Hadot has Foucault in his 
sights in his subsequently published What is Ancient Philosophy?. Here Hadot does not 
mince his words when he warns:  
 
[The] danger, the worst of all, is to believe that one can do without 
philosophical reflection. The philosophical way of life must be justified in 
rational, motivated discourse, and such discourse is inseparable from the way 
of life. Nevertheless, we have to reflect critically on the ancient, modern, and 
oriental discourses which justify a given way of life. We must try to render 
explicit the reasons we act in such-and-such a way, and reflect on our 
experience and that of others. Without such reflection, the philosophical life 
                                               
89 Here Nussbaum appeals to both the ‘different account in Hadot (1987, 1990), and the approving 
introduction [to Hadot’s 1990 text] by Arnold Davidson’ (2009 [1994]: 353). Cf. O’Leary who argues, 
contra Nussbaum, that Foucault’s account of Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation ‘closely follows 
Hadot’s’ (2002: 75).  Cf. Sellars (2003: 117–8).  
90 Hadot vacillates on this claim, however. In a 1992 interview with Michael Chase, he tells us that 
‘[w]hat’s interesting about the idea of spiritual exercises is precisely that it is not a matter of a purely 
rational consideration, but the putting in action of all kinds of means, intended to act upon one's self. 
Imagination and affectivity play a capital role here […].’ (2009 [1995]: 284) 
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risks sinking into vapid banality, “respectable” feelings, or deviance. (2002 
[1995]: 281) 
 
On Nussbaum’s view, all the Hellenistic schools91 prioritised rationality and the use of 
reason in self-cultivation as this was the best way to extirpate pathē, and she adduces 
compelling textual evidence for her contention that a specifically philosophical conception 
of self-cultivation dominated the Hellenistic world. She first cites Epicurus’ claim that 
philosophy must be primarily understood as therapy for the soul,92 before turning to the 
frequent references to this idea in the Stoic literature. Here she quotes Galen recounting 
(then extant) texts from the Stoic Chrysippus who tells us that, in addition to the ‘art called 
medicine’, there is a ‘corresponding art concerned with the diseased soul’ which is called 
philosophy (2009 [1994]: 13). Nussbaum finds further support for her contention in Cicero’s 
writings on the early Stoics. She quotes the Roman statesman approvingly when he refers 
to the early Stoic writings that suggest that philosophy should be regarded as ‘a medical 
art of the soul’, a conception that can guide us to ‘become capable of doctoring ourselves’ 
(2009 [1994]: 14). On her view, then, the cultivation of the self proceeded using a 
distinctively philosophical method insofar as it was discursive, analytical, and employed 
arguments. Nevertheless, Nussbaum argues that it did so for a therapeutic rather than a 
theoretical purpose, one tied to expiating pathē for the purpose of moral improvement.  
Furthermore, in addition to disagreeing with the historical accuracy of Foucault’s 
account, Nussbaum tells us that his previous philosophical commitments sever him from 
the possibility of offering an interpretation that does justice to the Hellenistic emphasis on 
rationality. In her scathing review of The Use of Pleasure, she tells us that Foucault’s interest 
in self-cultivation in the Classical period in this work is a ‘retreat from the principles that 
defined his career’ (1985: 13). Expanding on this view in Therapy, she claims that ‘it is 
questionable whether Foucault can even admit the possibility of such a community of 
freedom, given his view that knowledge and argument are themselves tools of power’ 
(2009 [1994]: 5–6; cf. 353). On Nussbaum’s reading, then, Foucault neither gives a 
historically accurate reading of Hellenistic techniques of self-cultivation, nor can he 
                                               
91 Nussbaum focuses on Epicureanism and Stoicism, rarely mentioning the Cynics, and discussing 
the Skeptics in a single chapter. Unless specified, I use the term ‘Hellenistic’ to refer to a common 
conception of philosophy shared by the Stoic and Epicurean schools. 
92 The source is Hermann Usener’s Epicurea, which Nussbaum translates as ‘empty is that 
philosopher’s argument [logos] by which no human suffering is therapeutically treated. For just as 
there is no use in a medical art that does not cast out the sicknesses of bodies, so too there is no use 
in philosophy, unless it casts out suffering in the soul.’ (2009 [1994]: 5) 
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incorporate Hellenistic notions of self-directed character development into his own 
philosophy, given the positions he had previously argued for so influentially in his earlier 
work.   
Nussbaum believes that we must understand Hellenistic exercises as philosophical 
at this time because she views Hellenistic ethics as organised according to an analogy that 
trades on a distinction between therapeutic procedures which apply to the body and those 
which apply to the soul. Contrasting her own account in Therapy with Foucault’s, she tells 
us that her work offers an account of Hellenistic ethics that follows a ‘central guiding […] 
analogy between philosophy and medicine as arts of life’ (2009 [1994]: 6). In the same way 
that medicine treats bodily pathogens – so her analogy runs – philosophy treats moral 
diseases of the soul, maladies that Hellenistic philosophers viewed as primarily caused by 
pathē, as I explored in 3.1 (see especially 2009 [1994]: 37). She writes:  
 
[Philosophy’s] arguments are to the soul as the doctor’s remedies are to 
the body. They can heal, and they are to be evaluated in terms of their 
power to heal. […] This general picture of philosophy’s task is common 
to all three major Hellenistic schools, in both Greece and Rome. (2009 
[1994]: 5) 
 
For Nussbaum, the philosophical art of extirpating damaging emotions can only be 
understood as an ‘art whose tools are arguments, an art in which precise reasoning, logical 
rigour, and definitional precision have an important role to play’ (2009 [1994]: 15). 
Philosophical therapy is appropriate, she argues, because of the nature of the complaint: 
for the Hellenists, ‘diseases of belief and social teaching’ are what hamper human 
flourishing, so the only way ‘we can [become] truly free and truly flourishing’ is through 
dialectical and deliberative practices, which she insists must be regarded as 
quintessentially philosophical (2009 [1994]: 5). While the features of ‘precise reasoning, 
logical rigour, and definitional precision’ still characterise the discipline of philosophy in 
our own era, for Nussbaum, the use of such argumentative tools had a markedly different 
purpose in the Hellenistic world, one which was explicitly aimed at the ‘achievement of 
flourishing human lives’ (2009 [1994]: 15). This meant that the ‘valuation of any particular 
argument must concern itself not only with logical form and the truth of premises, but also 






4.2   Foucault’s Pratiques de Soi 
 
Given Foucault’s wide-ranging focus in The Care of the Self and his concomitantly-presented 
lectures, it is perhaps unsurprising Nussbaum complains that his account of self-
cultivation does not unequivocally emphasise its philosophical dimension. Making no 
mention of philosophical concerns when he defines pratiques de soi, Foucault initially urges 
us to think of self-directed character development in the Hellenistic world as various 
‘ascetic practices’, in his terms, an ‘exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to 
develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being.’ (1994: 282). 
Foucault proposes that it would be ‘a mistake to think that care of the self was an inversion 
of philosophical thinking, and that it constituted a precept peculiar to philosophical life’ 
because, he emphasises, the idea of cultivating or caring for the self ‘was actually a precept 
of living that, in a general way, was very highly valued in Greece’ (1994: 94).93 In a 
subsequently polished version of the idea in The Care of the Self, he acknowledges that the 
theme of ‘caring for oneself (heautou epimeleisthai), was actually a very ancient theme in 
Greek culture’, one that eventually worked ‘loose from its first philosophical meanings’ 
becoming ‘rather general in scope’, operating as an ‘imperative that circulated among a 
number of different doctrines’ (1986 [1984]: 43–5). Over the course of the Hellenistic period, 
he tells us, the ideal of cultivating the self-became increasingly diffuse, evolving into 
‘procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and 
taught’, which required it spilling into disciplines outside of philosophy. He writes:  
 
 [T]he fact that the philosophers advise that one give heed to oneself 
does not mean that this zeal is reserved for those who choose to live a 
life similar to theirs, or that such an attitude is required only during the 
time one spends with them. It is a valuable principle for everyone, all 
the time and throughout life. (1986 [1984]: 47–8) 
 
Foucault’s account here fits with Nussbaum’s early acknowledgement that both 
philosophical and non-philosophical varieties of self-cultivation pervaded the Hellenistic 
Weltanschauung, and that even philosophers whose work falls squarely under the medical 
analogy had much in common with those ‘religious’, ‘magical’, and ‘superstitious 
movements’ who also ‘purveyed a biou technē [or] an “art of life”’ (2009 [1994]: 5). While 
                                               
93 Foucault writes, ‘the idea that one ought to attend to oneself, care for oneself (heautou epimeleisthai), 
was actually a very ancient theme in Greek culture. It appeared very early as a widespread 
imperative.’ (1986 [1984]: 43–4). 
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Foucault clearly does not view Hellenistic self-cultivation as only existing within the 
province of philosophy, many of the sources with which he articulates his reading have a 
distinctly philosophical flavour, even when they do not directly come from philosophers 
themselves. In any case, he also often cites philosophers on this theme directly, as I show 
below. Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s caveats show that she herself concedes that self-
cultivation was a widespread phenomenon in the Hellenistic world, which undercuts the 
severity of her criticisms of Foucault, especially if we consider that both philosophers and 
philosophy appear in The Care Of the Self.  
Instead of viewing techniques of self-cultivation as either philosophical or non-
philosophical like Nussbaum, Foucault proposes that we should regard Hellenistic 
exercises as lying on a continuum between ‘two poles’, which the Greeks called meletē 
[meditation] and gymnasia [physical exercise]. Between the poles of meletē and gymnasia, he 
tells us, there were a ‘whole series of intermediate possibilities’ which comprised the bulk 
of exercises of self-cultivation in the Hellenistic world (1997a [1982]: 240).94 Like Hadot 
(1995 [1987]: 59), Foucault tells us that meletē includes heterogeneous ‘rational’, 
‘imaginative’, and ‘intuitive’ elements which were fashioned into discrete mental and 
intellectual exercises, each aiming to foster the care of the self. Although some practices of 
meletē included a physical dimension,95 Foucault focuses on those involving one’s mental 
faculties alone.  
Foucault’s account of meletē is mentioned in The History of Sexuality, but he explores 
it in greater depth in the lecture courses and shorter articles (1997a [1982]: 239). I start by 
comparing his account of meletē with Hadot’s account of ‘spiritual exercises’ in order to 
broaden our understanding of the kind of mental exercises of self-cultivation that were 
                                               
94 See also the course summary of the Hermeneutic of the Subject lecture series in 1981–82, where 
Foucault tells us, ‘[b]etween the pole of the meditatio, where one practices in thought, and the pole of 
the exercitatio, where one trains in reality, there is a whole series of other possible practices designed 
for proving oneself.’ (1997b [1982]: 102) 
95 Foucault tells us that Seneca and the neo-Pythagoreans both recommended part-mental and part-
physical exercises. Seneca recommends ‘voluntarily placing oneself within the confines of 
destitution’ for ‘three or four days’ to experience a ‘bed of straw’, ‘coarse clothing’, and ‘bread of the 
lowest quality’; whereas Plutarch recalls a similar practice championed by the neo-Pythagoreans 
involving ‘whetting the appetite through the practice of some sport [and then] plac[ing] oneself in 
front of tables laden with the most succulent dishes, [before leaving] them to the servants and making 
do with the kind of food that slaves ate.’ (1984 [1986]: 58–60) 
 118 
common in the Hellenistic world.96 This allows me to pick out three exercises from Foucault 
and three from Hadot, roughly those which each thinker emphasises are vitally important. 
 
4.2.1   ‘Controlling One’s Representations’ 
 
Foucault tells us that the first exercise, ‘controlling one’s representations’, featured in both 
the Epicurean and Stoic schools, and consisted of an ‘attitude of constant supervision over 
the representations that may enter the mind’ (1997b [1982]: 103–4). Epictetus’ account of 
these kinds of mental exercises, he writes, was expressed with two metaphors:    
 
[T]hat of the night watchman who does not let just anyone come into 
the town or the house; and that of the moneychanger or inspector – the 
arguronomos – who, when presented with a coin, examines it, weighs it 
in his hand, and checks the metal and the effigy. (1997b [1982]: 103–4) 
  
Watching ‘perpetually over representations’ was often combined with a ‘morning 
examination’ in which one considers the ‘tasks and obligations of the day’, alongside an 
examination of one’s conscience in the evening to ‘review the day that had gone by’ (1997b 
[1982]: 240; 1986 [1984]: 60–1). Seneca’s claims that the ‘mind should be called to account 
daily’ is an example of this, as well as in his description of Sextius’ nightly practice of 
asking himself ‘”Which of your failings have you cured today? Which vice have you 
resisted? In what respect are you better?”’ (Inwood & Gerson [De Ira] 2008: 186 [36.1]). 
Describing how he often used this practice himself, Seneca tells us about the daily process 
of ‘plead[ing his] case in his own internal court […] hiding nothing from [himself] and 
omit[ting] nothing’ (Inwood & Gerson [De Ira] 2008: 186 [36.1]). Doing this, we can surmise 
in the terms of Pt. I, allowed him to improve his resolution to the question of ‘how one 
should live’, allowing him to check that his current conduct aligns with his duties, values, 






                                               
96 This is not exhaustive, however, as the Hellenistic corpus contains a variety of different exercises. 
For example, Massimo Pigliucci claims to be able to ‘distil […] twelve “spiritual exercises,” or Stoic 
reminders of how to act in everyday life’ from Epictetus’ Enchiridion (2017: 254–5). 
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4.2.2   ‘Praemeditatio Malorum’ and ‘Meletē Thanatou’  
 
In addition to a daily process of ongoing monitoring and evaluation of one’s 
representations, for Foucault. the two most-prized and dramatic Hellenistic exercises of 
meletē were the ‘mediation on future ills’ [praemeditatio malorum] and the ‘meditation on 
death’ [meletē thanatou]. The aim of the praemeditatio malorum, Foucault explains, was not to 
‘visualise the future as it is likely to be’, but rather to ‘systematically imagin[e] the worst 
that might happen’, even if this was not likely to happen at all; whereas the aim of the 
meletē thanatou was both to prepare for death, as well as encouraging the initiate to ‘live 
each day as if it were the last’ (1997b [1982]: 103). While both exercises may sound 
pessimistic, even needlessly morbid, Foucault emphasises how they were primarily aimed 
to evaluate one’s worldly attachments, or as he puts it allowing one to ‘judge each action 
that one is performing in terms of its own value’ (1997b [1982]: 105). Visualising the events 
depicted in praemeditatio malorum or meletē thanatou did not so much aim to prepare the 
practitioner for the future occurrence of these events, but rather to precipitate insights into 
whether they are living well or badly.97 By suspending the usual conditions under which 
the person viewed their life, it was hoped, they could discover the extent to which this 
person is truly satisfied with their lived resolution to the Socratic question. Although these 
exercises have a different focus, there are benefits both exercises could be said to share. The 
praemeditatio malorum primarily aimed to bolster the spirits, encouraging the participant to 
value and reappreciate the life they had become accustomed to enjoying. By focusing on a 
potentially disastrous future, on this interpretation, the person would become grateful 
because their current life was not completely disastrous. The meletē thanatou shares this 
dimension in even starker form, insofar as death is usually taken to be a greater evil than 
illness. Foucault cites Seneca urging Lucilius to live ‘each day as if one’s entire life 
depended on it’  (1997b [1982]: 105), and following his own advice in ‘On the Shortness of 
Life’ the Roman statesman gives an extended account how meditating on our finitude 
helps us live more fully (2007: 140–162).  
Hadot’s gloss on these exercises is also informative because he emphasises how 
they guided initiates towards other doctrines of the school concerned. To make this 
connection, the initiate must ‘engrave striking maxims on [his] memory’ so that, ‘when the 
time comes, they can help us accept such events’ (1995 [1987]: 85; cf. Hadot 2011: 162). As 
                                               
97 Nicolas Bummarito focuses on the mediation on death in the Buddhist tradition, but he notes that 
the mental exercise of imagining human finitude can also be found in Hellenic and Hellenistic 
philosophy, such as in Plato’s characterisation of Socrates in Phaedo (1997 [Phae.]: 67e) and in 
Epictetus (2008 [Dis.]: 8). 
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I show in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, the meletē thanatou also has a deep conceptual connection with the 
exercises that he picks out as vitally important.  
 
4.2.3   Hupomnēmata 
 
The last of Foucault’s pratiques de soi to explore in this section is his exercise of ‘self-writing’ 
(hupomnēmata), a self-reflective form of writing taking the form of ‘personal journals’ and 
‘intimate correspondence’. There are many Greek examples of this practice, but it increased 
in popularity and sophistication towards the end of the Roman Period, so most of 
Foucault’s examples come from the Roman Stoics, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius.98 
Although his accounts of these exercises only appear in short articles and lecture 
transcripts, these texts show that he views them as highly important, in part because their 
role was to document, integrate, and reflect upon insights generated by the other 
Hellenistic exercises in a comprehensive process of what he calls ‘subjectivisation’.99 For 
example, in the revised transcript of his 1982 seminar, ‘Technologies of the Self’, Foucault 
proposes that ‘Seneca’s letters are an example of this self-exercise’, and that reflective 
writing about oneself – either in the form of ‘taking notes on oneself to be reread’ or 
‘writing letters to friends to help them’ – increased in complexity towards the end of the 
Hellenistic period until it served a vital role ‘in the culture of the care of the self’ (1997a 
[1982]: 232). In a short text dated the following year, he tells us:  
 
Hupomnēmata […] could be account books, public registers, or 
individual notebooks serving as memory aids. […] One wrote down 
quotes in them, extracts from books, examples, and actions that one had 
witnessed or read about, reflections or reasonings that one had heard or 
that had come to mind. They constituted a material record of things 
read, heard, or thought, thus offering them up as a kind of accumulated 
treasure for subsequent rereading and meditation. (1997a [1983]: 209) 
                                               
98 As Foucault tells us, ‘writing – the act of writing for oneself and for others – came, rather late, to 
play a considerable role. In any case, the texts from the imperial epoch relating to practices of the self 
placed a good deal of stress on writing.’ (1994 [1983]: 208) See Sellars’ extrapolation of how, in 
Foucault’s terms, Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations is an exemplary hupomnēma (2012: 460–1). 
99 It is difficult to specify the precise differences between the Anglophone emphasis on ‘character 
change’ and the Francophone one on ‘subjectification’, although the latter includes a first-personal 
dimension that emphasises the subjective perspective of the person who undergoes the change in 
character. The absence of a shared nomenclature has hindered what could otherwise be productive 
Anglo-Franco discussion of these issues.   
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From this we can see that hupomnēmata constituted a variety of writing practices, all of 
which aimed to provide material that could be continually reflected upon in the ongoing 
cultivation of the self. With hupomnēmata, on Foucault’s account, a person could engage in 
a wholesale process of self-cultivation by gathering a set of personally-crafted and targeted 
fragments to help guide their ongoing character development. Assembling such a 
‘fragmentary [and] scattered logoi’, was a cherished means of ‘establishing a relationship 
with oneself’, he explains, a relationship that was tempered and hardened by the reflective 
practice of carefully recording these insights (1997a [1983]: 211). 
Nevertheless, to understand hupomnēmata fully we must distinguish it from two 
apparently-similar practices, both of which would distort our understanding of this vitally-
important tool. Regarding the first, Foucault cautions, ‘hupomnēmata should not be thought 
of simply as a memory support, which might be consulted from time to time, as occasion 
arose; [nor are they] meant to be substituted for a recollection that may fail’ (1997a [1983]: 
210). Instead hupomnēmata are better understood as a ‘framework for exercises to be carried 
out frequently’, as this allows the practitioner to assimilate the insights of ‘reading, 
rereading, meditating, conversing with oneself and with others’ (1997a [1983]: 210). 
Regarding the second apparently similar practice, Foucault stresses that we must be careful 
to differentiate hupomnēmata from the ‘narratives of oneself’ that we find in ‘written 
confession[s]’, in modern autobiographical literature, or in accounts of ‘spiritual 
experience (temptations, struggles, downfalls, and victories) that [are] found in later 
Christian literature’ (1997a [1983]: 210). Instead of such a ‘monastic notion of spiritual 
experience’, which aims to ‘dislodg[e] the most hidden impulses from the inner recesses of 
the soul’, hupomnēmata were used to constitute the practitioner as a ‘subject of rational 
action through the appropriation, the unification, and the subjectivation of a fragmentary 
and selected already-said’ (1997a [1983]: 221). Hupomnēmata are functional and practical, 
therefore, because they primarily aim to ‘capture the already-said […] for a purpose that is 
nothing less than the shaping of the self.’ (1997a [1983]: 210–1).  
From this we can see, on Foucault’s account, the hupomnēmata were an integral and 
supportive part of a comprehensive process of self-cultivation in the Hellenistic world. 
Their purpose was to record and document – in order to more intensely reflect upon – the 
practitioner’s current resolution of ‘how one should live’. Their aim was to assimilate and 
digest the insights of one’s previous resolutions to the question, as well as to reflect upon 
other practices of self-cultivation, including the ‘monitoring of one’s representations’, the 
praemeditatio malorum and meletē thanatou. They not only contained general practical 
wisdom – like Aristotle’s Ethics, for example – but they provided a personalised guidebook 
of how to do this in which the practitioner became actively involved in their own process 
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of formation. They enable the practitioner to ‘digest’ the insights of their reading and 
discussion on self-development by creating a personalised repository of endoxa. Citing 
Seneca’s imagery of horticultural cultivation, Foucault tells us that the hupomnēmata must 
be ‘planted in the soul’, so that one ‘does not merely make them its own but [is] itself’ (1997a 
[1983]: 210; translation amended, italics added).  
In contrast to the Anglophone emphasis on how the Hellenistic exercises were 
primarily aimed to extirpate damaging emotions, Foucault tells us that the hupomnēmata 
provided a forum where the attachments that generated pathē could be scrutinised and 
evaluated. He writes: 
 
They also formed a raw material for the drafting of more systematic 
treatises, in which one presented arguments and means for struggling 
against some weakness (such as anger, envy, gossip, flattery) or for 
overcoming some difficult circumstance (a grief, an exile, ruin, 
disgrace). (1997a [1983]: 210) 
 
Not only were the hupomnēmata useful in alleviating pathē such as ‘anger’ or envy’, they 
were also involved in the cultivation of whatever attachment gave rise to these feelings, 
since they allowed the practitioner to reflect on the loss of passionate attachments such as 
the death of a loved one (‘grief’), a change in fortune, such as one’s financial ‘ruin’ or one’s 
‘exile’ from the city state (1997a [1983]: 210). We can say, then, that even in the Hellenistic 
world the hupomnēmata were not only aimed at extirpating pathē, but also were directed 
towards an ongoing process of self-reflection on those passionate attachments that 
generated these emotions. Although I have previously stated pathē can be caused by all 
kinds of practical consideration – especially sought after prudential ones – the above 
passage singles out pathē that are generated by passionate attachments; grief, for example, 
associated with the death of a love object. This is not to claim that Hellenistic philosophers 
had a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments, but that they recognised that the 
kind of attachments that generate the strongest type of emotional disturbance must be 
managed, as well as the pathē themselves. I return to this idea in Ch. 5. 
  Foucault’s discussion of the hupomnēmata also reveals an interesting 
correspondence with Hadot’s interest in the eclecticism in the Hellenistic schools. As I 
argued in 3.2.2, Hadot’s justification for deploying the Hellenistic exercises outside their 
original context supports the project of enlisting their conceptual resources to offer a theory 
of cultivating our passionate attachments, as well as Foucault’s claim that the exercises can 
be applied to theoretical questions and to resolve problems in practical life. When 
discussing hupomnēmata, Foucault picks up on a similar eclecticism by stressing that 
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forming these personalised texts was a matter of ‘selecting of heterogeneous elements’ in 
contrast to either the ‘grammarian, who tries to get to know an entire work or all the works 
of an author’ or the ‘professional philosophers who subscribe to the doctrinal unity of a 
school’ (1994 [1983]: 213). Citing Epictetus, Foucault writes that ‘it makes little difference 
whether one has grasped exactly what [Zeno or Chrysippus] meant to say, or whether one 
is able to reconstruct their whole argument’ (1994 [1983]: 213). What matters is the way in 
which one employs these teachings to answer practical or theoretical questions.   
Although I have followed Foucault in emphasising that the hupomnēmata were 
employed in a self-led and highly-personalised process of character development – one 
which emphasised ‘withdrawing into oneself, getting in touch with oneself, living with 
oneself, relying on oneself’ – they must also be understood as serving as a platform for a 
more socially-orientated manner of cultivating the self (1997a [1983]: 211; italics added). 
While hupomnēmata are primarily ‘personal writing exercises’, they also ‘serve[d] as raw 
material for texts that one sen[t] to others’ (1997a [1983]: 214). Here Foucault is referring to 
the active epistolary tradition of the Hellenistic era, which is prominent in any 
reconstruction of the Hellenistic world because much of the extant source material takes 
the form of letters. These often combine a mix of philosophical commentary with personal 
information, informatively weaving both together, to provide personalised practical 
advice on the practices of cultivating the self. While this is connected to the emphasis on 
the value of friendship in the ancient world, Hellenistic epistolary practices employed and 
advocated concrete techniques and elaborate conventions though which friendships could 
be practically performed.  
In Ch. 3, I followed Nussbaum in arguing that friendship was perhaps the 
passionate attachment that Hellenistic philosophers looked upon most benignly, regarding 
it as serving an essential role in the cultivation of the self, rather than simply leaving us 
vulnerable to pathē. Not only did the Hellenists recognise friendship as an important 
passionate attachment, however, Foucault claims that these thinkers offered practical 
advice on how written communication with friends could aid self-cultivation specifically. 
Epistolary correspondence had recognised advantages over face-to-face discourse; 
exchanging letters allowed a greater period of time for the addressee to reflect upon their 
reply, forcing them to formalise their thoughts in a schematised way, and to use 
conventions that facilitated deeper-level reflection. Such correspondence offered an 
account of oneself and the principles one strives to live by, Foucault tells us, are a ‘matter 
of bringing into congruence the gaze of the other and that gaze which one aims at oneself 
when one measures one’s everyday actions according to the rules of a technique of living.’ 
(1997a [1983]: 221) Through the eyes of another person, one is required to find the 
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‘reciprocity of the gaze and the examination’, one that ‘works toward the subjectivation of 
the regimen that one judges useful to one’s correspondent’, as well as providing the 
opportunity to recall one’s own regimen (1997a [1983]: 217–8). 
I have shown that Foucault situates the Hellenistic exercises on a spectrum, 
ranging from the bodily exercises of gymnasia to the mental exercises of meletē. This should 
lead us to question Anglophone scholars who think of these exercises as exclusively 
concerned with the process of extirpating pathē. Furthermore, Foucault’s account of the 
practices of sifting one’s representations – praemeditatio malorum, and meletē thanatou – sits 
in tension with Nussbaum’s insistence that philosophy was the primary means of 
Hellenistic self-cultivation. Unless we radically reinterpret philosophy to such an extent 
that it is unlike anything resembling the contemporary discipline, stipulating that 
Hellenistic self-cultivation was primarily philosophical merely hampers the project of 
employing the exercises to answer new philosophical questions. 
 
4.3   Hadot’s Exercices Spirituels 
 
For Hadot, the role of the spiritual exercises must be prioritised in any account of the 
philosophy of the Hellenistic world, as I showed in 3.2. Hadot begins his account of the 
‘spiritual exercises’ by conceding that, despite the fact that ‘allusions to […] inner activities 
are very frequent in the writings of the Roman and Hellenistic periods’, ‘[n]o systematic 
treatise codifying the instructions and techniques for spiritual exercises has come down to 
us’ (1995 [1987]: 83–4). Despite this, he identifies two times in the Hellenistic corpus that 
exercises of self-cultivation have been given explicit thematisation, both of which appear 
in the writings of the Hellenistic-Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE – 50 
CE).100 Philo’s first list of exercises of self-cultivation consists in: ‘research (zetesis), 
thorough investigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), listening (akroasis), attention 
(prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia), and indifference to indifferent things’; the second cites 
‘reading, meditations (meletat), therapies of the passions, remembrance of good things, self-
mastery (enkrateia), and the accomplishment of duties.’ (1995 [1987]: 84) Hadot claims that 
these lists offer a ‘fairly complete panorama or Stoico-Platonic inspired philosophical 
therapeutics’, one which provides an informative summary of the kind of practices that 
were integral to Hellenistic philosophy. Nevertheless, he tells us, some of these exercises 
should be regarded as more important to Hellenistic self-cultivation than others. While 
                                               
100 Hadot explains his focus on Philo’s work by noting that ‘[m]any Stoic treatises entitled On Exercises 
have been lost’, although he tells us we have a ‘short treatise entitled On Exercise, by Musonius Rufus’ 
and ‘[o]ne chapter of Epictetus’ Discourses is dedicated to askesis’ (1995 [1987]: n.18, 111). 
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Philo’s lists are relatively general, he also cites independent evidence that ‘attending to the 
present moment’ and viewing one’s life ‘from above’ were especially important for the 
Stoic and Epicurean schools (1995 [1987]: 84, 238).  
Furthermore, it is important to note that Hadot views the exercices spirituels as 
connected with one another. For Epicureans, Hadot writes, the ‘thought of death is the 
same as consciousness of the finite nature of existence’, and focusing on this gives rise to 
understanding the ‘infinite value to each instant’ (1995 [1987]: 95–6). Citing a letter from 
Horace, he tells us that ‘believing each day that dawns will be [one’s] last’ increases the 
value of the present (1995 [1987]: 96; n.119, 120). For the Stoics, Epictetus and Marcus 
Aurelius, the thought of death ‘transforms the tone and level of inner life’ it is connected 
to the ‘infinite value of the present moment’, and focusing on it causes us to live as if the 
present is ‘both the first moment and the last’ (1995 [1987]: 96). Similarly, Hadot argues 
that the meletē thanatou has a natural connection to the ‘view from above’, and it precipitates 
the same kind of insights. Hadot tells us that to ‘observe human affairs from above means 
[…] to see them from the point of view of death’ (1995 [1987]: 247; cf. Sellars (2009) [2003]: 
153), as well as claiming that ‘[t]raining for death is training […] to look at things from the 
perspective of universality and objectivity.’ (1995 [1987]: 95). I discuss the ‘focus on the 
present moment’ and ‘view from above’ in detail in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 respectively, in 
preparation for exploring their potential role in passionate self-cultivation in Ch. 6.   
 
4.3.1   ‘Generalised Research’  
 
Given that many of the activities Philo mentions are not obviously or exclusively to do 
with cultivation of character, it is perhaps unsurprising that commentators who dispute 
the importance of exercises of self-cultivation in the Hellenistic world have questioned 
Hadot’s reliance on this material, especially as he sources his accounts of ‘attending to the 
present moment’ and the ‘view from above’ from other places in the Hellenistic corpus. 
Despite agreeing with Hadot’s claim that Hellenistic philosophers primarily understood 
their discipline as a ‘way of life’, Cooper offers two reasons to dispute his emphasis on 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation. First, he proposes that Hadot’s claim is based on 
scanty textual evidence; second, he suggests – á la Nussbaum’s attack on Foucault101 – that 
Hadot underestimates the distinctively philosophical nature of Hellenistic thought. 
Regarding his first criticism, Cooper complains, the most ancient figure Hadot cites as 
                                               
101 Cooper does not cite Nussbaum’s criticism, perhaps because it would lead him to an interpretive 
puzzle. Nussbaum enlists Hadot in her criticism of Foucault for not emphasising the distinctively 
philosophical nature of Hellenistic philosophy, but Cooper attacks Hadot for not doing precisely this.    
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representing the Stoic school is Seneca, a philosopher who writes in the middle of first 
century CE. ‘It is a striking fact’, Cooper notes, that ‘almost all [Hadot’s] references are to 
writings from the late second century and afterward’, with no mention given to ‘fourth- or 
third century BCE writings’ (2012: n.4, 402). Hadot cannot assume, Cooper cautions, that 
‘what goes for Marcus Aurelius or Plutarch or Galen goes for Chrysippus or Epicurus or 
those who followed the Stoic or Epicurean philosophies four to six centuries earlier!’ (2012: 
n.4, 403) In a similar vein, Cooper argues that Hadot gives Seneca’s account of the ‘nightly 
practice of self-examination’ and ‘examination of conscience’ too much significance, as the 
Roman statesman’s account of these exercises should be viewed as ‘evidence of the novelty 
of such a practice at Seneca’s time’ rather than its ubiquity (2012: 20). 
Cooper’s second claim connects to his first one insofar as it questions whether the 
extant evidence for the spiritual exercises can ground Hadot’s interpretation, although the 
force of the worry is directed towards whether Hadot’s spiritual exercises are philosophical 
enough to justify his claim that philosophy was an integral part of the Hellenistic way of 
life. To support this claim, Cooper argues that Hadot’s examples of philosophical exercises 
are either just (i) interpreted by him so loosely that they can capture any activity 
whatsoever; and (ii) they are only very loosely equivalent to the stab and thrust of genuine 
philosophical engagement. Regarding (i), Cooper complains:  
 
[Hadot] stretches the application of the term to cover any activity of 
living, for example activities of daily life in which one infuses one’s 
actions with one’s knowledge of Stoic logic or Stoic physical theory, as 
well as Stoic ethical theory, thinking Stoic thoughts in directing one’s 
daily life. Applied as widely as that, engaging in spiritual exercises 
would simply be synonymous with living one’s philosophy. (2012: n.4; 
402) 
 
Regarding (ii), his complaint that Hadot’s spiritual exercises do not take into account the 
distinctively philosophical nature of Hellenistic thought, Cooper proposes that the 
exercises Hadot cites are best described as practices of ‘nonrationality’, rather than 
philosophical exercises (2012: 22).102 He writes: 
 
                                               
102 Instead of constituting anything philosophical, Cooper writes, the bulk of Hadot’s spiritual 
exercises include ‘meditation, self-exhortation, memorization, and recitation to oneself of bits of 
sacred text, causing in oneself devoted prayerful or prayer-like states of consciousness and mystical 
moments’ (2012: 22).  
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[A] great many of the alleged ‘spiritual exercises’ Hadot instances in his 
discussion of Hellenistic philosophy are no more than perfectly 
ordinary ways of getting oneself to understand the real meaning and 
implications of philosophical arguments and philosophical positions, to 
fix them in one’s mind and make oneself ready to apply them smoothly 
to situations of life as they may arise. (2012: n.4, 402) 
 
Cooper suggests that Hadot underestimates how deeply Socrates’ way of life influenced 
all the Hellenistic schools. This way of life had a robust philosophical component in it, he 
proposes, and was one in which the: 
 
[P]ractice of philosophical discussion is itself the central activity. 
Philosophical insight and knowledge show us that the good of the soul 
is the highest good, and that this good is wisdom – a permanent, deep, 
and complete grasp of the whole system of human values, in all their 
ramifications and applications to the varying circumstances of life. 
(2012: 50). 
 
From my analysis of why Nussbaum’s attacks on Foucault miss the mark, however, we 
may think that Cooper’s second point is less devastating, as there are few hard-and-fast 
equivalences between philosophy in our own and the Hellenistic eras. Because of the 
nonrationality of Hadot’s exercises, Cooper writes, we should regard them as having ‘at 
most a secondary and very derivative function in the philosophical life during the heyday 
of ancient philosophy’ (2012: 22).  
As Cooper’s criticisms emphasise, the spiritual exercises that Hadot views as 
constituting ‘generalised research’ – ‘thorough investigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), 
listening (akroasis), attention (prosoche) – are a heterogeneous melange of different activities 
and practices that had a variety of other functions. Furthermore, Cooper is right to say that 
it would be hard to describe these practices as philosophical because there is no sense these 
activities involve rationality, argumentation, or logical thought. Instead, they would be 
better described as an ongoing process of developing one’s intellectual powers and 
academic knowledge, in a way that sought to improve, empower, and challenge the 
practitioner. Compared to Foucault’s hupomnemata, the exercises constituting ‘generalised 
research’ had a wider-ranging remit, one which allowed them to perform a variety of 
different functions, including accumulating and reflecting upon whatever non-




4.3.2   ‘Only the Present is our Happiness’ 
 
Similarly to how Foucault’s emphasis on non-philosophical forms of folk self-
cultivation, which he argues were an important feature in Hellenistic cultural life, 
Hadot tells us that Greek ‘[p]opular wisdom advised people both to be content with 
the present, and to know how to utilise it.’ (1995 [1987]: 221) Despite this, he warns, 
we should not adopt the romanticised view of the Greeks offered by philosophers 
such as ‘Hegel’, ‘Nietzsche’, or ‘Heidegger’, one which envisages the ‘existence of 
an idealised Greece’ in which the Hellenists were ‘perpetually bathed in beauty and 
serenity’ on account of the cultural importance they attributed to ‘liv[ing] in the 
present moment’ (1995 [1987]: 221). Echoing his claim that Hellenistic spiritual 
exercises had a variety of roles, including the extirpation of pathē, examined in 3.2.1, 
Hadot tells us that ‘people in antiquity were just as filled with anguish as we are 
today’ because ‘[l]ike us, the ancients bore the burden of the past’ and ‘the 
uncertainty of the future’ (1995 [1987]: 221). Because the Hellenists regarded losing 
contact with the present moment as deeply inimical to a person’s overall flourishing, 
however, both the Epicurean and Stoic schools ‘sought to provide a remedy’ that 
aimed to ‘allow people to free themselves from the past and the future, so that they 
could live within the present’ (1995 [1987]: 221–2).  
Not only did the Hellenists regard the practice of living in the present 
moment as one that reduced pathē that inhibit flourishing, it was also regarded as 
revolutionising the perceptual faculties, in a way that freed the practitioner from 
their habitual approach to the Socratic question. Hadot writes:    
  
[T]o live in the present moment is to live as though one were seeing the 
world both for the last and for the first time. To work at seeing the world 
as though one were seeing it for the first time is to get rid of the 
conventional and routine vision we have of things, to discover a brute, 
naive vision of reality, to take note of the splendor of the world, which 
habitually escapes us. This is what Lucretius is attempting to do when 
he suggests that if the spectacle of the world appeared briskly and 
unexpectedly to our eyes, the human imagination would be incapable 
of conceiving something more wonderful. And when Seneca speaks of 
the stupefaction that strikes him when he looks at the world, he says 
that it often happens that he looks at it as though he were looking at it 
for the first time. (2011: 173) 
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From this we can see that focusing on the present moment allows the practitioner to 
reappraise their life anew in a way that avoids positive assumptions or gloomy 
predictions about the future, one which is also free of the weight of past memories. 
As Hadot puts it, when focusing on the present one, ‘no longer projects oneself into 
the future, but considers each of one’s actions in itself and for itself’, allowing oneself 
to ‘become aware of the infinite value of the present moment, of the infinite value of 
today’s moments’ (2011: 163). As we develop our characters, so the Hellenists 
thought, we get stuck in self-made habits and routines of thought, both of which 
negatively impact upon our ability to flourish.  
As explored in 3.2.1, both the Epicurean and Stoic schools employed many 
of the same methods to keep a person’s attention raptly focused on the present, 
while proposing strikingly different reasons for doing this. Hadot claims to identify 
an ‘extraordinary structural analogy between the experiences of time as it was lived 
in both [the Epicurean and Stoic] schools’, one that by attending to we can ‘glimpse 
a certain common experience of the present underlying their doctrinal divergences’ 
(1995 [1987]: 222). Both schools, Hadot claims, are committed to the view that: 
 
[H]appiness can only be found in the present, that one instant of 
happiness is equivalent to an eternity of happiness, and that 
happiness can and must be found immediately, here and now. 
(1995 [1987]: 222) 
 
For Hadot, this shared view is what motivates the structural analogy, and which is 
responsible for the value each school attributes to attending to the present moment. To 
understand this, I examine how this exercise featured in the Epicurean and Stoic schools. 
In what follows, I examine the Epicureans’ motivation for various exercises of self-
cultivation connected to the focusing on the present, before focusing on those of the Stoics. 
After this we will be in a good position to understand why focusing on the present moment 
was considered valuable, as well as demonstrating Hadot’s claim that many spiritual 
exercises were shared between the Hellenistic schools for completely different doctrinal 
reasons. 
 Hadot tells us that the Epicureans’ views on desire motivated them to pay much 
attention to the task of focusing on the present moment. We first encountered their views 
on the various kinds of desires in 3.1.3, when I suggested that Anglophone scholars have 
reasonably taken Epicurus at his word when he tells us that ‘natural and necessary’ desires 
are the only permissible ones (Inwood & Gerson 1994 [Prin. Doct.]: 34 [XXIX]). Building on 
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Epicurus’ theoretical injunction regarding permissible desires, Hadot also offers a practical 
method for identifying desires whose status is ambiguous. Focusing on the present 
moment allows us to sift and weigh the importance of our desires in a way that allows 
those which are truly important to us to become most salient. He writes: 
 
According to Epicureanism, senseless people – that is, the majority of 
mankind – are tormented by vast, hollow desires which have to do with 
wealth, glory, power, and the unbridled pleasures of the flesh. What is 
characteristic of all these desires is that they cannot be satisfied in the 
present. (1995 [1987]: 223).  
 
On this view, we do not focus on the present moment once we have renounced all those 
desires that are not natural or necessary, but instead we engage in present-focused 
activities so we may be better able to distinguish between those desires we really care about 
from those that may well be initially highly attractive yet we cannot endorse upon 
reflection. Desires we care about will be action-guiding on reflection, whereas those we do 
not really care about can be identified as not worthy of action, and can therefore be 
discarded. This dimension of the exercise will play an important role in my account of how 
this has the resources for passionate self-cultivation in Ch. 6.   
Despite also advocating the same exercise, the reasons why the Stoics did so were 
vastly different. Instead of the Epicurean emphasis on being able to identify desires that 
should be action guiding, the Stoics primarily viewed attending to the present moment as 
valuable because it increased our autonomy. Hadot does not pull his punches in his 
account of the Stoic interest in focusing on the present, telling us that the ‘fundamental 
attitude that the Stoic must maintain at each instant of his life is one of attention, vigilance, 
and continuous tension, concentrated upon each and every moment’ (1995 [1987]: 226). 
Drawing on Marcus Aurelius’ account of how to do this in Meditations [9.6], Hadot terms 
Marcus Aurelius’ call to saturate each and every present moment as ‘delimiting the 
present’, claiming it has the power to free us from worry about the future or regrets about 
the past. For Hadot, the act of ‘concentrat[ing] [the mind] upon what one is in the process 
of doing’ was one of the most valuable exercises of self-cultivation for the Stoics because, 
as Anglophone commentators also emphasise, it allows us to evade the debilitating pathē 
of worry and anxiety. Aurelius tells us that ‘if you separate from yourself the future and 
the past, and apply yourself exclusively to living the life that you are living – that is to say, 
the present – you can live […] in calm, benevolence, and serenity’ (12.3, 3–4; cited by Hadot 
1995 [1987]: 228). Similarly, Seneca recommends ‘cutt[ing] short […] the fear of the future 
and the memory of past discomfort’ because, he tells us, ‘the one does not concern me 
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anymore, and the other does not concern me yet.’ (Seneca [Epi.], 78.14; cited by Hadot 1995 
[1987]: 228). 
 From this we can see that exercises of self-cultivation focusing on the present 
moment were highly prized in both the Epicurean and Stoic schools, albeit for very 
different reasons. Hadot’s claim that the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation are 
transferable and can be used to address different philosophical problems is supported by 
the fact that this exercises was engaged in despite having very different theoretical 
underpinnings. When we focus on the present instant, both the Epicurean and Stoic schools 
propose, our critical faculties to distinguish between the various kinds of desires which 
constantly bombard us are enhanced. Focusing on the present moment puts us in a 
stronger position to understand what kind of desires we truly care about, and in so 
increases our ability to come to a robust and insightful resolution to the question of ‘how 
one should live’. I return to the extent this exercise can facilitate this task in Ch. 6.103      
 
4.3.3   The ‘View From Above’ 
 
Like a hot-air balloon, [true poetry] lifts us up into higher regions, along 
with the ballast that clings to us, and lets us see, from a bird’s-eye view, 
the mad labyrinths of the world spread out before us. (Goethe [Dichtung 
und Wahrheit]: 580; cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 239).  
 
Goethe’s powerful image of how poetry, like flight, allows us to escape our mundane and 
limited viewpoint on the world, sets the scene for Hadot’s discussion of the Hellenistic 
exercise of the ‘view from above’. Altitude, for Goethe, reveals the overall structure of the 
cosmos and our essential interconnectedness to it, showing how we are only a limited part 
of a far greater whole.104 Elsewhere Hadot suggests that a similar experience was 
undergone by those who witnessed the lunar landings of 1969, as this gave rise to the same 
intuitive insight of the ‘vanity of borders and of all the barriers, physical and moral, that 
separate humans’ (2011: 168). In its literal sense, therefore, the ‘view from above’ is simply 
the act of looking down upon ourselves from a vertiginous vantage point, allowing us to 
                                               
103 See Foucault’s connection with hupomnemata. He writes, ‘[hupomnemata] can be connected to a very 
general theme of the period […]. The hupomnemata contribute one of the means by which one 
detaches the soul from concern for the future and redirects it toward contemplation of the past.’ 
(1997a [1983]: 211–2) 
104 When asked about his interest in this spiritual exercise, Hadot notes that Goethe’s enthusiasm for 
the ‘first hot-air balloon flights (in 1783)’ was motivated by the poet’s reverence for the bird’s-eye-
view perspective (2011: 168). 
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situate ourselves within the totality of a cosmos of which we are an insignificant fragment. 
Hadot writes: 
 
The view from above, directed at the earth from a mountain-top, an 
airplane, or a spaceship, must obviously be distinguished from the 
imagined, thought look from above, but that obviously supposes the 
experience of the look directed from an elevated point. (2011: 167) 
 
Nevertheless, this literal sense harbours a figurative meaning, one which enables it to 
function as a spiritual exercise. Long before the invention of hot-air balloons or spacecraft, 
Hadot tells us, many in the ancient world used this spiritual exercise to imaginatively 
precipitate the ‘terrible shock’ of our relative insignificance (2011: 168).105 By allowing the 
‘imagination [to] speed through the infinite vastness of the universe’ (1995 [1987]: 242), 
Hadot proposes, we can reveal the ‘whole of human reality, in all its social, geographical, 
and emotional aspects [as an] anonymous, swarming mass’ to which we are inextricably 
linked (1995 [1987]: 245). This exercise, he suggests, enables us to perceive beyond: 
 
[O]ur biased and partial point of view, to bring us to see things and our 
personal existence in a cosmic and universal perspective, to situate us 
in the immense event of the universe, but also, one might say, in the 
unfathomable mystery of existence. (2011: 96) 
 
On Hadot’s reading, therefore, the ‘view from above’ is, in his own words, the 
‘philosophical way par excellence of looking at things’ because it situates any particular 
thing in the context of the universal cosmos to which all things belong (1995 [1987]: 242). 
Viewing things in this way allows us to escape our limited point of view to see things from 
‘the point of view of universality’, allowing us to move ‘from individuality and 
particularity to universality and objectivity’ (1995 [1987]: 242). From this more detached 
perspective, one can accede to a more enlightened perspective, one which Hadot terms 
‘philosophical’.  
                                               
105 Hadot claims that the ‘view from above’ is frequently described in ‘Plato, Epicurus, Lucretius, 
Philo of Alexandria, Ovid, Marcus Aurelius, and Lucian’ (2011: 167). Sellars, for example, locates five 
examples of the exercise of taking up the ‘point of view of the cosmos’ in Marcus Aurelius’ 
Meditations (2009 [2003]: 150). Although Hadot does not claim that it functions as a spiritual exercise 
in the work of all these thinkers, he argues that it appears as an image from which philosophical 
insights can be drawn.  
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 Similar to how the Epicureans and the Stoics both advocated attending to the 
present for very different reasons, the motivation for encouraging students to practice the 
‘view from above’ as a spiritual exercise likewise differed radically according to each 
school. Hadot speculates that for the Epicureans this exercise may have been cherished 
because it was equivalent to the view taken up by the Epicurean sage. The lives of sages 
were subject to much interest and lively debate in the Hellenistic world as sages were 
regarded as exemplars to be emulated, and this interest maintained a large doxological 
literature on their ways of life.106 As Hadot puts it, the sage was characterised by his lack 
of concern with ‘mundane affairs’ because this individual spent their time ‘contemplating 
the infinity of space, time, and the multiple worlds’ (1995 [1987]: 243). It allowed, Hadot 
suggests, an ‘individual to see things in a universal perspective and to remove itself from 
its egoistical point of view’ (2011: 167).107 Imaginatively taking up the ‘view from above’ 
within the context of this Hellenistic exercise, therefore, was a way to temporarily 
participate in how the sage viewed the world on a daily basis. Taking the image further, 
Hadot speculates, the Epicureans may have even regarded his exercise as imitating the 
view of the Epicurean gods, those lofty celestial beings that Epicurus famously claims view 
the activities of humans with unconcern. The exercise, Hadot writes, allows humans to 
become ‘aware of the greatness of humans, because [like gods] their minds are capable of 
covering the whole universe.’ (2011: 167) 
 The Stoics’ motivation for the very same exercise was strikingly different, a claim 
Hadot bases on passages by Philo and Marcus Aurelius. In the first of these, Philo describes 
the life of the Stoic wise person in a way that would surely resonate with Epicurean 
accounts of the sage. He writes: 
 
Their goal is a life of peace and serenity, they contemplate nature and 
everything found within her: they attentively explore the earth, the sea, 
the air, the sky, and every nature found therein. In thought, they 
accompany the moon, the sun, and the rotations of the other stars, 
whether fixed or wandering. Their bodies remain on earth, but they give 
wings to their souls, so that, rising into the ether, they may observe the 
powers which dwell there, as is fitting for those who have truly become 
citizens of the world. (Philo Judaeus [Special Laws]: 44; cited by Hadot 
1995 [1987]: 243–4).  
                                               
106 See Sellars for a comprehensive list of this literature, including works on the lives of Hellenistic 
philosophers, by Plutarch, Xenophon, Diogenes Laertius, and Porphyry (2009 [2003]: 21–30). 
107 Although providing no references, Hadot tells us that ‘Lucretius describes [the view from above] 
in reference to Epicurus’ (2011: 167).  
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Here a physical description of the cosmos is shot through with the philosophical emphasis 
on the interrelatedness of entities that comprise it. Moreover, it is this insight pertaining to 
interrelatedness, Hadot writes, that enables wise persons to become what Philo calls 
‘citizens of the world’ (cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 244). Next Hadot quotes Marcus 
Aurelius on what the concrete upshot of this spiritual exercise might be. By watching the 
‘courses of the stars as if you were running alongside them’ and by ‘continually dwell[ing] 
in [one’s] mind upon the changes of the elements into one another [one can] wash away 
the foulness of life on the earth’ because by looking at ‘earthly things below as if from some 
vantage point above them’ we can see the natural rational forces that operate behind them 
(Aurelius [Med.]: 47–8; cited by Hadot 1995 [1987]: 244). By taking the ‘view from above’ 
we have the capacity to detach ourselves from the immediacy of our own concerns, and 
are better able to reflect upon our life and what matters to us from a more detached and 
considered perspective. We are able to reflect upon all the considerations that are 
important to resolving the question of ‘how one should live’.    
 
4.4   Enlisting the Resources of Hellenistic Philosophy 
 
This chapter began by exploring Nussbaum’s contention that any correct historical reading 
of this period must emphasise that self-cultivation in the Hellenistic world was resolutely 
philosophical, a position supported by Cooper and Hadot. Nussbaum’s insistence on this 
matter is directed against Foucault’s final works on Hellenistic philosophy, in which he 
countenances a broader conception of self-shaping, which he terms the ‘care of the self’. 
For Nussbaum, the pratiques de soi that Foucault claims fall under this broad notion are too 
general to equate to what she claims is the specifically philosophical kind of self-shaping 
that the Hellenists advocated. Philosophy is necessary, on Nussbaum’s view, because only 
reason and rationality can counteract pathē, those strong and debilitating emotions which 
impact upon our flourishing.  
 While I have shown in 3.1 that Nussbaum is right to view the Hellenists as deeply 
concerned with the damaging effects of pathē on our flourishing, I have also argued that 
they did not view the exercises of self-cultivation solely in these terms. Rather, I have 
followed Foucault’s account of Hellenistic self-cultivation that views it as a broader and 
more expansive process of self-shaping, as well as Hadot’s arguments for the 
transposability of the exercises though which they strived to do this. While jointly these 
arguments ensure that there is no direct conceptual incompatibility with using the 
Hellenistic account of self-cultivation to provide the resources for a theory of cultivating 
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our passionate attachments, Hadot’s arguments for the transposability of the exercises 
alone would be enough to justify using them for this philosophical task. The exercises of 
self-cultivation clearly served a variety of functions in the Hellenistic schools, and in Ch. 3 
I proposed that Hadot’s arguments for their contemporary theoretical and practical 
transposabilty are compelling. 
Furthermore, by outlining the Hellenistic exercises that Foucault and Hadot focus 
on in 4.2 and 4.3, I have shown that they were complex and sophisticated practices of self-
shaping that need not pertain to one dimension of character, and that there is evidence that 
they were not limited to the suppression or elimination of damaging pathē. Despite the 
Hellenists viewing these exercises as useful for extirpating pathē, it would be odd to 
describe these techniques as ‘philosophy’ because they often involve explicitly non-
rational imaginative techniques. Nussbaum’s insistence on them as ‘philosophical’ seems 
terminological, therefore, as these exercises can only be loosely described as philosophical 
in the discursive, analytical, and argumentative sense. Nevertheless, although she views 
Foucault’s pratiques de soi as failing to have suitable philosophical credentials, I argue that 
the breadth of these exercises is their strength for both a theory of cultivating our 
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Pt. III proposes that the philosophical resources of the Hellenistic tradition can provide the 
conceptual resources for a theory of how we can cultivate the passionate attachments in 
the terms laid out in Pt. I. In Pt. II I showed that the status of passionate attachments was 
an intense source of debate in the ancient world, one in which the Stoics and Epicureans 
sided against the Hellenistic Peripatetics to argue that any entity that generated pathē 
should be regarded with suspicion. While Nussbaum has shown that there were subtle 
differences between the schools on this topic, the Stoics and Epicureans are rightly 
regarded as viewing passionate attachments with distrust. Anglophone and Francophone 
thinkers agree that, historically speaking, extirpating pathē was a vitally important 
dimension of these procedures because the Hellenists regarded these strong emotions as 
inimical to moral development, viewing them as impacting negatively on the ethical ideal 
of the school concerned. Nevertheless, as the Francophone thinkers I have looked at 
contend, the exercises of self-cultivation which the Hellenists developed to increase human 
flourishing did not only aim to extirpate pathē, whether caused by passionate attachments 
or excessive prudential desires. Rather these exercises were part of an overarching interest 
in global character change, of which removing of the pathē was a central but not exclusive 
concern.  
Most importantly, however, both Foucault and Hadot propose that important 
aspects of these exercises can be enlisted to answer questions in contemporary philosophy 
and in practical life. Each thinker does this in different ways, however. For Hadot, as well 
as eliminating pathē, the exercises are connected to his contention that the Hellenists 
viewed philosophy as a way of life, a conception that he views as providing insights into, 
among other things, how the universal logos governs both us and the cosmos. The status of 
Hadot’s contention that ancient philosophy was a way of life to which he urges modern 
philosophers to return has generated much fascinating literature, but it is not the subject 
of this study. Hadot’s work is valuable, however, as he gives a series of arguments – 
explored in 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 – for why the Hellenistic exercises can be transposed from their 
original philosophical context to solve new problems. As well as underwriting Hadot’s 
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own work (and Foucault’s schematic remarks on the contemporary relevance of Hellenistic 
self-shaping), these arguments are useful for any project that seeks to enlist the conceptual 
resources of the Hellenists for new purposes.  
Neither Foucault nor Hadot offer a theory of passionate self-cultivation, for 
example, but are useful for forming a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments for three reasons. First, as mentioned above, Hadot provides compelling 
arguments for why the exercise of self-cultivation are amenable to being transposed. 
Second, both Foucault’s and Hadot’s emphasis on self-cultivation in the Hellenistic 
tradition offer valuable theoretical insights into how any process of self-directed character 
development must proceed. Third, both thinkers locate a set of paradigmatic practical 
methods of self-shaping within the Hellenistic corpus, exercises of self-cultivation that could 
be used for self-cultivation in different ways. The first argument secures the conceptual 
platform for applying the conceptual resources of the Hellenists to a contemporary 
problem, the second and third offer a theoretical and practical framework that I argue can 
be applied to passionate self-cultivation in particular. This does not aim to replicate or 
reconstruct the use that Foucault and Hadot envisage for the Hellenistic tradition when 
they reflect on how this tradition can be of use for contemporary life, although doing this 
does show one possible way that their claims regarding the value of Hellenism for 
contemporary philosophy and practical life could be fulfilled. 
If we take these reasons seriously, the Hellenistic exercises could be said to provide 
a practical method for self-directed character change on two levels. At the first level, they 
are involved in self-cultivation insofar as they allow us to generate a robust resolution to 
the question of ‘how one should live’ by countenancing the weight of all the various 
considerations that bear on how we resolve to live. Because the exercises generate deep 
reflective insights into our resolution to the Socratic question, engaging in them helps us 
better assess the relative weight of the considerations that inform our conduct. For 
example, in the process of deciding whether or not he should set sail to Tahiti, practising 
the meletē thanatou may have assisted Gauguin in weighing up the demands of his moral 
and prudential considerations against those of his passionate attachments. By envisioning 
imaginatively that his life was finite, Gauguin may have come to realise that his moral 
commitments were especially important to him, or it may have confirmed his gut instinct 
that to leave his family to pursue his passionate attachments was the right thing to do (as 
the epigraph to Ch. 5 suggests).   
At the second level, the exercises allow us to cultivate each of the dimensions of 
practical reasoning without which the question of ‘how one should live’ can only be 
partially resolved. To resolve the Socratic question, we must not just resolve how the 
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prudential, moral, and passionate considerations that bear upon our lives can be reconciled 
with one another, but we must also resolve how these considerations can be reconciled 
with other considerations of the same kind. As I showed in 2.2, both the moral and 
prudential traditions of self-cultivation countenance the use of exercises that can cultivate 
these aspects of our character. As Anglophone interpreters of Hellenism show, the 
exercises can also be used to cultivate ourselves in ways that benefit an aspect of character 
indirectly, such as when they are used to extirpate pathē with the aim of improving our 
moral character. Nevertheless, while there is much philosophical literature on how we can 
cultivate ourselves morally and prudentially, the question of how we can cultivate our 
passionate character remains entirely unexplored, and even the very philosophers who 
stress the importance of our passionate attachments either deny that these entities can be 
cultivated at all, or that we can form a theory of doing so. The contention of Pt. III is that 
they can also be applied to the cultivation of the passionate dimension of our characters in 
a self-directed process of cultivating our passionate attachments.  
Applying the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation to the cultivation of our 
passionate attachments puts them on unfamiliar terrain, one which departs from the 
leading contentions of all the theorists I have examined. On the one hand, although it 
concurs with Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s contention that the passionate attachments 
are a vitally important dimension of the flourishing life, it breaks with Frankfurt’s denial 
that the passionate attachments can be cultivated, as well as Wolf’s claim that, although 
possible, passionate self-cultivation is impervious to theoretical analysis. On the other, 
although it makes good on Hadot’s and Foucault’s claim that Hellenistic self-cultivation is 
relevant to theoretical philosophy and our practical lives, it does so in a way that they did 
not envisage. Such a composite theory of cultivating our passionate attachments need not 
satisfy all or any of its influences, of course. While we might hope that it is compatible with 
some of these influences, it need not agree with everything these influences say, and it may 
even be starkly opposed to them.  
For a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments to be comprehensive it must 
include three things. First, it must offer a substantive definition of what it is to cultivate our 
passionate attachments, distinguishing this kind of cultivation from similar-seeming self-
directed processes (especially prudential self-cultivation for the reasons discussed in 2.2.2). 
Second, it must show how the overall process works, explaining the theoretical principles that 
underlie any particular method of cultivating our passionate attachments. Third, it should 
offer a practical method of cultivating our passionate attachments, one that relates the 
theoretical insights concerning how passionate self-cultivation proceeds with a practical 
account of how this can be accomplished. To do this, I examine how each of the Hellenistic 
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exercises that Foucault and Hadot pick out could be enlisted in the project of cultivating 
our passionate attachments specifically. Combining my account of the importance of the 
passionate attachments for the flourishing life – à la Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf – with 
the Francophone accounts of how the self can be practically cultivated allows me to do all 
three things.  
 
Overview of Pt. III 
 
Pt. III offers a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments, one that employs 
the conceptual resources of the Francophone interpretation of Hellenistic philosophy 
explored in Pt. II to shed light on how we can cultivate our passionate attachments first 
raised in Pt. I. I begin by setting out the necessary and sufficient conditions for passionate 
self-cultivation in Ch. 5, before showing how principles of Hellenistic self-cultivation of 
character in general can be applied to the cultivation of our passionate attachments in 
particular. After this, in Ch. 6 I show how each of Foucault’s pratiques de soi and Hadot’s 
exercices spirituels offer a practical method that can be enlisted into the project of cultivating 
























A Theory of Cultivating Our 
Passionate Attachments 
 
Some have an end in life, others have none. For a long time I had virtue 
dinned into me; I know all about that but I do not like it. Life is hardly 
more than the fraction of a second. Such a little time to prepare oneself 
for eternity!  
Gauguin 1936 [1898]: 18 
 
5.0   Overview 
 
This chapter offers a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. It is 
composed of two elements. First, it defines what it is to cultivate our passionate 
attachments, showing what counts as passionate self-cultivation in terms of its necessary 
and sufficient conditions. Second, it explains how we can actively cultivate our passionate 
attachments, putting to work general Hellenistic observations on self-directed character 
change by applying them to how passionate self-cultivation functions specifically. To do 
this, 5.1 offers examples (and counterexamples) of passionate self-cultivation to show what 
distinguishes passionate self-cultivation from other – ostensibly similar – ways of 
cultivating the self, such as moral or prudential self-cultivation. Following this, 5.2 explains 
how such deep-seated character operates, comparing the processes that apply to all kinds 
of self-cultivation to those that apply to passionate self-cultivation specifically. These 
sections build on my account of what distinguishes our passionate attachments from other 
deep-seated action-guiding considerations (1.5), show how passionate self-cultivation 
differs from the other types of self-shaping that philosophers have traditionally been 
interested in (2.2), and connects this to the reasons we have to think that this kind of self-
cultivation is especially valuable (2.3). With this theoretical account in place, we will be 
ready to return to Foucault’s pratiques de soi and Hadot’s exercices spirituels in Ch. 6, where 
I show how these exercises offer a practical method that can be applied to the cultivation 





5.1   What Counts as Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments? 
 
For an activity to count as cultivating our passionate attachments, it must meet five criteria. 
Each of these criteria is necessary for a practice or activity to count as cultivating a person’s 
passionate attachments, and together they provide sufficient conditions for passionate self-
cultivation. This distinguishes passionate self-cultivation from other modes of cultivating 
the self, even those that might at first glance be misidentified as an instance of cultivating 
one’s passionate attachments. It also allows us to adjudicate between concrete examples, 
distinguishing cases of passionate self-cultivation from apparently similar cases.  
 
For an activity to be an instance of passionate self-cultivation: 
 
(i) It must involve a change in our passionate character. 
(ii)    It must be self-directed. 
(iii) It must be intentional, although the precise results need not be known in advance. 
(iv) It must be the result of an iterative process. 
(v) It must affect how a person resolves Socrates’ question.  
 
Only by meeting all these criteria could a person be said to be cultivating their passionate 
character. As I show, many instances of self-shaping meet most – but not all – of these 
criteria, so in these cases the above schema helps to show why they are not examples of 
cultivating our passionate character per se.  
 
5.1.1   Change in Passionate Character 
 
My discussion in Pt. I shows what passionate attachments are, so understanding how our 
passionate character can change mainly involves invoking the salient points. There I 
proposed viewing our passionate character as the profile of our various passionate 
attachments – those things we love and which generate a sense of identity and purpose in 
our lives. I initially followed Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s respective contributions to 
the notion, enabling me to produce a conceptual Venn diagram in which I showed that the 
overlapping aspects of each account bolstered the others, while also explaining how the 
non-overlapping areas elaborated on aspects of the notion the other accounts only touched 
on tangentially. Moreover, I added a further set of clarifying criteria in 1.5. These criteria 
provided an alternative to Wolf’s account of the ‘objective worth’ of the entities that she 
views as generating meaningfulness, while also showing how we can distinguish 
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passionate attachments from other cherished desires (the hoarder’s pursuit of junk, for 
instance).  
 Understanding a person’s passionate character as their profile of passionate 
attachments gives us most of the information we need to see what it means for it to change. 
Such a change need not involve the change of all of a person’s passionate attachments. 
Although passionate attachments are arranged in interlocking constellations (for example 
in a family), one or more passionate attachments might change independently of the 
others. Because of the ‘magnitude and complexity’ of passionate attachments discussed in 
1.5.1, even a change in one of them would have a significant effect on one’s resolution to 
the question of ‘how one should live’. To illustrate the wholesale change of all or most of a 
person’s passionate attachments, let us return to the Gauguin example. In all the variations 
of the example we have considered so far, Gauguin went from having a set of passionate 
attachments that were closely linked to his life in Paris, to a very different set connected to 
Tahiti. As the profile of Gauguin’s passionate attachments constitutes his passionate 
character, when one of these passionate attachments changes then his passionate character 
will change accordingly. Comparing the two states of Gauguin’s passionate character side-
by-side illustrates this change. At first, ‘Parisian Gauguin’ was passionately attached to his 
wife and children in fin de siècle Paris, painting when he could snatch time from his work 
or family duties. The passionate character of the ‘Tahitian Gauguin’ could not be more 
different, and it was one in which seemingly none of his former passionate attachments 
remained.108 This Gauguin no longer cared for his family or the Parisian painting scene 
because his passionate character had altered so profoundly that he only cared about his 
painting practice in Tahiti. The ‘Tahitian Gauguin’ fell in love with the smell of the jungle, 
the intensity of the tropical sunlight, and the beauty of the inhabitants of the island, one of 
whom he eventually married. Given the striking differences of Gauguin’s passionate 
attachments in Tahiti, we can say that there was a change in his passionate character. Not 
all cases are so clear cut. Consider a ‘Gauguin’ whose passionate attachments do not 
change so radically. In this somewhat happier example, the painter decides to travel to 
Tahiti to pursue painting, but cannot bear to leave his wife and children, so takes them 
with him. Yet whereas the change in this Gauguin’s passionate attachments here is not so 
sweeping or clear-cut as how Williams presents things, there is a change in his passionate 
character as he still pursues his love of painting in Tahiti. As passionate attachments are 
necessarily weighty, as I showed when discussing their ‘magnitude’ and ‘complexity’ 
(1.5.1), even altering a single one of them will alter our passionate character.  
                                               
108 Maugham’s depiction of his Gauguin-like protagonist epitomises this. Asked by the narrator 
whether he still ‘cares for’ his wife, the artist flatly replies, ‘not a bit’ (2009 [1919]: 47).  
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5.1.2   Self-Direction  
 
I first raised the possibility of self-directed character change when discussing the 
philosophical literature on moral self-cultivation in Ch. 2. There I claimed that, whereas 
Plato and Aristotle emphasise how our moral and passionate character must be passively 
cultivated for us during our youth, philosophers have also offered theories of self-directed 
moral development, exploring how we can improve or maintain our own moral character. 
As I discussed in 2.2.1, both Kant and Mill persuasively argue that the self-directed 
development of one’s moral character is important because of how certain activities require 
the intellectual capacities of adulthood. Kant, for instance, not only believes that doing the 
right thing is important, but also that we must do it for the right reasons, and this story of 
our moral motivation requires at least partially-developed mental processes. On Kant’s 
account, a person who does not cheat at backgammon because they have simply been 
taught not to does not demonstrate honesty; they only act morally when they refrain from 
cheating because they see it betrays the Categorical Imperative, which requires them to be 
in possession of the requisite intellectual faculties. In fact, if this backgammon player had 
had honourable play instilled into them during their youth – the importance of which 
Aristotle would emphasise – then Kant would not regard refraining from cheating to be a 
moral action at all.  
We might be sympathetic to the idea that self-directedness is especially important 
in the realm of passionate self-cultivation for similar reasons. Many highly-prized 
passionate attachments only become available to us once we have passed the formative 
stages of childhood and adolescence, the ages at which Plato and Aristotle emphasise that 
character change takes place most effectively. The idea of cultivating a passionate 
attachment to a prospective romantic partner before reaching the requisite emotional 
maturity is odd, whereas the idea of a person cultivating a passionate attachment with a 
sexual dimension before puberty is at least inappropriate. Cultivating our passionate 
attachments, therefore, needs to track the developmental stage one is passing through, so 
– unless the seeds of everything we will go on to love in adult life can be planted in us at 
an early age109 – it is important for us to develop our passionate character in a self-directed 
manner throughout our lives.  
                                               
109 Of course, according to Freud, passionate attachments of a sexual or romantic nature are closely 
tied to our early childhood experiences. But even if we accept the Freudian view that our childhood 
experiences tightly delimit our choice of future romantic or sexual passionate attachments, there is 
still room for the cultivation of our passionate attachments. In fact, the analytical process aims to do 
precisely this: through transference we are better able to make informed choices regarding which 
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The importance of self-direction, along with claims about the requisite qualities to 
do this using mature emotional and mental faculties, was recognised by the Hellenistic 
philosophers. They explicitly denied that the process of self-cultivation is finished once a 
person reaches maturity, and strongly advocated that self-cultivation ought to continue 
throughout adulthood. This view explains why many of the Hellenistic exercises assume 
sophisticated cognitive powers. In Foucault’s account of the praemeditatio malorum, for 
instance, we are presented with an exercise in which one’s resolution to the Socratic 
question is scrutinised in the knowledge that one’s life is finite, fallible, and will inevitably 
wane. This exercise is complex, and may be traumatic, involving much imaginative effort, 
so it is aimed at persons with the mental and emotional capacities required to vividly 
imagine such a troubling and complex experience.   
Understanding passionate self-cultivation as involving a self-directed aspect also 
helps to distinguish it from changes in our passionate attachments that result from so-
called ‘conversion experiences’. In these cases, although there is a profound change in a 
person’s passionate character, the fact that this change is caused by an external force 
prevents it from counting as an instance of passionate self-cultivation. Take Augustine’s 
conversion to Christianity, for example. At the end of Bk. VIII of his Confessions, Augustine 
describes how after years of living with two internal drives, ‘one carnal, one spiritual […] 
in conflict with one and other’, God communicated to him through the voices of two 
children repeating the words of a childhood game (2004: 189). These words, ‘Take up and 
read; take up and read’, Augustine tells us, directly instigated him to renew his study of 
the Bible, removing his obsession with the dissolute passionate attachments he had avidly 
pursued during his teenage years. Although Augustine’s conversion took place at the level 
of his passionate character (as well as his moral one), his description of it in Confessions 
shows that it was not self-directed. Indeed, his prayer of thanks gives God full credit for 
the new more wholesome passionate attachments he has taken up. It is because God 
converted him (‘Thou converted me’; 2004: 207–8) from his sensual passionate attachments 
to spiritual ones that Augustine is grateful. The passive dimension of Augustine’s 
conversion can be informatively contrasted with that of Blaise Pascal. As the Frenchman 
tells us in Pensées, he changes his passionate attachment to Christianity through a self-
directed process of self-cultivation, as it is through repeatedly attending church and 
through the practice of prayer that his faith in God grows. Unlike Augustine, Pascal 
demonstrates significantly more self-direction in the cultivation of his Christian faith, as 
he does not passively wait for his faith to be implanted in him by a higher power; he 
                                               
passionate attachments we ought to take up (or avoid) that benefits from the insights generated from 
psychoanalytical practice.  
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actively directs himself towards activities that ensure that his initially tentative faith will 
be nurtured (Pascal 1995 [1670]: especially 58–65).   
In addition, in Ch. 2 I argued that knowing someone’s passionate attachments is 
often taken to be a fundamentally important part of knowing their character, as well as 
noting that knowledge of one’s own passionate attachments is often strongly correlated 
with self-knowledge. While Socrates inaugurates a philosophical tradition that links 
knowing others with knowing their moral character, I argued that knowledge of one’s 
passionate attachments should be regarded as a similarly powerful mode of understanding 
oneself or others. Knowledge of another person’s passionate attachments – from their 
choice of romantic partner to how they spend their leisure time, from their deep-seated 
sexual desires to their charitable commitments – is at least as highly prized as a means to 
know a person as knowing their moral character. In fact our passionate character is so 
profoundly personal that we often regard the explicit direction or manipulation of another 
person’s passionate as inappropriate (see Ch. 2 n.29 regarding this in the choice of one’s 
romantic partner). Because a person’s passionate attachments are taken to be as least as 
revealing of their character as their moral disposition, we have reason to expect that a 
person should be actively involved in fashioning it through the choice and cultivation of 
these attachments, even if this was mediated through external advice or guidance.  
We can bring out our intuitions regarding this by way of example. Take a person 
who is strongly committed to a worthy environmental ideal, one which appears to occupy 
the status of a bona fide passionate attachment in their life. This person is deeply involved 
in supporting the ideal concerned, attends every committee meeting, is a recognised 
advocate for the cause concerned, and so on. For this person’s activity to be a genuine part 
of their passionate character, however, we have reason to expect them to have made up 
their own mind by engaging in a reflective process of countenancing other views on this 
topic, of investigating the pros and cons of different positions, in short, of acquiring their 
allegiance in a self-directed manner, et cetera. Suppose, after hearing about the passionate 
attachment of the nature-lover, we found out that their job requires them to endorse the 
environmental cause concerned, or that they come from a family that has advocated for 
this position for generations. While we may well still recognise the value of the passionate 
attachment concerned, we have good reason to take it less seriously because it has been 
passively adopted through a cultivated and not a self-cultivated process. If the person’s 
commitment to this cause was foisted upon them through family pressure, for instance, we 
may agree that they have a passionate attachment relating to this worthy cause, while 
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resisting the idea that it was self-directed in the required manner for it to count as an 
instance of the person cultivating their passionate attachments.110   
 
5.1.3   Intention  
 
Cultivating our passionate attachments must be intentional, although the unpredictable, 
often improvisational, and intransitive nature of self-cultivation means we must 
understand intentionality broadly. We can understand the importance of intentionality 
tweaking our Gauguin example once again. Imagine Gauguin had an Algerian lover whom 
he travels across the Mediterranean to visit every few months for an illicit rendezvous. In 
the rush at the Marseille docks, however, Gauguin accidentally embarks on the wrong 
ship, ending up in Tahiti instead of the closer African colony. Upon disembarking in Tahiti, 
he quickly discovers the pleasures of painting, writes to his wife to say he will never return, 
and then goes on to create the artworks for which he is best known. In this case, Gauguin 
has developed his passionate character in a way that meets all the criteria we have outlined 
so far: there has been a change in his passionate character (his passionate attachments have 
changed from his wife and family to pursuing the life of an artist), and this change was 
completely self-directed (he chose to embark upon the ship, albeit the wrong one). 
Nevertheless, in this case we cannot say that this Gauguin cultivated his passionate 
attachments, because he did not do so intentionally.  
We might think that all self-directed action is intentional, but while these things 
are often aligned this example shows that they can be prised apart. To say that Gauguin’s 
arrival in Tahiti was self-directed is just to say that Gauguin brought it about himself. He 
did this by buying the wrong ticket. In the same sense, we can say that acquiring his new 
set of passionate attachments was self-directed, even as we deny that it was intentional: 
Gauguin was causally responsible for his new set of passionate attachments because of his 
haste at the ticket office, even if he did not intend to be. Bringing about a state of affairs 
without intending to do so is incompatible with the idea of cultivating the state of affairs 
concerned. To return to the horticultural context from which the metaphor of self-
cultivation derives, a farmer does not cultivate the land unintentionally, but rather in a 
                                               
110 There are many other – often more troubling – examples of how a change in a person’s passionate 
character can occur without them being actively involved in the process. In cases of radicalisation, 
for example, we recognise that a person’s passionate character has changed in a way that cannot be 
attributed to the person themselves. Similarly, pernicious advertising is thought to work by 
implanting desires in us – often prudential – that we cannot trace back to ourselves, and upon 
reflection we can only partially identify.  
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thoroughly intentional process, which is purposeful, carefully planned, and closely 
monitored. We should not say that Gauguin cultivates his passionate attachment in this 
scenario any more than Jack’s mother cultivated a beanstalk by throwing away his magic 
beans. 
Finally, although intending to cultivate our attachments is a necessary condition 
for cultivating them, the specific change in our passionate character need not be anticipated 
in advance, a point I return to when discussing ‘incrementality’ in 5.2.1. Indeed, many of 
the processes of self-cultivation I have examined in earlier chapters show that there are 
good reasons why the change in a person’s passionate character cannot be predicted 
entirely in advance. Self-cultivation requires opening ourselves up to new kinds of 
attachments in an open-ended and often experimental way because we necessarily change 
as we embark upon this process. Even if we know the domain that the prospective 
passionate attachment will be in, we may well not know precisely which passionate 
attachment we will end up with. Take the example of romantic love. Embarking on 
cultivating a love relationship with someone begins from an open domain of possible 
options (although there may be certain constraints – the gender, age, or character traits of 
the person, for instance). It is part of the process that one cannot know in advance precisely 
who the person one falls in love with will be, and in fact not having an overly specific idea 
is often taken to be important. There is taken to be something questionable about a suitor 
who exclusively seeks a mate in terms of certain characteristics (height, weight, ethnicity, 
et cetera.), and this person is reasonably thought to be missing something vital. Similarly, 
we could imagine a situation where the painter Gauguin embarked upon a voyage to Tahiti 
with every intention of engaging in a creative activity, but in the end decided on sculpture 
instead of painting. In this case he intentionally cultivated his passionate attachments in 
the domain of creative work, despite ending up by using a chisel instead of a paintbrush. 
 
5.1.4   Iteration  
 
I now move to the penultimate criterion for cultivating our passionate attachments, one 
that eliminates all the various Gauguins I countenanced above. Cultivating our passionate 
attachments relies upon an iterated process in the sense that it is caused by a repeated 
practice or activity that leads to the eventual uptake of the passionate attachment 
concerned. Again the horticultural analogy of self-cultivation can guide us here. Just as a 
farmer tends her crops by watering them daily, regularly fertilising or pruning them, so 
too passionate self-cultivation is the result of an iterative process in which one regularly 
attends to, monitors, and evaluates one’s passionate attachments in an ongoing process. 
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Our passionate attachments may change in such a process – just as they can change 
unintentionally, for instance – but for them to change in a cultivated way requires that such 
a change was caused iteratively.     
We also have reason to think that the cultivation of our passionate character is an 
iterative process in which one repeats a practice or activity for the reasons I explored in 
Ch. 2. Here I showed that two reasons we are highly motivated to cultivate our passionate 
attachments in a self-directed sense is because they are in constant development, either 
changing to the extent that they are appropriate as we pass through life stages (2.3.2), or 
breaking down (therefore needing renewal) due to their inherent fragility (2.3.5). I also 
noted that it is often because we do not have up-to-date or realistic knowledge of our 
passionate attachments that we encounter psychological problems, ones which may well 
need remedial therapeutic work (2.3.1). In the transition from adolescence to adulthood, 
for example, we need to bear in mind that many of our passionate attachments will change, 
especially because they are integral to our practical identities. Because our passionate 
attachments govern how we understand ourselves and others, and because they are 
centrally involved in resolving the question of ‘how one should live’, means that when 
they are not aligned with how we conduct ourselves they have an impact on whether we 
flourish or not. This means that it is fundamentally important that our passionate 
attachments are regularly cultivated, and practical methods that can be employed to do 
this will improve our ability to flourish. We do not resolve the Socratic question once and 
once only. Rather, we do best by organising our lives in a way that facilitates the regular 
appraisal of our passionate attachments. We flourish most, then, when our passionate 
attachments undergo a continual process of ongoing evaluation, so that the considerations 
they generate can play a suitable role in our conduct, one which reflects how important 
these kinds of considerations are to our life as a whole.  
Finally, it is worth noting that an iterative process of cultivation is different from a 
protracted one. Gauguin’s resolution to travel to Tahiti would not count as cultivating his 
passionate attachments if it were a merely protracted process. For example, if Gauguin 
merely brooded about leaving his wife over a long period of time, this could not count as 
cultivating his passionate attachments because the very idea of cultivation requires that 
the cultivator repeatedly engage in the process. Although Gauguin’s voyage resulted in a 
discernible change in his passionate character (from his wife and children to his life as an 
artist), it was self-directed and intentional. In the absence of an iterated process concerning 
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his visit, it would perhaps be better described as a simple ‘major life decision’ in the way 
Wolf outlines.111  
Supporting what I said in 5.1.2 regarding self-direction, passive changes in a 
person’s passionate character that are not due to an iterative process cannot count as an 
example of cultivating our passionate attachments. Often our passionate character is 
altered by single events with no iterative dimension. A traumatic accident that shook up a 
person’s world view in a way that caused them to change their passionate attachments 
would fall outside the criteria I have already laid out above – notably ‘self-direction’ and 
‘intention’. Nevertheless, we can imagine a change in a person’s passionate character that 
was both self-directed and intentional, but still would not count as cultivating their 
passionate attachments because it was not the result of an iterative process. Aldous 
Huxley’s description of ‘soma’ in Brave New World is an example of this. Soma is a drug 
that citizens take to make them passively accept the nauseating features of their society, 
but changing one’s passionate attachments in such a manner would not be an example of 
cultivating one’s passionate character because it would miss the essential component of 
iterability, even if this is done in a self-directed and intentional way.112 
 
5.1.5   Socrates’ Question 
 
Finally, cultivating one’s passionate attachments must have what we could term 
‘existential bite’, that is it must affect how one resolves the question of ‘how one should 
live’. In Ch. 1 I followed Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf in arguing that passionate 
attachments have a powerful bearing on the Socratic question, and I supported this 
contention with the features I outlined in 1.5. Here I distinguished passionate attachments 
from less deep-seated desires on the basis of the ‘magnitude and complexity’ (1.5.1), 
‘exclusivity’ (1.5.2), and ‘sociality’ (1.5.3). Moreover, when discussing toxic and 
inappropriate passionate attachments in 1.5.4, I proposed that some passionate 
attachments should be regarded as suboptimal precisely because they will interfere with 
other considerations that feature in our resolution to the Socratic question. All these 
                                               
111 Of course, this is not to say that Gauguin would have to follow the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation. Far from it. Gauguin could still be said to cultivate his passionate attachments if he did 
so within another tradition of self-shaping that included cultivating passionate attachments. He may 
be a Buddhist, for example.  
112 Interestingly, when describing how soma differs from mescal, Huxley tells us that whereas the 
latter merely improves mood temporarily by making us feel more favourably disposed towards our 
current life, the former makes us identify with it in a deeper and more permanent sense.  
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considerations suggest that passionate attachments cannot be pursued lightly, and 
cultivating them will profoundly affect our practical lives. These weighty requirements for 
an entity counting as a passionate attachment explain why cultivating one’s passionate 
character is different from the activity of a dilettante who flits between passionate 
attachments. Even though the life of a dilettante resembles a person cultivating their 
passionate attachments, this person cannot be said to be cultivating the passionate 
dimension of their character because they do not engage with the attachment concerned 
with the requisite exclusivity (1.5.2).  
We can understand why this is the case by considering how the other ways we can 
cultivate our character share similarities with how we cultivate our passionate 
attachments. For example, we would want to resist saying that a person has cultivated their 
moral character if doing this did not result in a concrete change in how they resolved the 
question of ‘how one should live’. Someone who underwent a process of cultivating the 
virtue of honesty in themselves could only say they had done so successfully if they resist 
subsequent opportunities to lie or cheat. In a similar way, we can conclude that we have 
cultivated our passionate character, while actually deceiving ourselves, resulting in a 
previously discarded passionate attachment resurfacing. Take, for instance, a person who 
upon returning from an intensive retreat in which they had attempted to extirpate an 
unhealthy passionate attachment to a lover. Instead of embarking on a road trip with 
Dolores Haze, for example, Prof. Humbert might have checked himself into a treatment 
centre for the purpose of ridding himself of his infatuation with the girl. Nevertheless, the 
professor could only legitimately claim to have cultivated his passionate character if his 
practical reasoning was no longer moved by considerations to pursue Lolita once the 
treatment was over and he returned home.   
It would not be cultivating one’s passionate attachments if a person’s passionate 
character changed (5.1.1), as a result of a self-directed (5.1.2), intentional (5.1.3), and 
protracted (5.1.4) process with no change in their resolution to the question of ‘how one 
should live’. This does not mean that a person’s passionate attachments have to change in 
an obvious or externally manifest sense, because there are times when a process of 
cultivating one’s passionate attachments results in a person positively re-endorsing their 
current passionate attachments, and the role they play in their resolution to the Socratic 
question. Although in 5.1.1 I argued that a change in a person’s passionate character is 
necessary in order for us to say that the person has cultivated their passionate attachments, 
there will be times when a process of self-cultivation causes a person to positively 
reappraise their current passionate attachments, causing them to re-affirm or re-endorse 
them. Given that the phenomenology of loving the same things after a process of 
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passionate self-cultivation could well be strikingly different than before this process was 
embarked upon, in such a case we can say that this process still had ‘existential bite’.  
From this we can conclude that the cultivation of our passionate attachments must 
have a discernible impact on our resolution of the Socratic question. We can envision a 
person meeting all the other criteria (5.1.1–5.1.4) without this having a concrete bearing 
upon their life, and in this case we would have to deny that this counted as cultivating 
their passionate attachments. While their passionate character may have changed as the 
result of a self-directed, intentional, and protracted process, unless this changes how they 
live their life, we cannot say that they cultivated their passionate attachments. Even if one’s 
passionate character changes, it often takes courage to live in a way that expresses this 
change existentially because there can be other considerations that strongly tell against it. 
We could imagine a case where fear of professional recrimination or public shame kept a 
potential Gauguin from pursuing his artistic dreams. Even if Gauguin met all the other 
criteria for cultivating his passionate attachments, if he did not act on his love of a painting 
practice in Tahiti, we would be forced to deny that he cultivated his passionate 
attachments. In this case, despite his process of self-cultivation being self-directed, 
intentional, and – after practising the Hellenistic exercises – iterative, we would have to 
say that, although he got close, he failed to cultivate his passionate attachments in the 
fullest sense of the term.    
 
5.2   How Can We Cultivate Our Passionate Attachments? 
 
Now I have explained what counts as cultivating our passionate attachments, I am ready 
to discuss how this process operates, in preparation for showing how each of the Hellenistic 
exercises that Foucault and Hadot discuss can practically contribute to cultivating our 
passionate character in Ch. 6. Taken together, the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation 
constitute a specific method through which the self can be cultivated, one that follows the 
general theoretical principles of self-cultivation I outline here. Although these theoretical 
principles are not intended to be exhaustive, they apply to any practical method of 
passionate self-cultivation, indicated by how versions of these exercises appear the various 
methods of passionate self-cultivation that appear in other traditions. For example, a 
psychotherapist might propose that cultivating our passionate attachments requires 
transference; a Buddhist may claim it involves practices of renunciation; whereas a self-
help teacher may emphasise the merits of their specific method. While each of these 
practical methods of passionate self-cultivation involve very different practices, they are 
governed by the theoretical principles that govern how any specific method of passionate 
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self-cultivation operates. In contrast to understanding how any of these various practical 
methods function, a theoretical account of cultivating our passionate attachments involves 
showing what these governing principles and processes are, that is, articulating the 
theoretical principles that underlie any particular method of cultivating our passionate 
attachments. 
 As well as debating which specific methods were most efficacious for cultivating 
the self, in the ancient world the general principles of self-cultivation were discussed in 
terms of the technē of self-directed character change. As O’Leary notes, ‘[t]echnē [was 
regarded as] a skill or a craft that can be applied in any field’, for example in the ‘training 
of horses, the framing of laws, […] the sculpting of statues’ (2002: 4; cf. Nussbaum 2009 
[1994]: 5, 14). In addition to these practical activities, the term ‘technē’ was analogously 
applied to the ‘arts of the self, the techniques of existence (technē tou biou)’, since self-
cultivation was also ‘conceptualized as [an] instance of form-giving.’ (2002: 2; for a more 
detailed definition see Sellars 2009 [2003]: 42–5). A theory of the cultivation of our 
passionate attachments must do this too, albeit restricting itself to offering a technē of how 
we cultivate our passionate character specifically. As I showed in 2.2, the cultivation of our 
moral or prudential character each have their own distinct technē, ones which have already 
been subject to much literature, as have other related projects in self-directed character 
development such as extirpating pathē.  
Of course, other theories of character development often discuss ways we can 
cultivate our passionate attachments too. As noted in the General Introduction, Murdoch 
intends her discussion of M and D to improve our understanding of how important our 
perceptual faculties are in the self-directed cultivation of moral goodness, despite the fact 
that her example also describes the self-directed cultivation of M’s passionate character. 
Similarly, I have noted that the practical methods of self-cultivation advocated by self-help 
teachers, psychoanalysts, and various religions would be badly described as exclusively 
pertaining to our moral character. Rather these practical methods aim to improve the 
adherent’s passionate character – directing them to more worthwhile objects to love – in 
addition to reforming their moral one. A technē of cultivating our passionate attachments 
is concerned with how any practical method must operate, then, rather than detailing the 
particular features of one account or another. In sum, in offering a technē of cultivating our 
passionate attachments I do not debate the potential merits of any particular method, but 
rather lay out general principles according to which any practical method of cultivating 
the passionate attachments must operate, despite apparent diversity. Indeed, this is what 
makes this technē a contribution to practical philosophy. Before elaborating a practical 
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method that can cultivate our passionate character, first I will outline the key underlying 
processes that explain how cultivating our passionate attachments works.  
 
Passionate self-cultivation is governed by the following processes: 
 
(i) Our passionate character is cultivated incrementally.  
(ii) Our passionate character is cultivated regularly. 
(iii) Our passionate character is cultivated by reconciling fundamental considerations.  
(iv) Our passionate character is cultivated by hierarchising fundamental considerations. 
(v) Our passionate character is cultivated by subtracting extraneous considerations. 
 
In contrast to the five necessary (and collectively sufficient) criteria that allow us to identify 
what counts as cultivating our passionate attachments, outlined in 5.1, the processes that 
govern passionate self-cultivation outlined here do not aim to be sufficient. They simply 
outline a selection of the most important ways that passionate self-cultivation operates.  
 
5.2.1   Incrementality  
 
The cultivation of our passionate attachments operates according to an incremental process 
connected to the iterative nature of passionate self-cultivation that I discussed in 5.1.4. Here 
I argued that passionate self-cultivation cannot take place through the ingestion of a pill to 
change one’s passionate attachments or by hypnotising oneself to do this. Understanding 
the incremental process of cultivating our passionate attachments helps elucidate why 
cultivating our passionate character operates incrementally. In Ch. 1, I followed Frankfurt, 
Williams, and Wolf in arguing that our passionate attachments profoundly affect our 
resolution to Socrates’ question, so changes to our passionate character will strongly affect 
how we lead our lives, leading me to note that this is even a necessary criterion for a self-
directed process to count as cultivating our passionate attachment in 5.1.5. The change in 
Gauguin’s passionate attachments from Parisian family life to a painting practice in Tahiti, 
unseated his moral commitment to his family and motivated him to undertake a 
prudentially risky journey, changes that resulted in him endorsing a very different 
resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. Explaining how we can make such 
changes in our passionate character is prima facie difficult because they involve deep-seated 
changes in our conduct. Given that our passionate attachments are so decisive in how we 
resolve the Socratic question, therefore, we would be right to think that changing them in 
a self-directed way is difficult. Understanding how passionate self-cultivation operates 
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incrementally shows how, although challenging, we can produce such deep-seated 
changes in ourselves.  
The incremental nature of passionate self-cultivation can be illustrated if we view 
changes in our passionate character in retrospect. Understanding how we have come to 
have the passionate attachments we currently have is often inexplicable without a story of 
the intermediate passionate attachments that we have passed through to arrive at the ones 
we now have. The choice of our passionate attachments later in life can often only be 
explained with knowledge of the ones that preceded them. Charting the chronological 
trajectory of our passionate attachments can show that they share a continuous causal 
history that, once recalled, can explain our current passionate attachments. For example, a 
person may only be able to explain their current love of horse riding with reference to their 
childhood love of other pets, which led to their love of nature, which led to their love of a 
country house, which led to their love of horses, which finally led to their love of riding 
these animals. In this case, their current passionate attachments can only be explained by 
those that proceeded them.  
 Frankfurt’s denial that we cannot determine what we care about in manner of a 
‘sovereign author’ could be viewed as expressing the complexity of explaining how we can 
cultivate something so important to our practical lives as our passionate attachments (1999 
[1991]: 101). This led me to compare how early readings of Nietzsche also tended to 
overemphasise our volition in seismic character change.113 On Frankfurt’s view, regarding 
ourselves to actively choose our passionate attachments in this way would be to seriously 
overestimate the power of our volition in this regard. But whereas Frankfurt concludes 
that our passionate character cannot be cultivated, there is a way that we can make room 
for it, one which becomes clear once we understand the incremental nature of self-
cultivation. While it is difficult to see how we can change something as deeply embedded 
as our passionate character through the power of mere choice alone, it becomes more 
understandable if we think of the process as comprising many incremental and 
intermediate steps. So if self-directed change of our passionate character is possible at all, 
we should not be surprised that it occurs incrementally. It is easier to explain how we can 
make small incremental changes to our passionate attachments than large ones, and if such 
small changes were combined into a regular process (as I explore in the next section) we 
could envisage changes in our passionate character to occur in a ratchet-like process. This 
                                               
113 Contra the ‘sovereign author’ hypothesis, elsewhere I argue that Nietzsche constantly emphasises 
practices and virtues of self-cultivation in order to effect deep-seated character change. See Dennis 
2018: 1–18.  
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would mean that we can make large-scale changes to our passionate character in a 
cumulative process of making many small ones. 
Take, for example, a bereaved person desperately wishing to find a new passionate 
attachment to replace the one they have lost. In this case, it is hard to understand how this 
person could do this by simply choosing to love something without falling foul of 
Frankfurt’s criticism that we cannot understand our choice of passionate attachments like 
the choice of ‘sovereign author’. Understanding this process as an incremental one, 
however, makes the idea of taking on a new passionate attachment more plausible. 
Returning to Murdoch’s example of how M cultivates her love for D, we can see that 
Murdoch envisages this process to be ratchet-like as it is both gradual and cumulative. 
Murdoch describes how M manages to reframe her perception of D through a painstaking 
process of incrementally reinterpreting D’s behaviour; she does not claim that M could 
come to love D through a sheer act of will. Understanding the importance of incrementality 
in the cultivation of our passionate attachments sheds light on this. For our passionate 
character to change from X to Z, it will need to pass through Y. First, we may imagine, M 
focuses on those aspects of D that she does like, her free-spiritedness, for example. Then 
upon closer inspection, M sees that this is closely tied to other aspects of D’s character, 
which she starts reinterpreting in a positive light too.  
By understanding passionate self-cultivation as an incremental process, we can see 
how M can do the seemingly impossible: she can change her passionate character so that 
she ends up loving the very character traits for which she previously felt antipathy. Because 
passionate self-cultivation takes place incrementally, it is possible to explain the radical 
transformation of our passionate character, and we can even say that the more radical such 
a process is the more intermediate stages a person will have to pass though. We can only 
move incrementally, edging ourselves towards whatever it is we wish to take up as a 
passionate attachment.    
 
5.2.2   Regularity  
 
In 5.1.4 I argued that iteration is a necessary condition for passionate self-cultivation in a 
way that distinguishes cultivating our passionate attachments from merely making a major 
life decision regarding them. This means that a spontaneous decision to pursue a certain 
passionate attachment cannot count as cultivating a person’s passionate character. 
Relatedly, in the previous section, I emphasised that cultivating our passionate 
attachments works via an incremental process in which one cultivates a passionate 
attachment bit by bit, allowing us to come to love entities to which we were previously 
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indifferent to or even hostile. So how does regularity help explain how the process of 
passionate self-cultivation operates? How can regularly repeating an exercise of self-
cultivation allow us to change our passionate attachments?     
Regularity is closely connected to such incrementality. Because cultivating our 
passionate attachments works through the incremental incorporation of love objects, such 
a process requires that we diachronically persist in cultivating our passionate attachments 
in a process that necessarily exhibits regularity. We saw this emphasis on regularity in the 
accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation offered by Foucault and Hadot, which I examined 
in Ch. 3. There we saw that Hadot emphasises that in the Hellenistic world the ‘spiritual 
exercises […] must be taken up again and again, in an ever-renewed effort’ in order to be 
successful (1995 [1987]: 103). Similarly, Foucault suggests that his pratiques de soi should be 
engaged with on a routine basis, emphasising this in his account of both the meletē thanatou 
and praemeditatio malorum. Regularly envisioning one’s death or the worst possible 
outcome of one’s life allows us to shield ourselves from wayward emotions once these 
events eventually occur. Both thinkers emphasise that the exercises are not only practised 
sporadically when one is required to make decisions concerning the Socratic question, but 
should be practised on a regular basis. The exercises are intended to be diurnal, not merely 
involved in resolving ‘how one should live’ when one is making a long-term decision, but 
also used to guide one when making every day practical decisions. 
While I have not argued that the Hellenists had an account of cultivating our 
passionate attachments, in 3.2.2 I discussed how Hadot claims that their exercises of self-
cultivation – his exercices spirituels – can be applied to other dimensions of character, 
especially to the moral dimension which currently occupies most literature on this topic. 
Just as the exercices spirituels are practised regularly when extirpating pathē, or in the 
cultivation of the moral dimension of our character, so too we should view the cultivation 
of our passionate attachments as operating according to the same process.  Cultivating our 
passionate attachments involves the regular re-evaluation of our passionate character, in 
both in the sense of (i) appraising them with respect to other practical considerations, and 
in the sense of (ii) evaluating our passionate attachments in terms of one another. From our 
discussion of the chronological development of our passionate character in 2.3.2, we can 
see why this is the case. We seek appropriate passionate attachments to our state of 
development, so we must constantly monitor and track them in order to ensure that our 
current conduct is aligned with their pursuit. In addition to this there is another reason 
why the cultivation of our passionate character must be an ongoing or regular activity. As 
we saw in 2.3.5, we must also monitor our passionate attachments because they are fragile, 
and we are continually vulnerable to their loss or demise. 
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5.2.3   Hierarchisation    
 
Viewing character as composed of three dimensions aims to schematise those parts of our 
practical reasoning that are essential in resolving the Socratic question, but it also 
elucidates (and dramatises) cases of practical conflict, such as Gauguin’s, as well as 
allowing me to single out considerations generated by our passionate attachments 
specifically. Furthermore, schematising practical reason in this way also allows us to see 
how the process of hierachising our passionate attachments is important in their cultivation. 
We can hierarchise our passionate attachments in two ways, both of which track the two 
global ways of cultivating our passionate attachments that I outlined in the Introduction 
to Pt. III. Here I argued that we can either cultivate our passionate attachments in the sense 
of (i) cultivating them in terms of the other considerations that bear upon the Socratic 
question, or (ii) we can cultivate our passionate attachments in terms of other passionate 
attachments.  
Although it cannot count as cultivating our passionate attachments because it does 
not meet all the criteria outlined in 5.1, Frankfurt offers a powerful description of the first 
kind of self-cultivation when he describes a person making a ‘reasonable deliberation’ to 
the Socratic question, one that takes into account the various considerations that bear upon 
resolving it. He writes: 
 
In any reasonable deliberation about how […] to live, a person must 
assess and compare the values of those things that he regards as 
important to him. He must define the respective roles that are to be 
played in his life by feelings, by desires, by morality, by various 
personal commitments and ideals, and by whatever else he cares about. 
The most critical issue [a person] has to face, in deciding upon [his or 
her] final ends, is to determine the relative importance that [he or she] 
will accord to each of these. Answering the question of ‘how to live’ is 
tantamount, indeed, to making that determination. (1999 [1992]: 92) 
 
We might imagine Gauguin engaging in such a ‘reasonable deliberation’ before embarking 
on his voyage to Tahiti, insofar as he responds to the three primary dimensions of practical 
reasoning, which in Ch. 1 I argue are necessary in order to resolve the Socratic question. 
Gauguin’s case provokes our intuitions that it is sometimes legitimate to open ourselves to 
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a greater range of considerations, most importantly those pertaining to our passionate 
attachments, the considerations the painter eventually decides to prioritise.114 
In a similar manner, we can either: (i) hierarchise our passionate attachments with 
other kinds of practical considerations (moral or prudential ones), or (ii) we can hierarchise 
one passionate attachment over another. In the first sense, for example, we might imagine 
Gauguin weighing up the demands of his moral obligations towards his family and his 
desire to look out for his prudential well-being against his passionate attachment to travel 
to Tahiti. In the second sense – assuming his family is a rival passionate attachment – we 
might imagine him deciding whether he loves his family more than his painting or vice 
versa (We might think that this description of his case is plausible, because he is not only 
morally bound to materially provide for his family, but – one might hope – he also loves 
them, even if on reflection his passionate bond with his family turns out to be less strong 
than his desire to pursue his artistic development.) Tweaking the example in this way 
shows that Gauguin’s decision was one that did not only require that he resolve the 
Socratic question by responding to other considerations of practical reasoning, but also 
that he adjudicated between the various passionate attachments in his life. In this version 
of his dilemma, Gauguin weighed up the various passionate attachments in his life, 
ranking and ordering them, and eventually acted according to which passionate 
attachments were most important to him. Understanding which passionate attachments 
he prized most highly would be an integral part of the process.  
 
5.2.4   Reconciliation 
 
Throughout my discussion, I have emphasised the interlocking and composite nature of 
the considerations to which we respond. For example, certain passionate attachments – like 
one’s partner – come with clear moral obligations, along with – as those who are married 
often report – stringent prudential considerations, both of which enter into the question of 
‘how one should live’.  This means that considerations generated by the various 
dimensions of practical reason often pertain to the very same object, and require the same 
conduct. This is fortunate because it means reconciliation of one’s passionate attachments 
                                               
114 Fortunately the dilemmas of practical reason are not always as tragic as in Gauguin’s case, and we 
can often accommodate the various kinds of considerations that bear upon resolution of ‘how one 
should live’ without choosing between them so decisively. I have emphasised that the dimensions of 
practical reason are invariably muddled and intermingled. Although it has made conceptual sense 
to break practical reason into a tripartite system for the purposes of this study, this only aims to 
clarify the kinds of considerations that we should understand as bearing upon the Socratic question.  
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with other kinds of considerations is more easily achieved, as in responding to one 
consideration we indirectly meet the demands of another. We could imagine Gauguin 
initially striving to reconcile his passionate attachments with his moral commitments, for 
example, before realising that this was in fact impossible, and his circumstances required 
that he must choose one over the other.  
While Gauguin’s story is useful to show the strength and power of our passionate 
attachments, the circumstances that require that the painter choose to pursue his 
passionate attachments to the exclusion of all other practical considerations is clearly less 
than ideal. Of course, Williams’ schematised caricature of the painter’s plight is crafted 
precisely to precipitate the realisation that our passionate attachments are vitally 
important, as well as to convey his central point about how the success conditions of such 
an undertaking relate to whether the painter produces great work. On Williams’ reading, 
Gauguin fails to reconcile his practical considerations in a balanced manner in a way that 
testifies to the importance of his overriding passionate attachments – as they provide the 
horizon under which all his other activities are understandable. Under more propitious 
circumstances, however, we may hope to reconcile our passionate attachments with the 
other considerations that bear upon our practical reasoning in a way that allows us to 
harmoniously pursue them all in a joined-up way.  
In the original version of the tale, one that loosely fits our historical understanding 
of his situation, Gauguin is forced to choose between two options: either to stay with his 
wife and children, drastically curtailing his ability to work as an artist; or setting sail for 
Tahiti, fully embracing his painting practice, at the cost of permanently leaving his family 
in Paris. No compromise is possible. Gauguin is forced to choose. If he loves his family – 
that is, if they have the status of a passionate attachment – then he needs to choose between 
two loves: either his family or his painting practice. If he does not love his family, then he 
has to choose between his moral obligation to support his family and his love of painting. 
As I claim above, this is precisely the dramatic power of the example, but as many artists 
struggle to reconcile the demands of their family commitments with their passionate 
commitment to their creative work it seems to be possible to reconcile these competing 
demands satisfactorily, one which could well be aided though actively cultivating our 
passionate attachments. 
Due to the dramatic circumstances he found himself in, Gauguin could only 
cultivate his passionate character in the sense of hierarchising his passionate attachments, 
but under different circumstances we can imagine other ways that he could meet the 
demands of his dilemma. Fortunately our dilemmas in our practical lives are not always 
so clear-cut, and we sometimes have the possibility to reconcile the various considerations 
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that bear upon our resolution to the Socratic question. To reconcile his initial passionate 
attachments in Paris (family) with those future ones in Tahiti (art), we could imagine a 
situation in which Gauguin proposed emigrating with his family to Tahiti. While this 
would raise another set of practical questions – such as moral ones concerning the safety 
of his family – this would be an example of the painter integrating his passionate 
attachments through a concerted process of calibration. As with all real-world practical 
dilemmas, there could well be a trade-off, but it is the ill-fated circumstances of Gauguin’s 
case that led to such a striking practical dilemma.  
As Nussbaum notes in her book on practical conflict, often such problems are only 
produced by a lack of imagination in how we arrange our practical lives. To borrow 
Nussbaum’s own example, previous generations of women were often presented with a 
practical choice between motherhood or a career, choices that were often believed to be 
mutually exclusive.115 With the introduction of childcare, maternity cover, and the legal 
right to work part-time, however, such binary choices have been ameliorated. Indeed, we 
could imagine that Gauguin’s tragic choice might have been avoided had he travelled with 
his family to Tahiti, or mitigated if he could have regularly visited them, and so on.  
I first discussed our need to ‘integrate’ our passionate attachments in 2.3.4, when 
countenancing the reasons why we are motivated to cultivate our passionate character. 
Here we saw that we have reason to reject the scepticism of Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf 
regarding whether we can cultivate our passionate attachments, as we often do things to 
ensure that we can meet the future demands of our passionate attachments, either in the 
sense of prioritising how our passionate attachments determine our conduct over and 
above other considerations, or in the sense of making sure that our passionate attachments 





                                               
115 Nussbaum writes: ‘It was long thought that there must be a tragic conflict for a woman between 
career and family. Now we have called that complacent conclusion into question, by asking why the 
structure of careers should not be adjusted to reflect the facts of family life, and by asking that men 
share in child care. It was once thought that poor parents must face a tragic choice between educating 
their children and using them for child labour: the choice was thought tragic because child labour 
was thought to be necessary for the parents’ own survival. Now, although parents in many parts of 
the world still face such tragic choices, we know that this need not be: good political planning can 
make it possible for all citizens to be educated without anyone starving.’ (1986: xxxi) 
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5.2.5   Subtraction 
 
The previous two subsections have explored how cultivating our passionate attachments 
involves the processes of hierarchising (5.2.3) and reconciling (5.2.4) the considerations that 
bear upon the Socratic question. Similarly, cultivating our passionate attachments can 
involve subtraction, in which we strive to minimise the passionate attachments we have to 
be better able to meet their demands. In Ch. 1, I showed why the ‘magnitude and 
complexity’ (1.5.1) of passionate attachments indicates that pursuing them will be onerous, 
and that passionate attachments require us to engage with them with a requisite amount 
of ‘exclusivity’ (1.5.2). Having too many passionate attachments thwarts our ability to 
establish satisfying relations with them, which is why subtraction is an appropriate process 
through which we can cultivate them.  
The importance of the process of subtraction in self-cultivation in a general sense 
can be found in the work of those ancient thinkers who were involved in the reception and 
transmission of the idea of Hellenistic self-cultivation. In a passage cited by both Hadot 
and Foucault as emblematic of the processes of Hellenistic self-shaping, Plotinus tells us 
that:  
 
If you do not yet see your own beauty, do as the sculptor does with a 
statue which must become beautiful: he removes one part, scrapes 
another, makes one area smooth, and cleans the other, until he causes 
the beautiful face in the statue to appear. In the same way, you too must 
remove everything that is superfluous, straighten that which is crooked, 
and purify all that is dark until you make it brilliant. Never stop 
sculpting your own statue, until the divine splendour of virtue shines 
in you [...] If you have become this [...] and have nothing alien inside 
you mixed with yourself [...] when you see that you have become this 
[...] concentrate your gaze and see. For it is only an eye such as this that 
can look on the great Beauty. (Plotinus [Enneads]: 1.6.9) 
 
In a pointed reference to how the image appears in the Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of existence’, 
Hadot tells us that Plotinus’ image is ‘often misunderstood, since people imagine that this 
expression corresponds to a kind of moral aestheticism.’ On this interpretation, ‘its 
meaning would be to adopt a pose, to select an attitude, or to fabricate a personality for 
oneself.’ Nevertheless, for Hadot, it means ‘nothing of the sort’ because ‘[f]or the ancients, 
sculpture was an art which “took away,” as opposed to painting, an art which “added on.” 
The statue pre-existed in the marble block, and it was enough to take away what was 
superfluous in order to cause it to appear.’ (1995 [1987]: 102) 
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 Although Plotinus is discussing self-cultivation in general, not the cultivation of 
passionate attachments in particular, the image nonetheless functions as a good analogy 
for a vital process of passionate self-cultivation. I touched on one of the reasons why this 
is the case in 2.3.4, when discussing how we often strive to integrate our passionate 
attachments with one another, as well as the other considerations in our lives, because this 
ensures we can conduct ourselves in a way that satisfies multiple considerations. When 
Plotinus discusses the cultivation of character in the passage above, the emphasis – as 
Hadot points out – is squarely on the removal of the superfluous to reveal the essential, 
rather than ‘reconciling’ the various parts of the statue with one another. Moreover, as 
noted above, Gauguin’s dilemma is instructive – as well as so tragic – because the dramatic 
circumstances in which he found himself effectively ruled out the possibility of responding 
to moral and prudential considerations if he was to satisfy his passionate ones. Although 
he may well have wanted to reconcile his passionate attachments with other considerations 
bearing on ‘how one should live’, Gauguin was in a position where this was not possible, 
and because he chose to sacrifice his prudential and moral concerns for the sake of 
pursuing his passionate attachments shows how important his passionate attachment to 
his painting practice was to him. Unable to reconcile or hierarchise his attachments 
effectively, Gauguin was forced to choose to pursue those he valued the most, and this 
involved eliminating other weighty considerations that had previously informed his 
resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. This shows that as well as striving to 
reconcile our passionate attachments, both with one another and with competing 
influences on the Socratic question, we must strive to eliminate whatever considerations 
are incompatible with a single way of life.  
Furthermore, there may be a more substantive reason why passionate self-
cultivation should be thought of as a subtractive process, one which does not just apply to 
self-cultivation in general, but to the cultivation of our passionate attachments in 
particular. When indicating the most distinctive features of passionate attachments in 1.5, 
we saw that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf all emphasise how passionate attachments are 
typically all-encompassing, that they exceed a threshold magnitude and complexity, and 
that they act as the semantic horizon for a person’s life. Both the tenor and tone of all these 
descriptions (and the other requirements I added to their respective theories, such as 
‘magnitude and complexity’) suggest that our passionate attachments will be few and far 
between. Cultivating our passionate attachments can certainly sometimes be conceived as 
a process of reconciliation, but, given the magnitude of these kinds of considerations, any 
sense in which we cultivate them must take into account that practically it is often a 
question of selecting those passionate attachments most important to us and eliminating 
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the others. Wolf is right to be concerned that Williams’ language of ‘ground projects’ may 
be too project-orientated, since our passionate attachments are often found embedded in a 
context of personal relationships (when they are not personal relationships themselves). 
Nevertheless, we can think about the cultivation of our passionate attachments as 
concerned to make sure that those attachments we value most highly, or those that we 
identify with most deeply, are given highest priority in resolving the question of ‘how one 
should live’.  
In addition to this, the emphasis on the required parsimony and elimination in 
self-cultivation in the Hellenistic source material goes hand-in-hand with our account of 
the required economy of passionate attachments, for example in the Epicurean garden, 
which I examined in Ch. 3. Despite their general scepticism regarding passionate 
attachments, when Hellenistic philosophers countenance the idea that such attachments 
are an important part of the flourishing life, they do so with strong reservations, 
emphasising the gravity and grave dangers involved in such undertakings. Taking on 
passionate attachments – to use Nussbaum’s words – makes us ‘hostages to fortune’, so 
should only be engaged in with extreme care and attention (2009 [1994]: 370; cf. 366). In 
addition, the Hellenistic philosophers describe a world in which we are naturally 
immersed with attachments, pulled in this direction or that by the demands of many 
different kinds of love objects. The task, well illustrated by the coddled environments that 
the Epicureans created, was to remove extraneous attachments, rather than finding new or 
better things to which to become attached. Starting out by viewing human beings as 
typically having too many attachments – passionate or otherwise – to one in which we 
have a more honed and refined set of attachments is the primary purpose of the processes 
of self-cultivation that the schools promoted. When applied to the passionate attachments, 
the exercises themselves imply that we should be most concerned with refinement of our 
current attachments, rather than gaining more. Typically, they are aimed at testing, 
stressing, and interrogating our current passionate attachments, discerning those genuine 
attachments from false ones, even in the absence of a guarantee that the meletē thanatou, for 
example, will not precipitate the realisation that one has overlooked a passionate 








5.3   A Theory of Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments 
 
This chapter has offered a two-part theory of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments, one that includes (i) a definition of what counts as cultivating our passionate 
attachments, and (ii) an explanation of the processes constituting passionate self-
cultivation. From this we can distinguish cultivating our passionate attachments from 
other kinds of self-shaping, such as moral and prudential self-cultivation, both of which 
already come with a detailed philosophical literature, as outlined in 2.2. Defining what it is 
to cultivate our passionate attachments incorporates elements of the literature on these 
kinds of self-cultivation, and shows what is sui generis about this type of self-directed 
character change. For example, unlike the self-directed change of our moral or prudential 
characters, cultivating our passionate attachments involves developing our passionate 
character specifically. Describing the processes through which this kind of self-shaping 
proceeds also distinguishes cultivating the passionate dimension of our character from 
cultivating its moral or prudential dimensions. While there is overlap in the processes that 
govern these three kinds of self-shaping, I have also highlighted the processes applying to 
the cultivation of our passionate attachments specifically. My discussion of ‘subtraction’ in 
5.2.5 illustrates this. Here I connected my claim in 1.5.2, that our passionate attachments 
must have a certain ‘exclusive’ claim on our resolution to the Socratic question, with the 
process of ‘subtraction’. Passionate attachments are especially amenable to be cultivated in 
a process of subtraction since we cannot sustain many of them because they must play a 
weighty role in our resolution to the Socratic question in order to be passionate attachments 
in the first place. This shows how the processes that constitute the cultivation of our 
passionate character are informed by the very nature of our passionate attachments. It 
shows that, although we can learn from the processes that govern the cultivation of the 
other dimensions of our character, in order to understand how we cultivate our passionate 
attachments we must account for what is special about the passionate dimension of 
character.     
 In Ch. 1, I followed Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf in their insistence that we cannot 
understand fundamental aspects of the good life without understanding the importance of 
our passionate attachments. Resolving the question of ‘how one should live’ involves 
responding appropriately to the moral, prudential, and passionate considerations that bear 
upon our conduct. Not only is responding to passionate considerations required to resolve 
the Socratic question, but it is also a condition of resolving it satisfactorily, that is, it is a 
condition for our flourishing. A flourishing life is one that is experienced as meaningful, 
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and as passionate attachments are an important source of meaningfulness, they are an 







































Practices of Passionate Self-Cultivation  
for Contemporary Life 
 
Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover a positive self or the 
positive foundation of the self. Maybe our problem is now to discover 
that the self is nothing else than a historical correlation of the technology 
built into our history. Maybe the problem is to change those 
technologies. And in this case, one of the main political problems would 
be nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves. 
 
     Foucault 1997 [1982a]: 222–3 
 
6.0   Overview 
 
This chapter returns to the Francophone interpretation of the Hellenistic exercises of self-
cultivation, and explores how the exercises explicated by Foucault and Hadot offer a 
sophisticated method that can be applied to the cultivation of our passionate attachments. 
In 6.1 I argue that this fulfils the respective promises that both Foucault and Hadot make 
regarding the importance of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation for our own era, 
albeit not in a way that they would have anticipated. Nevertheless, since my project does 
not aim to reconstruct their views on the contemporary relevance of Hellenism, the 
primary concern of this chapter is to show how each of Foucault’s Pratiques de Soi and 
Hadot’s Exercices Spirituels can be used to facilitate the cultivation of our passionate 
character. To do this, I discuss each of Foucault’s exercises in 6.2, discussing those that 
Hadot elaborates in 6.3. As I note in 6.4, although these exercises only offer one of many 
possible methods of cultivating our passionate character, it is significant that many of the 
exercises which Foucault and Hadot discuss in the context of the wholesale cultivation of 







6.1   Fulfilling the Promise of Francophone Interpretations of Hellenism 
 
In the Introduction to Pt. II, I surveyed some of Foucault’s and Hadot’s auspicious claims 
about the value of the Hellenistic account of self-cultivation for practical philosophy and 
contemporary ways of living. Here I discussed Foucault’s declaration that the Hellenists 
harbour a ‘treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, procedures that, [although] cannot 
exactly be reactivated, at least constitute […] a certain point of view which can be very 
useful as a tool for analysing what’s going on now – and to change it’ (1997b [1983]: 261), 
comparing this with Hadot’s contention that Hellenistic self-cultivation ‘could still be 
reactualised [since] these models correspond to permanent, fundamental attitudes which 
all human beings find necessary when they set about seeking wisdom’ (2002 [1995]: 277–
8).  
 For Hadot, just as the exercises were commonly transposed from one Hellenistic 
school to another in order to justify this or that doctrinal position, so too we can employ 
the exercises whether we endorse these doctrines or employ them for our own purposes. 
In 4.3.2, I showed that, on Hadot’s account, both the Epicureans and the Stoics advocated 
attending to the present moment, despite offering opposing reasons for doing so. I also 
argued that Hadot does not view such ‘transferability’ as being confined to the Hellenistic 
era: he claims to find traces of the injunction to focus on the present moment in ‘Nietzsche’, 
‘Hegel’, ‘Hölderlin’, and ‘Heidegger’ (1995 [1987]: 221). Most radically, however, as I 
explored in 3.2.3, Hadot claims that the exercises have contemporary relevance, repeatedly 
citing the writings of Georges Friedmann, and telling us that these exercises are ‘still alive 
in contemporary consciousness’ (1995 [1987]: 81–2). Despite these claims, Hadot’s own 
view on how the Hellenistic exercises have contemporary relevance has three main 
components, each of which, he argues, has an important precedent in ancient philosophy. 
I present them here in order of increasing importance. First, like the Hellenists, he views 
them as practical tools for combating pathē. Second, also like the Hellenists, he views them 
as facilitating the connection between our own individuality and that of the cosmos. Third, 
like all ancient philosophers from Socrates onwards, he views them as an example of how 
philosophy used to be a ‘way of life’, for which a renaissance of Hellenism is necessary to 
reconnect us with these ‘permanent, fundamental attitudes’ that allow us to acquire 
philosophical wisdom (2002 [1995]: 278). Although a theory of cultivating our passionate 
attachments fits with Hadot’s claim that the Hellenistic exercises have the potential to 
benefit our practical lives, it does so in a way that does not meet these three specifications.     
Foucault moves beyond this position in important ways. In the quotation used as 
the epitaph to this chapter, he reiterates his claim about the contemporary relevance of 
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Hellenism. Here he tells us that revaluing the Hellenistic account of self-cultivation is 
important because it provides a practical account of how we can change the technologies 
by which we are surrounded. By changing these technologies, so his claim goes, we not 
only have the power to affect our practical lives, but we can even change how we arrange 
ourselves collectively, either in a social or political sense. What precisely Foucault had in 
mind by these claims – especially his tantalising claim on how self-cultivation relates to 
politics – is beyond the scope of this thesis, and reconstructions have already been the 
subject of many excellent studies (Elden 2016, McGushin 2007, O’Leary 2002).116 
Nevertheless, it shows that Foucault thinks that we must go beyond how they were 
employed historically if we are to see how these exercises can contribute to contemporary 
life. Not only should we recognise a certain ‘transferability’ of the exercises – one that 
allows them to instil the various agendas of the schools à la Hadot – but, on Foucault’s 
view, their potential use extends beyond extirpating pathē. While Foucault did not have the 
project of cultivating the passionate attachments in mind, showing how the Hellenistic 
exercises provide the conceptual resources to explain how we can do this at least makes 
good on his claim that they can be usefully redeployed in contemporary life. 
From this we can see that, although neither Foucault or Hadot propose that a 
theory of cultivating our passionate attachments can be underwritten by the conceptual 
resources of Hellenism, we can still make good on their claims that Hellenistic philosophy 
holds the resources to answer contemporary philosophical problems – in fact, the value of 
giving a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments should spur us on 
towards this goal for the reasons I gave in Ch. 2. Furthermore, in Ch. 5 I argued how 
Hellenistic discussion of self-directed character change can help us think about the 
processes through which we cultivate our passionate attachments, such as the Hellenistic 
emphasis on ‘subtraction’, discussed in 5.2.5. Additionally, this chapter outlines how each 
of the Hellenistic exercises that Foucault and Hadot discuss could be enlisted in a process 
of cultivating our passionate attachments specifically. To do this, I devote a subsection to 
each of the exercises, showing how each of them could be said to practically contribute to 
the cultivation of our passionate attachments. If I can show how the exercises of self-
cultivation which appear so prominently in the Francophone tradition can be enlisted into 
a practical method of cultivating our passionate attachments, then I can show how 
exercises which were originally designed to combat and inhibit pathē can be applied to 
solve a contemporary problem in practical life.  
                                               
116 Of these works, Elden’s recent text, Foucault’s Last Decade, gives the most comprehensive work to 
date on this theme, one which offers a painstakingly reconstruction of Foucault’s position, based on 
his lecture notes, incomplete manuscripts, and interviews (2016: 134–63).  
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6.2   Enlisting Foucault’s Pratiques de Soi 
 
In 4.2 I examined Foucault’s pratiques de soi, focusing on his account of those exercises that 
Nussbaum suggests are incompatible with the Hellenistic emphasis on the philosophical 
component of self-cultivation. Here I showed that Foucault’s pratiques consisted in various 
mental [meletē] and physical [gymnasia] exercises, the latter of which are perhaps less useful 
for an account of cultivating our passionate attachments. As Nussbaum points out in her 
critique of Foucault for including non-philosophical modes of Hellenistic self-shaping, his 
interest in gymnasia – Hippocrates’ regimens from the Epidemics, or Athenaeus’ quasi-
medical remedies – closely connects self-cultivation to our prudential well-being. Foucault 
saw this practical side as extremely important. As he tells us ‘[n]o technique, no 
professional skill can be acquired without exercise; nor can the art of living, the technē tou 
biou, be learned without an askēsis that should be understood as a training of the self by 
oneself.’ (1997a [1983]: 208). Nevertheless, as we saw in 4.2.3, Foucault not only discusses 
gymnasia; his pratiques de soi also include mental exercises, and it is these exercises that I 
argue have most potential to be enlisted in the project of cultivating our passionate 
character. Again, although doing this was neither Foucault’s nor the Hellenistic purpose 
in using these exercises, we can recall they were explicitly aimed at bringing our practical 
lives into line with the demands of the Socratic question. Given the value of our passionate 
attachments for the flourishing life (Ch. 1), and the value of cultivating the passionate 
dimension of our character to bring us to a greater measure of flourishing (Ch. 2), it is 
reasonable to think that redeploying the Hellenistic exercises in the project of cultivating 
our passionate attachments has much to contribute to resolving the question of ‘how one 
should live’ itself.    
 
6.2.1   ‘Controlling Our Representations’ 
 
The exercise of controlling our representations occupies a central place in Foucault’s 
account of Hellenistic self-cultivation (1997b [1982]: 105). Perhaps this is unsurprising 
given that, on the Hellenistic view, our desires are labile, inconsistent, and readily hijacked 
by forces outside of our control. Such a model of desire implies that we must strictly 
monitor the representations of desirous entities, otherwise they will implant themselves in 
us, actively developing according to their own agenda, leaving us with no opportunity to 
reflectively endorse them in our resolution to the Socratic question. While we need not 
follow the Hellenistic proposal that pathē are the cause of our ills, I have shown in Ch. 2 
that our passionate attachments make us vulnerable because we identify with them, so we 
 170 
are affected by their fortunes, their interests, and their fate. I also emphasised this in Ch. 3 
when discussing Nussbaum’s account of how the Stoics regarded loving – even in its 
highest forms – as a risky business, in part because pathē are most keenly generated by the 
representations of entities we feel strongly about. Taking this picture seriously gives us 
good reason to think that actively controlling our representations could play an important 
role in the cultivation of our passionate attachments.  
Fortunately, as I showed in 4.2.3, Hellenistic philosophers such as Epictetus and 
Seneca developed a method for dealing with the representations of potentially alluring 
attachments that can lead us astray. These need not be potentially new and enticing 
passionate attachments, of course, but could be entities that generate other kinds of 
considerations, notably prudential ones geared towards pleasure or well-being. I first 
examined the heterogeneous nature of prudential desires when discussing Kant’s account 
of self-cultivation in 2.2.1. There I showed that Kant claims that a philosophical theory of 
cultivating our inclinations is unnecessary because, for him, such prudential desires are 
more than capable of looking after themselves. Considerations generated by a prudential 
concern for our own well-being, for Kant, are what need to be combated in order to give 
moral self-cultivation a foothold, so we do not need a philosophical theory of how we can 
actively cultivate them, nor practical guidance on how to do this. In fact, I argued that Kant 
laments how moral considerations are typically weak, despite their overwhelming 
importance on his view, so need to be bolstered whenever possible. (When Wolf points out 
the danger of a moral saint we can say that she is notably more optimistic than Kant about 
the propensity of people to become dominated by moral considerations.)  
Taking the Hellenistic picture of the lability of our desires, along with Kant’s view 
about the propensity of our desirous nature to become dominated by prudential 
considerations pertaining to our own well-being, underlines the importance of the exercise 
of controlling our representations in cultivating our passionate attachments. If flourishing 
involves resolving the Socratic question in a way that is responsive to each of the three 
fundamental dimensions of practical reasoning (moral, prudential, passionate), then we 
should pay close attention to representations of attachments that generate considerations 
in each of these realms. Following Kant, we can say that exposing oneself to 
representations of alluring prudential attachments is especially dangerous, since 
representations of prudentially attractive things are likely to have an inordinately 
powerful effect on how we resolve the Socratic question. Not only can these things override 
pertinent moral considerations, but they can also override more fragile passionate ones 
because – as shown in Pt. I – passionate attachments are difficult to acquire, risk potential 
injury, and can rarely be guaranteed. If we are to cultivate our passionate attachments in 
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the sense of actively hierarchising them against other considerations, we should remain 
wary that our representations of these things may be susceptible to fading against 
potentially more alluring prudential ones. From Pt. I onwards, I have argued for a 
conception of flourishing in which we are responsive to considerations from all three 
dimensions of practical reasoning (moral, prudential, passionate), so it is vitally important 
that one kind of consideration is not allowed to dominate.       
As well as competing with representations of moral and prudential considerations, 
controlling our representations has another potential role in the cultivation of our 
passionate attachments, one which relates to how passionate attachments are cultivated 
with one another. I have discussed the importance of cultivating the various kinds of 
considerations that bear on the Socratic question with one another in the Introduction to 
Pt. III, so it will be useful to see how the controlling of our representations could fulfil this 
role. When discussing how our passionate attachments can be cultivated in 5.2, I proposed 
that ‘reconciling’, ‘hierarchising’, and ‘subtracting’ our passionate attachments should be 
viewed as fundamental modes of cultivating them. Due to the magnitude and complexity 
of passionate attachments (1.5.1), they require a certain ‘exclusivity’ over our attention 
(1.5.2), which led to my argument in 5.2 that it is important to hierarchise our passionate 
attachments, and to regularly be on the lookout for ways to eliminate ones that are less 
cherished or are – or have become – toxic (1.5.4). All these aspects of our investigation so 
far should cause us to ask how the control of our representations could be used to cultivate 
our passionate attachments in the sense of integrating them with one another. How can we 
do this? 
Following the horticultural metaphor of ‘cultivation’, in 5.2.3 I discussed how we 
cultivate our passionate attachments in a process of ‘incrementality’, one which involves 
cultivating a relationship with a loved entity bit by bit. This can take place negatively or 
positively. We saw an example of a negative process above, when I described how we can 
cultivate ourselves by weakening or attenuating other potential considerations (moral or 
prudential ones, say), although this process can also apply to the attenuation of passionate 
attachments themselves. It is at least plausible to think that we can hierarchise or subtract 
inappropriate passionate attachments from our resolution to the question of ‘how one 
should live’ by filtering our images of these things. Thinking back to Prof. Humbert’s 
pursuit of Dolores Haze in 1.5.4, there is a strong sense in the book that the protagonist is 
blameworthy, not just because of his desire, but also because of how he has actively 
cultivated it. Nabokov overtly describes Prof. Humbert as feeding his passionate 
attachment to Dolores by viewing images of similar looking girls. If Humbert was 
concerned to attenuate his passionate attachment to Dolores, he could have resolutely 
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avoided images that fed this desire, which may have caused his passionate attachment to 
her to diminish.  
In contrast to how such an abstemious Prof. Humbert could have mitigated his 
passionate attachment to Dolores by controlling his representations, we encountered an 
example of a person positively implanting passionate attachment in themselves in 
Murdoch’s mother-daughter example. Here I argued that we can read Murdoch’s example 
as one in which M cultivates her passionate attachment to D by focusing on what she 
already loves about her, then building upon this by finding resemblances with those other 
aspects of D that M does not yet love. Understanding how the cultivation of our passionate 
attachments works in this way gives us a clue to understanding how the controlling of our 
representations could be involved in this process. Thinking back to Murdoch’s example, if 
the mother-in-law let herself encounter representations of her daughter-in-law in an 
uncontrolled or an unselective sense, she would be less able to cultivate her initial feelings 
of antipathy towards this person. By focusing her attention on those aspects of D that she 
likes, however, M is able to kindle a love relationship with D, one which could be described 
as a process of controlling her representations. By narrowing the parameters of the 
representations that she allows herself to experience, M can foster her love for D, thereby 
cultivating his passionate attachment.     
 
6.2.2   ‘Praemeditatio Malorum’ and ‘Meletē Thanatou’  
 
As discussed in 4.2.2, Foucault tells us that both the ‘praemeditatio malorum’ and the ‘meletē 
thanatou’ were ways to ‘judge each action one is performing in terms of its value’ (1997b 
[1982]: 105). It is this evaluative element that is useful in the project of cultivating our 
passionate attachments because it reveals how passionate attachments can be valued 
relative to moral or prudential considerations, and how they can either be reconciled, 
hierarchised, or subtracted from one another. Indeed, while I suggested that each of the 
Hellenistic schools understood the value of conduct in terms of their ethical ideal, Foucault 
does not offer any such ideal himself, so we can remain open as to what this value is. To 
do this, we should not assume that Foucault is thinking of a value that relates to any 
particular dimension of practical reasoning, but rather that he is thinking of value in terms 
of how the action concerned contributes to the resolution to the Socratic question in 
general. Both these exercises were concerned with changing the conditions of our 
evaluative perception, so that we could see a particular aspect of our life with greater 
clarity in terms of its contribution to our life as a whole. Despite this similarity of aim, both 
exercises function differently, however, so we must deal with them separately to best 
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determine how they can be useful in the project of cultivating our passionate attachments. 
To recall, in the praemeditatio malorum, a person envisages the very worst life events that 
could befall them. This person might, for instance, recall each of their most cherished 
prudential desires, and imagine that they will remain perpetually unsatisfied. Or this 
person might imagine each of their passionate attachments perishing, those things from 
which they draw their life-purpose and sense of identity.  
Thinking about the mental state precipitated by this exercise helps explain how it 
could be enlisted into a practical method aiming to cultivate our passionate attachments. 
Practising this exercise brings the person’s passionate attachments under intensified 
scrutiny, allowing us to better discern the role the person reflectively thinks they should 
play in their resolution to the Socratic question. In 2.3.1, I noted that knowledge of our 
passionate attachments is often inaccessible to us because of their complexity, 
interconnectedness, and the manifold roles they play in our practical lives. We value 
knowledge of our passionate attachments precisely because of this, but accessing this 
knowledge is not easy. Take, for example, a person musing over whether her partner is a 
bona fide passionate attachment. While introspecting, she realises that there are many 
different considerations that bear upon how she has resolved the question of ‘how one 
should live’ with this person, but she cannot be certain about which considerations 
motivate her current resolution. She feels some moral obligation to stick with her partner, 
she also feels moved by prudential considerations relating to her own well-being and her 
desire to start a family, and the strength of both these considerations leave her wondering 
whether she is passionately attached to her partner. The praemeditatio malorum could be 
thought of as offering a way to answer this question, which could in turn affect how the 
woman resolves the question of ‘how one should live’. When agonising over whether it is 
her partner whom she loves, or simply his ability to father her children, for example, she 
might be able to discover what she thinks about this by envisaging a situation in which her 
partner could not be her biological co-parent for medical reasons. Envisioning such a 
situation might allow the woman to realise that her passionate attachment to her partner 
is not strong enough to sustain a childless relationship, or –  perhaps more happily – it 
might precipitate her realisation that she loves this man no matter what. Whatever the 
result, the exercise seems to directly facilitate the woman’s knowledge of her passionate 
attachments in a way that her previous attempts at straightforward introspection failed to 
do.117  
                                               
117 See my discussion of Frankfurt’s arguments in 2.1 on why introspecting about what we care about 
is notoriously unreliable.  
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In a similar manner, the meletē thanatou could be enlisted to precipitate insights 
into the role our passionate attachments have in our current resolution to the Socratic 
question. As I showed when discussing Foucault’s account of this exercise in 4.2.3, the 
practitioner envisages their own death in order to generate deep-level reflection on how 
they are currently living their life. As Foucault puts it, this exercise offers the ‘possibility 
of looking back, in advance as it were, on one’s life’, and this is what allows the practitioner 
to assess the ‘value’ of each action they perform (1997b [1982]: 105). To understand how 
this might contribute to the cultivation of our passionate attachments, we need to imagine 
how thinking of our own finitude might be able to elucidate how we value our current 
passionate attachments, or might even galvanise the person concerned into prioritising a 
previously neglected passionate attachment. How might this work?   
There are traces of this kind of reasoning at work in the quotation from Gauguin’s 
journal, used as the epigraph to the previous chapter. Here Gauguin connects his 
commitment to his ‘end in life’ to his awareness that ‘[l]ife is hardly more than the fraction 
of a second’, noting that this leaves ‘[s]uch little time to prepare oneself for eternity!’ (1936 
[1898]: 18). In the meletē thanatou we are made to realise that, as finite creatures, our 
resolution to the Socratic question is one that is bounded by rigid temporal limits. Perhaps 
deathbed regrets about how one has chosen to live are not uncommon precisely because 
resolving the Socratic question is a difficult process, one in which one constantly risks a 
subset of considerations dominating. These regrets take the form of wishing that they had 
emphasised different considerations in their resolution to the Socratic question (moral 
ones, for instance), but at other times they can express a last-minute worry about the 
neglect of the person’s passionate character. In Bronnie Ware’s 2012 book, The Top Five 
Regrets of the Dying, for example, participants often reported wishing that they had devoted 
less time to their jobs and careers. Couched in the terms of my study, we can say that they 
regretted resolving the Socratic question in the way that they did because they gave too 
much importance to a particular kind of consideration. Envisaging our mortality may well 
precipitate thoughts regarding the amount of time we have left to devote to our various 
projects, especially as the projects that ground our semantic horizons are often able to be 
neglected in a way that the more pressing demands of prudential or even moral 
considerations cannot.118  
                                               
118 Variations of this exercise have been proposed by other traditions that deal with self-directed 
character change. The celebrated self-help theorist Stephen Covey proposes that a version of this 
exercise can get our prudential considerations into focus (2013 [1989]: 45). Interestingly, in 2017 an 
internet application was developed that sends users five randomly-timed reminders of their eventual 
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6.2.3   ‘Hupomnemata’  
 
In 4.2.3 I showed that Foucault’s account of hupomnemata emphasises that this practice did 
not simply aim to record or represent the life of the practitioner. Instead, hupomnemata 
comprised collections of notes and fragments that acted as a highly personalised practical 
guide for ongoing self-development. Hupomnemata were assembled diachronically 
(usually over months or years), and cataloged whatever was regarded as pertinent to the 
practitioner’s way of life. It was not only personal observations, however. It comprised 
highly personalised endoxa – a bricolage of the ‘already said’, as Foucault puts it – for the 
purpose of ‘shaping the self’ (1997 [1983a]: 211). The practice of hupomnemata can be viewed 
as consisting in two parts. On the one hand, it functioned as a repository of practical texts 
that aimed to further self-cultivation and the practitioner’s resolution to the Socratic 
question. On the other hand, it served as a reflective forum to analyse and evaluate the 
insights generated from other exercises of self-cultivation. So could a text-based practice 
that is modelled on the Hellenistic interest in hupomnemata be enlisted into the project of 
cultivating our passionate attachments? And, if so, how might this operate? 
     In speculating how the practice of writing hupomnemata could be enlisted to 
cultivate our passionate attachments, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which 
the original Hellenistic version of this practice already was concerned with the self-
directed development of our love relationships. As I showed in Pt. II, all the Hellenistic 
schools recognised the passionate attachments as significantly impacting on our resolution 
to the Socratic question, invariably emphasising their dangers. Yet, in opposition to the 
unyielding view of traditional Anglophone scholarship, Nussbaum argues that the 
Hellenistic schools evaluated the passionate attachments in sophisticated and nuanced 
ways, which I used to support my contention that they viewed them as amenable to 
cultivation, even if this was invariably understood as extirpation. While the passionate 
attachments were worrisome because of their propensity to generate malign pathē, the 
issues regarding them were fiercely debated. We saw this most forcefully in 3.1.2, when I 
explored the theoretical arguments between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but in 4.2.3 the 
issue came up again when I discussed the value of friendship, and the role it had in 
correspondence. Looking at extant hupomnemata reveals that these documents did indeed 
contain much discussion of the passionate attachments. So how could the extended written 
reflection on the passionate attachments comprise their cultivation, in the terms laid out in 
Ch. 5? How might such a process work? 
                                               
death. As Brooklyn-based developer Hansa Bergwall notes, this is based on a folk Bhutanese saying 
that we should contemplate death five times a day to find happiness. 
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The first reason we might think that hupomnemata are especially well suited to the 
cultivation of our passionate attachments is because of their dual role. Not only did these 
texts function as a repository of previously written practical advice, they were also a forum 
in which the practitioner could analyse and evaluate the insights generated from other 
exercises of self-cultivation. Since these exercises were complex, there would be much to 
be gained from sustained reflection on each of Foucault’s other pratiques de soi and Hadot’s 
exercices spirituels, especially if this took place across a long period. Take, for example, my 
discussion of a person who practices the praemeditatio malorum in order to explore their 
passionate attachment to their family in 6.2.2. This exercise, I suggested, has the potential 
to generate insights relating to this person’s passionate attachments because it enhances 
their perceptive power of specific attachments in their life. The exercise of meletē thanatou 
has similar powers, as I proposed when discussing Ware’s account of the wishes of 
terminally-ill patients. By practising these exercises, we may hope to become better at 
letting our resolution to the Socratic question accommodate our passionate attachments 
correctly. Without doing this, our conduct may not be aligned with our resolution to the 
Socratic question, and we are in danger of overemphasising one kind of consideration or 
another (as Ware’s patients regretted overemphasising prudential considerations). By 
recording the insights that these exercises generate, however, we have reason to think that 
we would be better able to build up an accurate picture of the passionate attachments we 
have, and our motivations for pursing them further. We would also be better able to detect 
considerations that still function as action-guiding despite us no longer caring about them.  
Compiling the insights generated by the praemeditatio and meletē thanatou may also 
help the practitioner to discover correlations and overlaps in their passionate attachments, 
or to be able to discern that they are pursing two – perhaps mutually exclusive – passionate 
attachments that can never be reconciled. To use an example from outside the Hellenistic 
tradition, we could consider Nietzsche’s recommendation in Schopenhauer as Educator 
when he asks us to visualise on ‘what have you truly loved up to now? what has drawn 
your soul aloft? what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it?’ While here Nietzsche 
only proposes that we ask ourselves these questions sporadically in order to discover what 
we care about, this process would surely be even more effective if we were able compare 
our answers over a significant span of time. After asking this, he recommends that the 
practitioner should: 
 
Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and 
their sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own 
true self: Compare these objects one with another, see how one 
completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they 
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constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself 
as you are now (1997 [1873]: 129) 
 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on a comparison between our ‘revered objects’ in this passage 
suggests that diachronically tracking our passionate attachments could allow us to discern 
the common denominator that connects them. Isolating a common denominator that links 
previously pursued passionate attachments may well give rise to valuable insights into 
what future attachments one would do well to pursue, as well as invaluable recollections 
of how it was to pursue a certain passionate attachment, the problems of doing so, and the 
resultant satisfaction, et cetera. We can see what previously worked, what didn’t, what 
satisfied us, and so on. Because passionate self-cultivation must be an ongoing process, the 
documenting of this process in  hupomnemata will yield insights that have a long range and 
span. We do not ask the Socratic question once and once only, but are in a continual process 
of development, so the hupomnemata are eminently suited to tracking such a long-term 
process. 
In addition to the merits of extended personal observation, we might also think 
that hupomnemata can be enlisted into the project of cultivating our passionate attachments 
because of their aim to produce a highly personalised life guide. In 2.3.1 I argued that 
knowing our passionate character is highly valued because it gives rise to a level of self-
knowledge that is at least as illuminating as knowledge of our moral character. Given that 
passionate attachments are so personal, then targeted advice on cultivating this 
idiosyncratic aspect of our character will be valuable. This fits with how hupomnemata were 
often used to fuel the active epistolary tradition in the Hellenistic world. As I discussed in 
4.2.3, writing to others who were also concerned to cultivate themselves enabled the 
correspondents  to compare notes, and to exchange useful information. Discussing the 
cultivation of our passionate character with others in such a forum offers the possibility of 
questioning, interrogating, and critically evaluating our own process of cultivating our 
passionate attachments, while allowing our correspondent to do the same. Circumstantial 
evidence for this is perhaps provided by the fact that discussion of our passionate 
attachments with long-term friends and family members often yields insights that we 








6.3   Enlisting Hadot’s Exercices Spirituels 
 
In 4.3 I examined Cooper’s criticisms of Hadot’s conception of exercices spirituels, a 
conception Cooper criticises for being only loosely philosophical because of the wide remit 
and inclusivity of the exercises. Here I noted that these criticisms are analogous to those 
Nussbaum makes of Foucault. Both Cooper and Nussbaum employ a conception of 
philosophical thought that is anachronistically applied to the Hellenists, which we can see 
by considering how many of the canonically endorsed philosophers employed what today 
would be considered to be non-philosophical methods. As I emphasised in my discussion, 
neither Foucault nor Hadot restrict themselves to exercises of self-cultivation that would 
be considered philosophical in the modern sense of the word, and the exercises they pick 
out would be unlike anything on a modern philosophical syllabus. Nevertheless, I have 
argued that Foucault’s exercises of self-cultivation can be enlisted into a practical account 
of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. These exercises offer a methodological 
contribution to the theory I outlined in Ch. 5 by showing how we can practically cultivate 
our passionate attachments. The next section examines whether Hadot’s exercices spirituels 
can add anything to this practical account of how we can cultivate our passionate 
attachments. I discuss the Hellenistic exercises Hadot focuses on in the order I presented 
them in 4.3. 
 
6.3.1   ‘Generalised Research’ 
 
Hadot’s account of the Hellenistic practice of ‘generalised research’ shares affinities with 
Foucault’s of hupomnemata. Focusing on these affinities allows us to see how Hadot’s 
exercise could also be usefully enlisted into the project of cultivating our passionate 
attachments. Just as hupomnemata involves collecting the ‘already said’, and critically 
sifting this source material into a personalised guide for living, Hadot’s generalised 
research involves both ‘reading (anagnosis)’ and ‘listening (akroasis)’ to assemble a 
collection of insights pertaining to self-directed character development. Similarly, to 
hupomnemata, generalised research also involves an introspective aspect as it includes 
‘attention (prosoche)’, which has the potential to facilitate first-personal observations of how 
the practitioner’s passionate attachments have chronologically developed. Nevertheless, 
in addition to the features it shares with hupomnemata, generalised research has another 
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important aspect, one that is solidly empirical and research-orientated.119 In what follows, 
I argue that it is this empirical aspect of the practice that makes it especially well suited to 
the cultivation of our passionate attachments. How might this work?  
Hadot’s description of this exercise is brief and schematic, so my account here is 
speculative rather than reconstructive. Despite this, even a speculative approach shows 
how this exercise could provide a platform that could be developed in ways that would 
lend themselves to the cultivation of the passionate attachments. This is because this 
exercise is not only a passive accumulation of the ‘already said’, but it also involves actively 
acquiring new knowledge that may be pertinent to the practitioner’s resolution to the 
Socratic question. As well as the aspects of generalised research that are shared with 
hupomnemata, mentioned above, Hadot mentions that this exercise includes ‘research 
(zetesis)’ and ‘thorough investigation (skepsis)’. Generalised research is more outward-
orientated than assembling previously articulated philosophical insights because it is 
concerned with any information that could enhance the cultivation of the self.  We can see 
how the active dimension of generalised research could be especially important in 
cultivating our passionate attachments by thinking back to the reasons we are highly 
motivated to cultivate our passionate attachments, which I explored in 2.3. Here I argued 
that we have reason to seek knowledge of our passionate attachments (2.3.1), that our 
passionate character changes chronologically (2.3.2), that the passionate attachments we start 
life with are contingent (2.3.3), that we have a desire to integrate our passionate attachments 
(2.3.4), and that whatever passionate attachments we have will be inherently fragile (2.3.5). 
Although the first of these considerations would perhaps be best met from the 
introspective processes associated with hupomnemata, the last four give us reason to think 
that the active dimension of generalised research could be useful in the process of 
cultivating our passionate attachments. Passionate attachments are externally situated 
entities, so cultivating them involves being knowledgeable about things outside ourselves 
in a way that requires us to move beyond our power to introspect.    
 In 2.3.2, I emphasised that we often find ourselves experimenting with potential 
entities in order to become passionately attached, even if we do not employ a formalised 
practical method of doing so. The person who decides to leave an unhappy marriage may 
throw themselves into other activities for the purpose of experimenting with what 
potential passionate attachments they could take up. Formalising this process by adopting 
a practical method to cultivate their passionate attachments might have tangible benefits. 
                                               
119 The empirical dimension of this exercise sits uncomfortably with Hadot’s criticisms of the lack of 
philosophy in Foucault’s account of Hellenistic self-cultivation because, as Hadot presents it, 
generalised research is overwhelmingly empirical rather than philosophical.  
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Researching potential passionate attachments, in the manner Hadot outlines in his account 
of generalised research, would be valuable because it helps us understand what potential 
passionate attachments are out there. It gives a framework to compare them to our current 
passionate attachments, and to test how they could feature in our future resolution to the 
Socratic question. Combining an active process of self-cultivation with the more 
introspective processes also included in the idea of generalised research could mutually 
enrich one another. Understanding how previous passionate attachments have affected 
our resolution to the Socratic question positively or negatively could provide invaluable 
insights to evaluate the merits or otherwise of other speculative passionate attachments.  
 We might also think there are reasons why generalised research into potential 
passionate attachments would help us cultivate them effectively because of what I said 
about the contingency of our passionate attachments, which I explored in 2.3.3. Here I 
argued that we are initially introduced to passionate attachments before our critical and 
evaluative faculties are fully developed, so although our passionate attachments begin as 
contingent, self-directed cultivation offers us the possibility of finding those that we find 
more satisfying. The outward-orientated aspect of generalised research offers us a way to 
think about doing this. By comparing our existing passionate attachments with other 
potential attachments, we can come to recognise that the passionate attachments we have 
are largely contingent. By doing this we will be better able to situate our current 
attachments within an evaluative context that is populated by other potential attachments. 
Such an evaluative context can only be established once we know what other potential 
passionate attachments are out there, however, and doing this requires us to embark upon 
an outward-looking process of generalised research. Doing this helps us escape the 
contingency of the passionate attachments with which we are initially surrounded, and – 
especially if these passionate attachments are inappropriate or toxic – brings us closer to a 
greater measure of flourishing.  
 In 2.3.4 I noted that we have a strong desire to integrate our passionate 
attachments, which I suggested is a reason for developing a theory of the cultivation of our 
passionate character. Generalised research offers us a way to think about how this could 
be practically achieved, one which combines both the reflective dimension of this practice 
and its more outward-looking aspect. Reflecting on our previous passionate attachments 
reveals what our passionate attachments are, but to discover whether these attachments 
are integratable with one another often requires an experimental approach. Speculatively 
considering a certain passionate attachment would benefit from such a process. In this case 
we may want to research its compatibility with other attachments, or the other 
considerations that bear upon our resolution to the Socratic question. This would be 
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benefitted by a process of generalised research that is focused on the passionate attachment 
concerned.  
 Most importantly, however, we can consider a practice of generalised research to 
be important when we lose a cherished passionate attachment, for example, if we suffer a 
bereavement. In 2.3.5, I discussed how such grief can be ameliorated by seeking out new 
passionate attachments, and – although the process of coming to love again is extremely 
painful – it is often the best chance we have of moving on from our loss. Faced with the 
loss of a partner, a person may find themselves with reason to engage in the practice of 
generalised research to see what new potential attachments there are out there. In these 
cases, the outward orientated dimension of the practice of generalised research will be 
highly valuable in cultivating new passionate attachments, as it will allow us to understand 
what potential passionate attachments are out there, how these share similarities (and 
differences) with previous attachments, and how they can replace the lost passionate 
attachment in our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’.  
 
6.3.2   ‘Focusing on the Present’ 
 
From the beginning of Ch. 3 onwards, I argued that Hellenistic philosophers offer a picture 
of human experience in which we are confused, deluded, and typically estranged from 
those entities that would ensure our flourishing. For these philosophers, we gravitate 
towards entities that generate debilitating pathé which cloud our judgment, and only by 
subjecting ourselves to a strenuous process of self-cultivation can we hope to liberate 
ourselves from these damaging emotions. When exploring Hadot’s account of focusing on 
the present in 4.3.2, I noted that he cites memory of past experiences and the imagination 
of potential future experiences as chronically hampering our ability to discern what is in 
our best interests. The exercise of focusing on the present aims to redirect our perception 
away from our memory and imagination towards an accurate representation of how our 
conduct aligns with our resolution to the Socratic question. Taking this exercise out of the 
Hellenistic context, I propose, shows how this exercise could be enlisted into the project of 
cultivating our passionate attachments by a similar process of suspending the powers of 
memory and the imagination.120 How can we envisage this exercise as contributing to the 
cultivation of our passionate attachments? 
                                               
120 Sellars offers a compelling account of the differences between this Hellenistic exercise and 
contemporary ‘mindfulness’. For Sellars, whereas mindfulness ‘aimed at increasing health, 
happiness and general well-being’, for the Stoics the exercise ensured that the practitioner kept 
‘philosophical principles […] ready to hand’ (2018: 17–18; cf. Sorabji 1997: 197). Just as how modern 
 182 
The Hellenistic philosophers advocated focusing on the present moment because 
it was thought that this would enable those who practised it to see what considerations 
should be action-guiding. Memories or imaginative speculation expands the number of 
images that can give rise to pathé. By focusing on the present moment, then, we not only 
drastically narrow the range of things within our perception to which we can respond, but 
we also limit our focus to those entities that we can have the power to affect. We could 
think of how this exercise has the potential to be enlisted into a practical method of 
cultivating our passionate attachments in a similar way. By filtering out considerations 
pertaining to the past or the future, we strengthen our perceptual faculties in a way that 
allows us to see what we care about more carefully. Given that our passionate attachments 
are in a continual process of change and development (2.3.2), gaining up-to-date 
knowledge of them is both necessary and highly useful. Increasing our ability to know 
what our passionate attachments are is especially useful, therefore, both because these 
kinds of considerations are vitally important to resolving the Socratic question and because 
our passionate character is in a constant process of change.  To take an example from 
literature, Herman Hesse’s Siddhartha describes the process in which after an extended 
process of meditation, one primarily involving focusing on the present moment, the 
narrator decides to dramatically alter his passionate attachments by leaving a life of pomp 
and luxury to join an ascetic community. Under the conditions that focusing on the present 
moment produces, we are better able to see which of our current passionate attachments 
should be reaffirmed, whether we truly love the passionate attachments we have, and 
whether our conduct follows our resolution of question of ‘how one should live’ 
 
6.3.3   ‘View From Above’ 
 
Perhaps there are especially compelling reasons why the view from above could be used in 
a process of cultivating our passionate character compared to the other exercices spirituels 
that Hadot mentions. Understanding why this is the case, we need to recall the social 
dimension of passionate attachments, which I examined in 1.5.3. There I argued that 
because our passionate attachments are part of our practical identities, they need to be able 
to be socially sharable. Entities that are resolutely idiosyncratic would not be able to be 
taken up as a passionate attachment, leading me to dismiss the idea that the hoarder’s 
pursuit of junk could be a passionate attachment in the full sense. Practising the exercise 
                                               
versions of mindfulness have entirely different aims to the Stoic exercise of ‘attention to the present 
moment’, so too my account of how the exercise can be deployed to cultivate our passionate 
attachments has aims that would not be recognised by the Stoics.  
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of the view from above could be said to create the conditions to focus on this social 
dimension of passionate attachments. Imaginatively viewing ourselves in an increasingly 
wider context allows us to see how any passionate attachment we have must be embedded 
in a social context, one which is an essential aspect of the passionate attachment concerned. 
We first encountered this idea in 1.3 when I discussed Wolf’s emendation to Williams’ 
terminology of ‘ground projects’, a term which she argues does not adequately reflect how 
passionate attachments are necessarily deeply enmeshed within social relationships. 
Passionate attachments are either other human beings, or are inexplicable outside of a 
social context constituted by others.  
Viewing our lives from above, along with our resolution to the Socratic question, 
reveals that our passionate attachments cannot be understood as exclusively personal, but 
rather that they are only comprehensible within a social context. Situating our passionate 
attachments within this social context should be considered as an important aspect of 
cultivating them. Furthermore, viewing our passionate attachments in an enlarged social 
context reveals how we do not pursue passionate attachments alone, but that we do so in 
a context in which others pursue their passionate attachments. Viewing our passionate 
attachments in an enlarged social context allows us to see that our passionate attachments 
are often intricately entwined with others, especially in reciprocal relationships where two 
people take each other as a passionate attachment. Viewing our passionate attachments in 
an enlarged context helps us see that they are best pursued when they are comprehended 
as part of a large social context.  
Although the very idea of the self-directed cultivation of character might seem 
individualistic, I stressed in Ch. 3 that the Hellenists regarded self-cultivation as intricately 
connected to a social context, one that typically involved friendship, exemplars, schools, 
and reliance on a corpus of existing literature. In fact, as I argued in 2.2.1, although the 
philosophy of moral self-cultivation shows that self-directed self-cultivation is possible, we 
should not understand this as the isolated cultivation of the person, but rather as showing 
how cultivating ourselves always takes place in a context in which others are present. Like 
the meletē thanatou, viewing our passionate attachments from above reveals to us that how 
our pursuit of them will be limited by surrounding circumstantial factors that are outside 
of our control. The pursuit of passionate attachments always has limitations because our 
passionate attachments are fragile, and our own ability to pursue them is limited. By 
situating our passionate attachments in as broad a context as possible, the exercise of the 




6.4   Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments 
 
This chapter supplements the theory of cultivating our passionate attachments, as outlined 
in Ch. 5, with a practical account of how the Francophone reading of the Hellenistic 
exercises of self-cultivation could be enlisted into such a project. This means that the 
conceptual resources of the Hellenistic tradition have not only been useful to construct a 
theoretical account of cultivating our passionate attachments, but the exercises that 
Foucault and Hadot focus on also offer a practical method that can be applied to passionate 
self-cultivation.  Deploying the Hellenistic source material both goes beyond the historical 
use of these exercises, and how these exercises have been viewed by Francophone 
interpreters. For example, I have acknowledged that using these exercises to offer a 
practical method of cultivating our passionate attachments goes against the three ways that 
Hadot himself suggests that the Hellenistic exercises could be deployed in a contemporary 
context. As noted, Hadot suggests that the exercises provide theoretical and practical 
accounts of how we can (i) extirpate pathē, (ii) understand ourselves to be a connected part 
of the cosmos, and (iii) return to a conception of philosophy as a way of life. Hadot has a 
vital role to play in the project of cultivating our passionate attachments, however, because 
he provides arguments to show why the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation can be 
transposed into new theoretical and practical contexts (3.2.2).  
 In addition to Hadot’s arguments, there is another reason we why should look 
favourably on the idea of applying the exercises of self-cultivation to the cultivation of our 
passionate attachments specifically. In Ch. 1, I followed Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf in 
arguing that resolving the Socratic question required responding appropriately to moral, 
prudential, and passionate considerations, as well as endorsing a conception of the good 
life that recognised that each of these fundamental considerations were necessary for 
human flourishing. Because we can find examples of exercises of self-cultivation in 
practical accounts of moral and prudential self-cultivation, then applying these techniques 
to the cultivation of our passionate character is at least possible in principle. As this chapter 
has argued, there is no conceptual incompatibility with using the Hellenistic exercises of 
self-cultivation in this task, and I have sketched how we can envisage how the exercises 










Self-Cultivation in Practical Philosophy 
 
When making a decision of minor importance, I have always found it 
advantageous to consider all the pros and cons. In vital matters, 
however, such as the choice of a mate or a profession, the decision 
should come from the unconscious, from somewhere within ourselves.  
 
Sigmund Freud 1983 [1913]: vii121 
 
i.   Constructing a Theory of Passionate Self-Cultivation 
 
Contrary to Freud’s assertion above, I have argued that some of the most ‘vital matters’ in 
our practical lives – viz. pursuing passionate attachments – can be actively and reflectively 
cultivated, and that we can locate the conceptual resources for a theory of how to do this 
from the account of self-directed character change found in the Hellenistic tradition. As 
well as positioning myself against Freud’s above remark, doing this places me against 
Frankfurt’s denial that we can cultivate our passionate attachments, and Wolf’s claim that 
– although on occasion we are granted a spike in our capacity to choose them – we cannot 
form a philosophical theory of how we do this. I have called those who think that we 
cannot actively and reflectively cultivate our passionate attachments ‘romantic fatalists’, 
and at least the tenor and tone of Freud’s remark indicates he would be willing to join 
Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf in their view that our passionate attachments are 
impervious to self-directed change. Constructing a theory of cultivating our passionate 
attachments, then, rebuts both key claims of romantic fatalists: first, it demonstrates we can 
indeed cultivate our passionate attachments (contra Frankfurt); second, it shows we can 
formulate a theory of doing so (contra Wolf).  
This is not to say that actively and reflectively cultivating our passionate 
attachments requires, in Freud’s words, ‘consider[ing] all the pros and cons’ (1983 [1913]: 
vii; cited above). Given the value of these kinds of considerations in resolving ‘how one 
should live’, it would be crass to suggest that we can cultivate them merely by tallying up 
the reasons for pursuing this passionate attachment or that. Doing justice to the importance 
                                               
121 Conversation with Theodore Reik in 1913. Reference to Reik 1983 [1913]: vii. 
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of passionate attachments in our practical lives requires that we cultivate them with a 
comprehensiveness, a perseverance, and an urgency that goes beyond weighing their 
relative advantages and disadvantages. Cultivating our passionate attachments does not 
just require us to calculate which passionate attachments we have most reason to pursue. It 
requires that we consistently strive for knowledge of them, that we modify our pursuit of 
them as we grow up, that we upgrade them when we discover better ones, that we strive 
to integrate them with our other commitments, and that we replace them when they perish.  
To construct such a theory, I have proposed that we can locate both the conceptual 
resources for a theoretical account of cultivating our passionate attachments and a practical 
method which can facilitate doing this by examining the Francophone account of self-
cultivation in the Hellenistic tradition. The exercises that Hadot and Foucault focus on in 
their respective accounts of self-directed character change go far beyond Freud’s 
suggestion to ‘consider the pros and cons’, at least when making a minor decision, in terms 
of their sophistication and complexity, but they also differ insofar as they are highly self-
reflective, requiring us to consciously appraise the considerations that bear upon our 
resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’, rather than following the dictates of 
our unconscious. Nevertheless, although conscious, these processes are not especially 
calculative or rationalistic, as Freud’s terminology of ‘pros and cons’ suggests. Rather, as 
well as self-reflectively weighing considerations, they require us to use our memory, 
imagination, and non-cognitive powers to discern what our passionate attachments are, to 
track their growth and decline, to search out new ones, and to seek to reconcile them with 
other fundamental considerations that bear on our resolution to the Socratic question. As I 
explore in the next section, this is not to say that all our passionate attachments can be 
cultivated in this way, since Freud may be right to say that some are guided by unconscious 
mental processes that we cannot actively or self-reflectively control. Nevertheless, in the 
above epigraph at least, Freud overstates his case by telling us that quintessential 
passionate attachments such as the ‘choice of a mate or profession’ can only be decided 
upon by tapping into those unconscious forces that he views as directing the most 
important decisions in our practical lives.  
Freud’s casual remark here is perhaps not representative of the complex 
psychoanalytical story about how we cultivate our passionate character, as I have already 
implied when briefly discussing psychoanalysis in Ch. 2. In fact, in stark opposition to the 
concerns of modern moral philosophy, the importance of our passionate attachments for 
character development and human flourishing has always been a key psychoanalytic 
concern, so recent philosophical interest in this topic could be said to have been anticipated 
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by this tradition for some time.122 Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic theorisation of our 
passionate character is usefully supplemented by a philosophical one, such as the one I 
have outlined above. This is partly because the psychoanalytical story contains more 
governing assumptions than a philosophical theory of passionate self-cultivation, making 
it difficult to discern what is common between it and other methods of cultivating our 
passionate character. Most obvious is the fact that psychoanalysts invariably privilege 
passionate attachments with an erotic dimension, as they view unconscious libidinous 
energy as the actual cause of all passionate attachments we take up. Such assumptions, 
could be said to skew how psychoanalysts view the cultivation of our passionate 
attachments, both in theory and in practice. It is the source of Freud’s theoretical assertion 
that in ‘vital matters’ – that is, when seeking to resolve ‘how one should live’ – we must 
look to the unconscious, as well as seeping into the practical methods that psychoanalysts 
advocate for doing this, such as the practice of transference.   
Enlisting the conceptual resources from the Hellenistic tradition gives us a 
remarkably different set of tools with which we can cultivate our passionate attachments. 
I have argued that the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation that Foucault and Hadot pick 
out as especially important provide a practical method that can be applied to the 
cultivation of our passionate attachments, one that is relatively unfreighted with 
theoretical assumptions. In fact, Hadot’s arguments for the transposability of the 
Hellenistic exercises shows how they can operate independently of a theoretical 
framework, a claim that both he and Foucault use to support the idea they can be enlisted 
to solve contemporary problems. I have emphasised that neither Hadot, Foucault, or the 
Hellenistic philosophers understood the exercises as having this function. Rather the 
opposite is the case. As I have argued, historically speaking, the Hellenists regarded the 
spiritual exercises of self-cultivation as having a variety of functions, including the 
extirpation of the pathē, but this historical fact need not limit the exercises to this role. 
Instead of adjudicating between the various interpretations of how the Hellenists 
understood the exercises, I have focused on those aspects of them that are most useful for 
a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments, especially on those arguments that 
these theorists offer for their respective claims that Hellenistic self-cultivation has potential 
contemporary applicability.  
Constructing a theory of passionate self-cultivation in this way, makes good on 
Hadot’s and Foucault’s claims that Hellenistic philosophy has relevance to our own era, 
but it does so in a way that goes beyond their own research trajectories. Given their fervent 
                                               
122 As psychoanalyst Hans Loewald writes, ‘becoming a person is [a matter of the] development of [a 
person’s] love life’ (Loewald 1978; cited by Harcourt 2011: 82).    
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claims regarding the relevance of Hellenistic self-cultivation for contemporary philosophy 
and practical life, it may be that they would support of such a project, although I have not 
speculated on this since reconstructing their respective claims is not the aim of this thesis. 
Rather I have focused on these Francophone thinkers because they locate the conceptual 
resources to rebut the claims of romantic fatalists such as Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf. 
Not only do Hadot and Foucault give detailed attention to the widespread potential of 
practices of self-shaping in the Hellenistic world, Hadot’s proposal that we return to the 
Hellenistic conception of philosophy as a way of life requires that he provides arguments 
as to why the exercises can be transposed to solve problems in our own era. Although 
Hadot’s major claim does not directly contribute to the philosophical concerns of his thesis, 
I have proposed that his arguments show that Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation need 
not be restricted to their historical use and function, because they can be transposed to 
provide the conceptual resources to solve new problems in contemporary philosophy and 
practical life.  
From this we can see that we do not have to follow the imperatives of romantic 
fatalists when they say that what we love has been decided for us. Neither do we need to 
accept the various causal stories they offer to explain why we have the passionate 
attachments we have. Rather, as I have argued, some of the most important passionate 
attachments in our practical lives are amenable to self-cultivation. Given that these 
passionate attachments are so important in our practical lives, it is reasonable to want to 
attend to their growth and development to the best of our abilities. But I have also argued 
that some passionate attachments – a romantic partner, for example – require that we 
actively choose who this person will be because this type of relationship cannot be entered 
into passively, or on the basis of non-passionate considerations. Constructing a theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments allows us to bring philosophical insight to bear on 
how we can do this, both demonstrating what passionate self-cultivation has in common 
with other ways of cultivating the self, and also showing what makes it distinctive.  
 
ii.   The Limits of Passionate Self-Cultivation 
 
Although I have argued that there is good reason for practical philosophers to offer a 
theory of how we cultivate our passionate attachments, I have not claimed that all our 
passionate attachments are amenable to cultivation, or that all aspects of passionate 
character can be developed in a self-directed way. This means that although I have denied 
Frankfurt’s view that ‘[w]hat we love is not up to us’, I only have done so because this 
claim is too sweeping (2004: 49). Contra Frankfurt, I have argued that at least some of what 
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we love is up to us because many our passionate attachments can be cultivated, as well as 
arguing that these passionate attachments are some of the most significant in our practical 
lives. Frankfurt may be right that we harbour a core of passionate attachments that remain 
impervious to self-directed development, so circumscribing these attachments usefully 
clarifies the parameters of my theory of passionate self-cultivation. So what passionate 
attachments might be un-cultivatable? And how might these attachments differ from those 
which I have argued are amenable to self-directed development, such as, contra Freud, the 
‘choice of a mate or a profession’ (1983 [1913]: vii; cited above)? 
 We first encountered the contention that some passionate attachments are 
impervious to cultivation in 2.2, when I discussed Plato’s and Aristotle’s insistence that 
our moral character must be cultivated at an early age. Since this is only effective when the 
person is in infancy, adolescence, and early adulthood, the process is required to begin 
before we acquire the requisite faculties for self-directed development, so our parents, 
guardians, and teachers must take charge of cultivating us morally on our behalf. In 2.3.2, 
I argued that this dimension of moral self-cultivation cannot be grafted on to a theory of 
cultivating our passionate attachments because our mature passionate attachments cannot 
simply be inculcated into us at a young age because they require faculties that we have yet 
to develop. My later discussion in 5.1.2 aimed to respond to this problem by showing that 
the cultivation of our passionate attachments cannot begin too early because it requires 
‘self-direction’. Not only is it impossible to cultivate certain mature passionate attachments 
too early (sexual ones, for example), certain passionate attachments require 
correspondingly mature faculties to be successfully assimilated into the person’s life. As 
noted in 5.1.2, it is an important dimension of romantic love that we choose our beloved 
ourselves, which requires the kind of autonomous faculties I termed as ‘self-direction’.   
 While Frankfurt intends his view that ‘[w]hat we love is not up to us’ to apply 
across the board, he does offer some reasons why certain passionate attachments may be 
considered to be impervious to our self-direction, and why the cultivation of such 
attachments is unnecessary. Both ‘caring about our children’ and caring ‘about our own 
lives’ are, Frankfurt claims, ‘biologically embedded in our nature’ (2004: 29–30). We cannot 
cultivate such passionate attachments because they ‘naturally grip us’ with a ‘practically 
inescapable power’, and those who strive to free themselves from such attachments, either 
deliberatively or by simply neglecting them, betray ‘our fundamental expectations 
concerning human nature’ to such a degree that we are justified in ‘regard[ing] them as 
pathological’ (2004: 84). Indeed, much support for Frankfurt’s view comes from 
psychological literature on attachment, which emphasises the persistence of early infantile 
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attachments, explaining it with a story about the biological and psychological processes 
that govern human behaviour.  
Nevertheless, much of this literature is also concerned with what happens when 
our passionate attachments go wrong, and how developing strong and stable bonds, even 
with our own children, is not something that can be guaranteed.123 This means that 
Frankfurt’s picture could strike us as too sanguine, as it does not do justice to the messiness 
– nor what can be the tragedy – of the practical lives of human beings, even regarding so-
called stable attachments such as their own children. Although Frankfurt is right to say we 
should be troubled by those who ignore considerations generated by these kinds of 
passionate attachments, unfortunately it is not uncommon for people to do precisely this. 
Given that passionate attachments are so fundamental to our flourishing, we should be 
continually wary of underestimating the extent to which they can be cultivated, otherwise 
we will routinely neglect a means to increase our flourishing in a self-directed sense. 
Despite the limits of cultivating our passionate attachments, we should strive to cultivate 
those we can as much as possible by improving, modifying, and upgrading them. It is 
surely better to overestimate our power to cultivate our passionate attachments, because 
the danger of underestimating our power to do this is that it becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  
 
iii.   Prospects for a Comprehensive Theory of the Self-Cultivation  
 
In Ch. 1, I followed Frankfurt’s, Williams’, and Wolf’s arguments that modern moral 
philosophy ignores or neglects the passionate attachments, so cannot fully understand 
human flourishing. Despite this, in Ch. 2, I explored how these very same philosophers 
argue that, although vitally important, our passionate character can neither (i) be cultivated 
(Frankfurt), or (ii) be theorised (Wolf), claims which I countered by arguing (i) we have 
reason to think we can cultivate our passionate attachments (2.3), and (ii) we can model a 
theory of passionate self-cultivation on existing theories of how we cultivate ourselves 
morally and prudentially (2.2). Following my arguments that our passionate character is 
amenable to self-cultivation, and its cultivation can be theorised, I proposed that we can 
locate the conceptual resources to underwrite a theory of passionate self-cultivation in the 
Hellenistic tradition. 
                                               
123 See Harcourt’s summary of the attachment literature, especially how early secure attachments 
‘make available to the infant a great many other goods’ in later life (2013a: 124). For a concise account 
of the importance of early secure attachment, see John Bowlby’s summary of his own infant 
attachment theory (1982 [1969]: 376–8). 
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In Ch. 3, I examined the differences between Anglophone and Francophone 
readings of Hellenistic philosophy, arguing that the latter holds more conceptual resources 
for a theory of passionate self-cultivation. Both Hadot and Foucault claim that the 
Hellenistic account of self-cultivation has much to offer contemporary philosophy and 
practical life, but, instead of following the ways these thinkers envisage this in their own 
work, I focused on how Hadot’s arguments for the transposabilty of the Hellenistic self-
cultivation underwrite other uses of the conceptual resources of the Hellenistic tradition 
(3.2). Furthermore, in Ch. 4, I argued that the Hellenists not only offer us a theoretical 
account of self-cultivation, but also a practical method to do this, one which is elaborated 
on by Foucault’s informative account of pratiques de soi and Hadot’s account of exercices 
spirituels.  
In Ch. 5, I proposed that the exercises offer us the possibility of transposing the 
Hellenistic account of self-directed character development in two ways: first, we can 
deploy the general theoretical principles on self-directed character change to the 
cultivation of our passionate character in specifically. Second, we can think imaginatively 
about how the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation offer a practical method that could 
be applied to cultivating our passionate attachments. Ch. 5 followed the first way. There I 
employed some of the Hellenistic theoretical insights into self-cultivation to show how we 
can formulate a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. Ch. 6 followed the second 
one. There I argued that the practical exercises of self-cultivation that the Hellenists offer 
can be enlisted into this process, and that these exercises offer a practical method that can 
be applied to cultivating our passionate character. Together these chapters show how the 
Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation make a theoretical and practical contribution to the 
question of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments.  
While a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments can be considered a 
valuable addition to practical philosophy in its own right, it is especially valuable given 
the other accounts of self-cultivation in practical philosophy. Practical philosophers 
already offer detailed theories of self-directed character change for the moral and 
prudential dimensions of our character, so offering an account of cultivating our 
passionate character change complements these theories, making our understanding of 
how self-directed character change operates significantly more comprehensive. Human 
flourishing extends well beyond the parameters laid out for it by modern moral 
philosophers. It is multifaceted, and involves responding appropriately to passionate 
considerations, as well as to moral and prudential ones. We cannot understand our 
practical lives without accounting for all three of these dimensions of our character, so we 
ought to give serious philosophical attention to how we can cultivate each of them. This 
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means that constructing a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments 
usefully adds to existing philosophical accounts of how we cultivate our moral and 
prudential characters. We must not only strive to cultivate ourselves morally and 
prudentially, but must also strive to cultivate our passionate character. This study has 
proposed how this can be done in theory and in practice, and this suggests that a 
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